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The main thrust of this thesis entitled "Concept of 
Freedom in Sartre's and Iqbal's Philosophy" is towards 
investigating the concept of freedom in the philosophies 
of Muhammad Iqbal and Jean-Paul Sartre. These two philoso-
phers present several points of interesting contrast in the 
sense that Iqbal. is an enlightened theist, whereas Sartre is 
a 'committed* atheist. While Iqbal's aim was reconstruction 
of Islamic ideas in the perspective of creative evolution of 
the spirit, Sartre's objective was to develop a social 
philosophy on Marxist lines on the basis of existential 
ontology that marks a significant point of departure in Western 
philosophy. 
There are also similarities between these two philosophers 
which provide a common ground for their conC^trasting philosophies 
Both Iqbal and Sartre were contemporary in outlook, both 
exercised great influence on modern thought and politics and 
most significantly both were concerned deeply with the problem 
of the Individual Man and his freedom to such an extent that 
the conception of freedom could be called as the core issue in 
their philosophical quest. 
In this work an attempt is made to grasp the concept of 
freedom as it emerges in the philosophy of Iqbal and Sartre 
respectively. In order to facilitate this task, the general 
a 
philosophical orientation of both the thinkers has been 
critically expounded. With a view to provide a common 
ground for this comparative study the concept of freedom 
is discussed in its various contexts such as law, politics 
and religion, so as to locate the exact sense in which the 
idea of freedom is the concern of philosophy especially 
th^ philosophy of Sartre and Iqbal. 
Chapter I is devoted to a general discussion of the 
concept of freedom. After taking into consideration various 
meanings and uses of the term freedom, an attempt is made 
to examine the problem in three important fields, viz.. Law, 
Politics and Religion, 
In Chapter II an attempt is made to define briefly 
existential philosophy and to examine the conception of 
freedom in its perspective. Major existentialist themes such 
as human existence, choice, freedom, responsibility, authen-
ticity etc, are briefly discussed with reference to different 
existentialist thinkers. 
Chapter III deals with Sartre's notion of freedom and 
Its implications for individual and society. In this part 
of the work, the effort is made to present the conception of 
freedom as systematically developed by Sartre in all his 
writings, particularly in his major philosophical works such 
as* Being and Nothinffliess, Existentialism and Humanism, Critique 
o£ BiaIiec-&L6al Reason, as well as h±s literary works sticb as 
his triology, The Roads to Freedom; (The Age of Reason, The 
Reprieve, Iron in the Soul); Altona. Men Without Shadows, 
The Flies etc. How Sartre expounds the significance and 
implications of individual's freedom for society is also 
discussed in this chapter. 
Conception of freedom in Muslim Philosophy is discussed 
in Chapter IV. This chapter consists of five sections. Section I 
deals with the socio-political conditions in the early Islamic 
society. How the problem of predestinarlanism and freedom 
(Jabr and Qadar) was raised in early Islamic Ummah and was 
interpreted in the light of the Qur'an, Hadith and other early 
authentic sources such as Nah.j al-Balaghah and al-Kaf i. 
In section II the emergence of "^ ilm al-Kalam (dialectical 
theology) is taken up with special reference to the three 
prominent schools of Muslim Thought, namely the Mu^tazilah, 
the Asha^ 'irah and the Shi^ -ah. In the last three sections the 
conception of freedom in the above three major schools of 
Muslim thought is presented. 
Chapter V of the tehsis is devoted to the analysis of 
Iqbal*s conception of freedom. The following issues have been 
especially discussed: How did Iqbal make a radical break from 
the tradition of Muslim philosophers to reconstruct Islamic 
thought-system according to the need of the time? Why is he 
considered to be an amalgam of Eastern religious insight and 
Western intellectualism (imbibing higher values and ideals from 
the East and philosophico-scientific advancement of the West 
and interpret ing them in the Islamic Weitanschauung according 
to the demands of contemporary philosophical and sc ient i f ic 
outlook)? How does man, according to Iqbal, with his unique 
KhudI and freedom unfold his po ten t ia l i t i es and capab i l i t i e s , 
creat his own world, his ideals and part icipate in the 
Ik. 
creative process of Allah? 
A comparative study of Sartre*s and Iqbal ' s notions of 
freedom is made in chapter VI of the disser ta t ion. Here an 
attempt i s made to highlight the s imilar i t ies and d i s s imi la r i t i e s 
between the two thinkers . The issues par t icular ly discussed 
are: 
a ) . Man's existence and his personal involvement; 
b ) . Anti-intellectualism and anti-impersonal functional-
izat lon of man; 
c)• Alienation and authentic existence; 
d ) . Freedom, c rea t iv i ty and responsibi l i ty. 
Besides the a the i s t i c and the is t ic in terpre ta t ions of 
freedom, other relevant issues such as anguish, love, fac t ic i ty , 
authentici ty, Inauthent ici ty , dread etc , are also discussed. 
Chapter VII i s devoted to a general and c r i t i c a l assessment 
of both the th inkers . Concluding remarks are directed towards 
an appraisal of the approaches of Sartre and Iqbal . 
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FREEDOM : A GENERAL DISCUSSION 
CHAPTER - I 
FREEDOM: A GENERAL DISCUSSION 
(a). What Freedom Is ? 
The problem of 'freedom* has been very crucial in human 
history and culture. Like many other philosophical problems, 
freedom conspicuously has been always a very important point at 
issue. The term "freedom" is very ambiguous, for it is employed 
from various points of view. In the history of philosophical and 
social thought the term "freedom" has a specific use as a moral 
and a social concept. It refers either to circumstances which 
arise in the relations of man to man or to specific conditions 
of social life. Even when so restricted, important differences 
of usage are possible, and most of the political, religious and 
philosophical arguments about the meaning or the nature of freedom 
are concerned with the legitimacy or convenience of a particular 
application of the term. Let us define briefly the term "freedom" 
in order to understand its application in different contexts. 
The term "freedom" is ambiguous like the term "happiness" 
2 
and the term "rationality". It does not, however, have a single 
generic meaning from which the others have been derived, even 
though the several specific meanings of the term are loosely 
associated. "Freedom" as a term is defined in three distinct 
ways: (a), as the absence of external restraint; (b) as the capacity 
1* Encyclopedia of philosophy. Paul Edwards (Editor), The Mac-
Millian and the Free Press, New York, 1967, Vol.3, p.221. 
2, Olson, R.G., An Introduction to Existentialism. Dover Publi-
cations Inc. New York, 1962,p.10A^. 
to do what one wishes; and lastly, (c) as the capacity to do what 
one ought to.Llterally, freedom means 'not in bondage'. It is 
also important to note that the term 'liberty' and 'freedom' are 
frequently used interchangeably. However, freedom has a more 
philosophic connotation, and liberty is most often associated 
with the first of the three above mentioned definitions. In a 
specific sense, it can besaid that, liberty is freedom applied to 
political or legal matters, while freedom can apply to social, 
personal or moral matters as well. 
Freedom in its first two senses as the absence of external 
restraint and as the capacity to do what one wishes as mentioned 
before, could never be absolute. Total absence of external 
restraints is certainly unimaginable. If a man were free to follow 
his own desires completely, there would be continual conflict with 
others resulting into violence. In this condition what one person 
wants to do is often unfair or even harmful to some one else. 
From the earliest times, people have found it practical to live in 
groups. To do this, they restrained some natural desires and 
2 
permitted themselves to be controlled by rules or laws. Thus, 
the word "freedom" according to changing conditions of society 
was interpreted differently in each period of human development. 
1, New Standard Encyclopedia. Standard Educational Corporation, 
Chicago, 1983, Vol. b,pp. F-338-39. 
2. Ibid.,pp. F-338-39. 
In its simplest sense, 'freedom' refers mainly to the 
absence of compulsion or restraint by any external power. Freedom, 
as the absence of constraint or what in the technical term of 
philosophers is called 'coercion' has a special sense and appli-
cation and, therefore, needs to be elaborated at same length. 
According to the above mentioned conception, freedom refers 
primarily to a condition characterized by the absence of coercion 
or constraint imposed on a person by another person. A man is 
said to be free to the extent he can choose his own goals or 
course of conduct and also has the capacity to choose between 
different alternatives available to him. Moreover, he is not 
compelled to act as he would not himself choose to act or is not 
prevented from acting as he would otherwise choose to act, by 
the will of another man,orthe state, or any other authority. Freedom 
in the sense of not being coerced or constrained by another is 
sometimes called negative freedom (or "freedom from"). It refers 
to an area of conduct within which each man chooses his own course 
and is protected from compulsion or restraint. J.S.Mill's essay 
"On Liberty* is perhaps the best well-known expression in English 
of this individualistic and liberal conception of freedom: 
The object of this essay is to assert one very 
simple principle, as entitled to govern absolu-
tely the dealings of society with the individual 
in the way of compulsion and control, whether 
the means used be physical force in the form of 
legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public 
opinion. That principle is, that the sole end 
for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
4 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty 
of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make 
him happier, because, in the opinions of others, 
to do so would be wise, or even right. These 
are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or 
reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreat-
ing him, but not for compelling him, or visiting 
him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To 
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired 
to deter him must be calculated to produce evil 
to someone else. The only part of the conduct of 
anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others. In the part which 
merely concerns himself, his independence is, 
of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign. "1 
When we go into details in explaining the meaning of 
'coercion', we shall have to see its nature and consequences. 
If we confine ourselves to saying that a man is free in so far 
as his action is not coerced by another or external force, it 
is evident that the conception of coercion itself requires some 
consideration. Here an important point may be made by examining 
Bertrand Russell's oft-quoted sentence: "Freedom in general 
may be defined as the absence of obstacles to the realization 
of desires." This definition of freedom hardly goes far 
enough. Because, in this connection, one can imagine an 
example of "an authoritarian society in which rulers have for 
1. Mill, J.S., "On Liberty", (Cf. Man and the State; The 
Political Philosophers, (Ed.) Saxe Commins & Robert N. 
Linscott, Random House, New York, 19A7, pp. 144-45. 
2. Cf. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Op. Clt., Vol. 3, p. 222. 
years been so successful in controlling and manipulating what 
1 
members of the community read and what views they encounter." 
Not only this but the educators also in such a soceity have 
been so subtly and skillfully worked to mould the minds and 
dispositions of the very young, and almost all the citizens 
naturally desire what their rulers desire them to desire, without 
its ever occuring to them that there are alternatives to what 
they are accustomed to or that their freedom to choose has been 
in any way circumscribed. In this way, they are not conscious 
of any obstructions to the satisfaction of desire, and indeed 
no obstructions may exist to the satisfaction of any desire 
they experience. Though what is mentioned is a limiting case, 
yet it directs our attention to the fact that there are various 
such conditions which exist more or less in all societies. We 
would scarcely concede that the members of such a society enjoyed 
any or much freedom. In a word, whatever the society may be, 
coercion, in one form or the other, would be there and complete 
2 freedom in all respects seems impossible. As J.S,Mill puts it: 
Acts, of whatever kind, which without justifiable 
cause do harm to other, may be, and in the more 
important cases absolutely require to be, controlled 
by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, 
by the active interference of mankind. The liberty 
of the individual must be thus far limited; he must 
not make himself a nuisance to other people. ^ 
1. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. O^.Cit., Vol. 3, p. 222. 
2. Ibid., p. 222. 
3. Mill, J.S., "On Liberty", O^. Crt., p. 193. 
6 
F]rom the above discussion one can easily infer two important 
points. First, if the absence of coercion or restraint is a 
necessary condition of being free, coercion must be understood as 
including not only the direct forms such as commands or prohibit-
ions backed by some authority or a supernatural power, but also 
many indirect forms of moulding human view and manupulating it 
or, more genej'ally^  forms of control which are indirect because 
they involve control by certain persons of the conditions that 
determine or affect the alternatives available to others. This 
is in fact, an important extension of 'coercion'. Secondly, 
if liberty means the right of individual choice between the given 
alternatives, then this right in turn Implies that the alternatives 
can be known by those who are to choose; that individual persons 
have the opportunity to understand the character of available 
alternatives and can make deliberate or informed choice. The 
freedom that members of society enjoy will be connected, therefore, 
with the extent to which competing opinions, objectives, modes 
of behaviour, ways of living and so on are, so to speak, on 
display^ and with how freely they can be recommended, criticized 
and examined, and thus the ease with which men can make a 
deliberate choice between them. 
Certainly knowledge or awareness enlarges the capacity 
or faculty of choice and decision. It is an important precondi-
tion of the existence of freedom because knowledge extends the 
capacity for acting freely. Freedom in its positive aspect 
is the activity and the process for choosing onself and acting on 
one's own initiative, and choice can be manipulated as readily 
as it can be coerced. In the strict sense, freedom is not the 
choice of available alternatives only. In certain circumstances 
the extent of the range of available alternatives may be relevant 
to a judgement of the extent of freedom, but in general one can 
talk profitably about both the existence and the extent of 
freedom in a particular society only by taking into account the 
individual and social interests, the capacities, the modes of 
behavior and the ways of living on behalf of which freedom is 
claimed. One has to live in a society, so the exercise of one's 
freedom solely depends upon the situations around him. In this 
connection, A.V.Spakovsky in his book Freedom Determinism 
Indeterminism has rightly remarked: 
...It is also quite natural that the coexistence 
of man with man necessitates certain limitations 
in regard to the social freedom of everybody. 
This coexistence transforms the absolute freedom 
of man as a separate individual, as a separate 
"I", into the coordinated freedom of man as a part 
of human society, as an element of a collective 
"We".2 
He further introduced a formula to pinpoint the crux of the 
problem saying: "My freedom begins where the freedom of another 
man ends, and my freedom ends where the freedom of another man 
begins." 
1. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Op. Cit., Vol. 3, pp. 222-23, 
2. Spakovsky, A.V,, Freedom Determinism Indeterminism, Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hauge,Natherlands, 1963, p. 5. 
3. Ibid., p. 5. 
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( b ) . Freedom of The Will and Determinism; 
As stated before, the word "freedom" refers to the absence 
of coercion or restraint, constraint or compulsion by any external 
power. In an ordinary discourse the word "freedom" indicates that 
a man is free to the extent he can achieve chosen goals with a 
minimum effort. Conversely, to the extent he discovers obstacles 
in his way he is not free. But the problem is that freedom has 
its specific application in different fields. So the connotation 
of freedom in fields like religion, politics, psychology, 
morality^ philosophy, law etc. differs accordingly. Hence "the 
most common meanings of the term" in traditional ( and even in 
modern) philosophizing, holds R.G.Olson, "are known technically 
as 'freedom of self-realization' and 'freedom of indeterminism' 
or 'freedom of the will'". 
Philosophers have long been engaged in debating the issue 
of 'free will' versus determinism. Some argue that will is free, 
while others argue differently, Anthony Kenny, regarding this, 
with the reference to Tolstoy, writes: 
"The problem of free will", said Tolstoy, "from 
the earliest times has occupied the best inte-
llects of mankind and has from the earliest 
times appeared in all its colossal significance. 
The problem lies in the fact that if we regard 
man as a subject for observation from whatever 
points of view theological, historical, 
ethical or philosophical we find the universal 
law of necessity to which he (like everything 
else that exists)is subject. But looking upon 
man from within ourselves man as object of our 
own inner consciousness of self we feel our-
selves to be free."2 
1. Olson, Robert G,, An Introduction to Existentialism, Op.Clt,, 
pp. 100-101. 
2. Cf, Will. Freedom and Power, By Anthony Kenny, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, i575, p. i^b. 
The existence of freedom, holds Kenny, according to Tolstoy, 
was incompatible with the existence of scientific laws. Reason 
or wisdom teaches man the laws of necessity. According to this 
view the consciousness of freedom must at best be the expression 
of the ignorance of laws. "It is necessary to renounce a freedom 
that does not exist and to recognize a dependence of which we 
1 
are not personally conscious." We also find ^ similar view of 
the incompatibility between freedom and determinism in the thought 
of Dr. Johnson, when on rejecting determinism he says: "We know 
2 
our will is free and there is an end on it." 
Generally, the problem of 'free will* or the 'freedom of 
the will' is complicated for various reasons. In the first 
place the traditional formulation of the issue, its very name 
is misleading. To ask whether the 'will* is free assumes that 
there is such a thing as "will" which may or may not be free 
in its activities. Will is really a general term describing 
certain sorts of events (volition) and not the name of an agent 
which performs them. As John Locke remarks: 
For, if it be reasonable to suppose and talk 
of faculties as distinct beings that can act, 
(as we do, when we say the will orders, and the 
will is free,) it is fit that we siKJuld make a 
speaking faculty, and a walking faculty, and a 
dancing faculty, by which these actions are 
produced, which are but several modes of motion; 
as well as we make the will and understanding to 
be faculties, by which the action of choosing 
and perceiving Sre produced, which are but 
several modes-of thinking. And we aay as 
properly say that it is the singing faculty 
sings and the dancing faculty dances, as that the 
will Ghooges..•0 , * 
n—Ibid., p, "m:—^ ~~" •" ' 
2. fbid.. p. t45. 
3 . Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
(Gollected gnd Atmtiftea lay Alexander Campbell F ra se r / , Oxford 
The Clarendon Press , 1894, Vol. I , Book I I , Chapter XXB«pp.321-22 
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In the light of John Locke's definition, it would be 
much better to speak of the 'freedom of the self, that is of 
the person an existing conscious being, than of an abstract 
will. But the problem is that "Free Will" is too well established 
to be dislodged. Moreover, the very expression 'freedom 
of the self (or say personal freedom) might suggest the problem 
of political liberty rather the philosophical and psycholo-
gical problems traditionally associated with the term free will. 
The term "will" is invariably used by psychologists for 
the decision-making process of human mind. Untill the 20th 
century, most psychologists believed that the 'will' was one of 
the three faculties or powers of mind, the other two being emotion 
(feeling) and intellect (thought). They were of the view that the 
intellect guided the will in the making of decisions and choices. 
Most psychologists now believe that the mind acts as a whole^ 
although there are different aspects of the mind such as knowledge, 
attitudes and emotions which interact in mental processes. Thus, 
'will' is any such interaction that results in a decision. Psycho-
logists say that the will is not a separate function of the mind. 
Philosophers of various persuations have long 
debated the issue of freedom and determinism. Some stress that 
the 'will' is free——that a person can act freely, independent 
1. Encyclopedia Britannica, William Benton, Chicago, London etc. 
i$6i, vSl. 9, p. g53o 
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of the influence of outside forces or of his past actions and 
experiences. Others argue that there is no freedom of the will 
that decisions and choices are always controlled or determined 
by past conditions or external causes. So the problem of 'freedom 
of the will versus determinism' is complicated because of various 
points of view that interpret it differently. It would be appro-
priate to give a brief account of the views of the psychologists, 
epistemologists, moral philosophers, jurists, politicians and 
theologians on the problem. 
The psychologist and the epistemologist are mainly interested 
in the apparent conflict between freedom of choice and the usual 
scientific assumption that all things, including mental events, 
are subject to the law of necessity. As indicated before, psycho-
logists say that the "will" is not a separate function of the 
mind and the term itself is considered as unscientific. In the 
world of sciences also there have been different assumptions. 
According to the scientific world-view every thing is determined 
(or say caused) by natural laws. Hence, 'determinism' and often 
•mechanism' are taken for granted in the realm of nature. Harold 
H.Titus writes: 
The universe as a whole and all its parts participate 
in and are governed by an orderly causal sequence. 
Effects follow causes with often predictable regularity. 
The causal sequence is thought to hold not only in 
the physical sciences but in the biological, social, 
and spsychological sciences as well. All these sciences 
have made considerable progress operating on the basis 
of a strict determinism, ' 
1. Titus, H.H., Living Issues in Philosophy. Van Nostrand Reinhold 
Company, New York etc., 1970, p, 182. 
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Many thinKers agree with this thoroughgoing determinism as 
a scientific doctrine. Baron Von Holbech, a French philosopher, 
'I 
holds that "Our volitions and our desires are never in our power." 
In the same context the German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer 
thought that the course of man's life was "as necessarily predeter-
mined as the course of a clock" and that "a man can surely do 
p 
what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills," 
He and his followers hold that "Will is a blind, irrational and 
aimless world primordial principle, similar to Kant's 'thing-in-
itself". Thus, determinism as a scientific doctrine is the view 
that the entire realm of nature, including huftian beings, works 
within an unbroken chain of cauee and effect. In this way, all 
events in the world are fully explained by preceding events. 
According to the exponents of this view, wherever nature has been 
studied, men have found orderly causal sequences that are ruled 
by the law of causation. As Titus describes: 
From such sciences as physics, chemistry, biology, 
psychology, and sociology we discover that man too 
is ruled by cause and effect. His glands, complexes, 
unconscious drives, conditioning, folkways, and 
conventions all influence his life; the whole range 
of hereditary and environmental pressures are ever 
present and are powerful determining factors. ^  
« 
1, Cf, Living Issues in Philosophy. By H,H.Titus, Op.Ci t . . p ,182, 
2 . I b i d . , p . 182. 
3. Dictionary of Philosophy, (ed.) by I.Frolov, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 451. 
4, Titus, H.H., Living Issues in Philosophy, Op. Clt., p. 183. 
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Though many advocates of freedom of choice accept the 
principle of scientific determinism with regard to nature only, 
yet there are some scientists and philosophers who carry the 
notion of determinism with regard to human will also to the extent 
where freedom is completely denied. The example of this view 
of their denial of freedom is vividly found in a famous psycholo-
gist, B.F,Skinner's writings. He says: • 
The use of such concepts as individual freedom, 
initiative, and responsibility has, therefore, 
been well reinforced. When we turn to what 
science has to offer, however, we do not find 
very comforting support for the traditional 
Western point of view. The hypothesis that man 
is not free is essential to the application of 
scientific method to the study of human behaviour. 
The free inner man who is held responsible for the 
behaviour of the external biological organism is 
only a prescientific substitute for the kinds of 
causes which are discovered in the course of a 
scientific analysis. All these alternatives lie 
outside the individual. The biological substratum 
itself is.determined by prior events in a genetic 
process. 
Again, we also find an example of a thoroughgoing determinism 
in the writings of Benedict Spinoza, who says that the "will" is 
a mode or modification of thought and there can be no separation 
between thought and will. He further adds that no volition can 
exist unless it is determined by another cause, this by another 
and so on. An action is free only insofar as the cause of the 
action is wholly contained in the nature and past history of the 
agent. "...All this plainly shows that the decree of the mind. 
1. Skinner, B.F,, Science and Human Behavior, (New York: Macmillan, 
1953), pp. 447- m* 
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the appetite, and determination of the body are coincident in 
nature, or rather they are one and the same thing..." 
Thus, a group of scientists, epistemologists and psycho-
logists is of the opinion that man is determined by the orderly 
causal sequences; his freedom of choice is determined by the laws 
of nature, and all his mental events are subject to a law and 
necessity. 
The moral philosopher is primarily interested in 'free 
will' as a postulate of the moral life. For, according to him, 
if a man is compelled by past circumstances to do what he doesnot wish 
to do and no alternative action is open to him, how can we say he 
ought to have done otherwise or blame him for what he did ? As 
we know, the 'will' is the ability men have of choosing one course 
of action rather than another and that to be free is to be able 
to do as one wills. Jonathan Edwards a metaphysician, theolo-
gian and moral philosopher p^oints out that freedom is compatible 
with determination of the 'will', for if the will were not 
determined, there would be no possibility of moral motivation 
and no sense in praise or blame. In the third part of this 
work known as A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern 
Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of the Will which is Supposed 
to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Voice, Reward and 
Punishment, Praise and Blame', Edwards deals with the question 
1. From "Ethics", Part III, of Spinoza Selections, (ed.) John Wild, 
Scriber's tiew York, 1930, p. 213. 
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whether liberty of the will (in the Armlnlan sense) Is necessary 
to moral agency. The conclusion of this part of his work is 
thus: 
.,,Virtue depends upon necessity; if the person 
could not be moved by exhortations, considerations, 
and inducements, neither virtue nor vice would be 
possible, and neither praise nor blame would be 
sensible. Even the commands of God would have to 
be acknowledged as senseless, if a virtuous soul 
could not be moved by those commands without losing 
its moral freedom, ' 
What is meant to say is that the 'free will' is considered as a 
postulate of the moral life of a human person. As Henery Sidgwick, 
in this regard asserts: 
If a man's actions are mere links in a chain of 
causation which ,..ultimately carries us to 
events anterior to his personal existence, he 
cannot, it is said, really have either merit or 
demerit; and if he has not merit or demerit, it 
is repugnant to the common moral sense of mankind 
to reward or punish even to praise or blame 
him, ...Free Will in relation to moral action 
generally (has)... its importance in relation to 
punishing and rewarding... ^ 
The Jurist also is concerned with the relation between 
'free will' and 'responsibility'. His question is: Can punishment 
be justified if the criminal had no choice but to commit the crime? 
According to the Jurist it is only human existence which can be free 
in any serious sense of the word. Man alone knows and exercises 
his freedom in the world. It is only the human person who has 
the sense of responsibility and can live and die for freedom, 
1, Magill, Frank N., (ed.) Masterpieces of World Philosophy; 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, ^9b^), pp. 505-506. 
2, Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics. (London, Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1967}, (Seventh Edition;, p. 66. 
16 
Broadly speaking, to the Jurist,responsible choice is the essence 
of freedom. "Freedom and responsibility can fully be appreciated 
only as two mutually interpenetrating inberdependent and complemen-
tary requisites of the development of personality," Freedom 
divorced from deep-rooted sense of responsibility deteriorates 
into licentiousness, and responsibility without freedom becomes 
a burden. In a word, being free, a man is responsible for the 
decisions he takes, the choices he makes and the personality he 
shapes for himself. In the words of W, Temple: 
'•it is the responsible exercise of deliberate 
choice which most fully expresses personalityp 
and best deserves the great name of freedom," 
Moreover, freedom is the source of rights and duties for a free 
man, "Freedom brings not only rights but also certain responsi-
bilities or duties, A man released from prison gains freedom, 
but at the same time must face the responsibility of supporting 
himself"-^ because he is responsible for himself and jt£ himself. 
The politician is a«lso interested in 'freedom' and considers 
it as "an ability to achieve chosen goals," In the political 
discussion this sense of the term 'freedom' is the one which most 
often comes to the fore. According to a politician, if a man has 
freedom of speech or freedom of assembly, this means that if he 
chooses to speak or to assemble with others for political purposes 
1. Cf, Sabira K.Zaidi's, Freedom and Responsibility (Part one) 
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 1964, p, 29, 
2, Ibid,, p, 29. 
3. New Standard Encyclopedia, Op.Cit,, Vol, 6, p, F,339. 
4, Olson, Robert G,, Introduction to Existentialism. Op.Cit.. 
p. 100, 
17 
he will encounter no legal obstacles. Thus, because of given 
freedom of speech or assembly, he will not be clubbed by the 
police or thrown in jail. Again, it is said that there can be 
no freedom unless the scope of government is limited. Plainly 
it means that if the government can interfere in every matter 
and if there is no limit to its meddling, then little room is 
left for private life and for personal initiative and choice. 
Ofcourse, this is true and it suggests one way of interpreting 
the idea of political freedom, in which a politician is interested, 
This is as a special case of negative freedom or say negative 
political freedom in which it is "as freedom from constraint by 
2 
government" for using constraints is essential for a government. 
But when a person wants to participate in or support any political 
party, he is, as stated before, free at his will to assemble or 
to express his feelings. Milne underlines the issue: 
There must be freedom to participate actively 
in politics to issue the challenge and put 
pressure on the government to answer it. This 
is the freedom which the members of the citizen 
body have under a representative form of 
government,3 
Lastly, the theologian has a keen interest in the problem, 
since 'free will* seems to involve the denial of God's Omniscience 
and Omnipotence or of His Justice.For, according to the theologian, 
1. Ibid., p. 100. 
2. Milne, A.J.H., Freedom and Rights. (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1968), p. 304. 
3. Ibid., p. 304. 
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if men are truly free to choose, then God cannot foreknow 
their actions or control their choice; but if men are not free 
then God cannot be justified in punishing or rewarding their 
deeds. It means man is sometimes, in some matters, free and 
sometimes in others, determined. This seems to be a rational 
outlook that can be defended in the light of studies on the issue 
in various disciplines. On the contrary, there are theologians 
who consider predestination as a doctrine according to which God 
has decreed every event that was to take place, or at least that 
each man's destiny was fixed by Divine decree. Thus, according 
to this view events in nature as well as human 'will' both are 
determined by God. In this connection, H.H.Titus, in Living 
Issues in Philosophy, writes: 
If God is omnipotent and omniscient that is, 
all-powerful and all-knowing then things must 
be determined by Him. This means that events 
in nature and human conduct, including man's 
will, are determined by the sovereign will of 
God. The view is thus theological and super-
natural in its outlook and emphasis. ' 
So far as the validity of the theological outlook is concerned, 
one finds this view quite appropriate that according to theolo-
2 
gians man is partly free and partly determined. 
The central problems, regarding freedom of the human will 
and determinism, as discussed above, are accurately formulated 
1. Titus, H.H., Living Issues in Philosophy, Op, Cit.. p. 185. 
2, (i). Iqbal, S,M., Secrets of the Self ( Asrar-i-Khudi ), 
Tr.by R.A.Nicholson, (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf,1955), 
p. (Introduction) XXI, • 
(ii). Fazlur Raihaian, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din 
al-Shirazi), (Albany (New York): State University of New 
York Press* 1975), p. 170, 
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by Henery Sidgwick in his book, The Methods of Ethics, in the 
following words: 
And the question which I understand to be 
at issue in the Free Will controversy may 
be stated thus: Is the self to which I 
refer my deliberate volitions a self of 
strictly determinate moral qualities, a 
definite character partly inherited, partly 
formed by my past actions and feelings, and 
by any physical influences that it may have 
unconsciously received; so that my voluntary 
action, for good or for evil, is at any 
moment completely caused by the determinate 
qualities of the character, together with my 
circumstances, or the external influences 
acting on me at the moment including under 
this latter term my present bodily conditions? 
or is there always a possibility of my 
choosing to act in the manner that I know 
judge to be reasonable and right, whatever 
previous actions and experiences may have 
been?1 
After taking into consideration various meanings of freedom^ 
we, in the following pages, propose to examine the problem of 
free will in three important fields viz.. Law, Politics and 
Religion. 
1. Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics, (London, Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1967), (Seventh Edition), pp. 61-62. 
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(l). FREEDOM IN LAW: 
Law has been variously defined by various individuals from 
different points of view and no wonder there is no unanimity of 
opinion regarding the real nature of law. However, it is essential 
to discuss some definitions of law forwarded by some important 
thinkers. 
Generally, the term "Law" means that which is laid down, 
ordained or established. A rule or a principle according to which 
natural and social pehnomena occur is called 'law'. In regard 
to human action law has a different meaning that is applicable 
to both the social and the political norms, which control the 
activities of individual members of the society or state. "Law, 
in its generic sense, is a body of rules of action or conduct 
prescribed by a controlling authority, and having binding legal 
force." It is that which must be obeyed and followed by citizens 
subject to sanctions or legal consequences. "Law is a solemn 
2 
expression of the will of the supreme power of the state" Again, 
law is considered as a system of rules and standards of behaviour, 
established or sanctioned by state authority and the fulfilment 
of those legal rules is forcibly ensured by the state. Therefore, 
it is defined as: 
The body of rules or principles, prescribed by 
authority or established by customs, that a 
state, community, society, or other group 
recognizes as binding on its members. 3 
1« Black's Law Dictionary. By Henery Black; West Publishing Co., 
197^ (Fifth Edition),'p. 795. 
2» Ibid., p. 795. 
3. New Standard Encyclopedia. Op« Cit.. Vol. 8, p. L-104. 
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However, the purpose of Law is mainly to maintain peace and 
order, to define the rights of citizens, to secure Justice, to 
maintain a harmonious culture, to settle conflicting interests 
and finally" to provide means and ways for punishing wrongdoers. 
Some other definitions of law may help us to grasp its fullest 
2 
meaning and purpose. According to Keeton: 
*^'A law is a rule of conduct, administered by those 
organs of a political society which it has ordained 
or the purpose and imposed in the first instance at 
the will of dominating political authority in that 
society in pursuance of the conception of Justice 
which is held by that dominating political authority 
or by those it has committed the task of making such 
rules J' ^ 
Vinogradoff defines law as "a set of rules imposed and enforced 
by a society with regard to the distribution and exercise of 
power over persons and things." 
In the words of Erskine, "Law is the command of a soverign, 
containing a common rule of life for its subjects and obliging 
5 
them to obedience," Green holds: "Law is the system of rights 
c 
and obligations which the state enforces." The most authentic 
definition of law is that of Paton. According to him the term 
1. Ibid., p. L-104. 
2. Cf. Vidya Dhar Mahajan's, Principles of Jurisprudence. (Delhi; 
Eastern, 1955), pp. 82-84. 
3. Ibid., 
4. Ibid.. 
5. Ibid., 
6. Ibid., 
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'law* may be defined from various points of view such as from the 
view-point of the theologian, historian, sociologist, philosopher, 
political scientist or lawyer. Some times the word 'law' is also 
used in a metaphorical sense. Law may be defined, firstly, by 
in terms of its roots in nature, reason, religion or ethics. 
Secondly, it may be defined in terms of its origin in custom, 
precedent or legislation. In the third place, it may be defined 
by its effect on the life of society. Fourthly, it may be 
described by the method of its formal expression or authoritative 
application. In the fifth place, it may be defined by the ends 
that it seeks to achieve. Paton himself defines law in these 
words: 
'^''Law may be described in terms of a legal order 
tacitly or formally, accepted by a community 
that considers it essential to its welfare, and 
which it is willing to enforce by the creation 
of the specific mechanism for securing compliance 
A mature system of law normally sets up that type 
of legal order that is known as the state, but 
we cannot say a priori that without the state no 
law can exist.'TT 
« 
A famous psychologis t , B.F.Skinner i s of the view tha t the 
study of law or jurisprudence i s usual ly concerned with the codes 
and p r a c t i c e s of spec i f ic governments, past or p r e s e n t . l t is also 
concernexl with c e r t a i n quest ions upon which a funct ional ana lys is 
of behaviour has some bear ing. He fur ther says tha t a law 
usual ly has two important f ea tu re s : 
1 . I b i d . , p . 85 . 
Z3 
^'in the first place, it specillces behaviour. 
The behaviour is usually not described topo~ 
graphically but rather in terms of its effect 
upon others the effect which is the object of 
governmental control. ...In the second place, a 
law specifies or implies a consequence, usually 
punishment. A law is thus a statement of a 
conti^ency of reinforcement maintained by a 
governmental agency^ * 
He further adds: 
^'^k law is a rule of conduct in the sense that 
it specifies the consequences of certain 
actions which in term Vule' behaviour/^ 2 
In the light of various definitions given above, we can 
very aptly say that law is a set of rules, body of principles 
or a system of rights and obligations, which in its specific 
sense is enforced by the public or the society with regard to 
the distribution and exercise of power by the state or a political 
authority or the laws makers. 
In law "freedom" is the state of being free. It is self 
determination, absence of restraint and the opposite of slavery. 
According to the advocates of the freedom of 'will', will is the 
power of acting in the character of a moral personality without 
a check, hinderance or prohibition other than such as may be imposed 
by just and necessary laws and the duties of social life. 
ks stated earlier, in every discipline of life, freedom 
has its specific sense. In Law freedom means 'exemption from 
1. Skinner, B,F,, Science and Human Behavior, Op. Cit., p. 339. 
2« Ibid., p. 359. 
3 - Black ' s Lav Dictionary. Op. C l t . . p . 597-
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extraneous control' freedom from all restraints except such 
as are justly imposed by law. Hence, it is freedom from 
restraint, under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of 
the same right by the others. Freedom is regulated by law. It is 
'•the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable 
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the 
community'! Again, in law, as indicated before, freedom is the 
power of the 'will' to follow the dictates of its unristricted 
choice, and to direct the external acts of the individual without 
restraint, coercion or control from other persons. 
The term "will" in law is a written document in which a 
person w^ho is called 'testator' tells what he wants to do 
with his property after his death. A 'will* may also cover 
rightly guardianship of minor children and the administration of 
an estate. It must meet certain legal requirements and should 
be phrased in such a way that the person's or testator's 
intentions are clear. In law it is specifically visualized that 
the person who makes a 'valid will' must be mentally competent 
at the time it is drawn up, and must fully and consciously under-
stand the effect of what he does. It is still generally accepted 
that the right to make a 'will' is really a privilege granted by 
a statute, not an inherent constitutional or fundamental right. 
Consequently, specific laws, which generally vary from state to 
2 
s t a t e and country to country govern the making of w i l l s . 
1 . I b i d . , p . 827. 
2, New Standard Encyclopedia. Og. Cit,, Vol. 17, p. W-212. 
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This is what the term 'will' means in law. Though the legal 
sense of will is not relevant to our present study, it, however, 
underlines the testator's mental competence and liberty, which 
are essential for the exercise of human 'will' in moral sphere 
too. 
Generally, instead of 'freedom' the word 'liberty' is 
9 
used in its specific connotation in law: 
"The word 'liberty' includes and comprehends 
all personal rights and en;5oyment. ...It 
embraces freedom from duress, freedom from 
governmental interference in exercise of 
intellect, in formation of opinions, in the 
expression of them, and^in action or inaction 
dictated by judgement." 
Liberty has two sides p^ositive and negative. On its 
positive side, liberty denotes the fullness of individual 
existence or his obligation to do something, while on its negative 
side it denotes his right to do nothing or be left alone, or the 
necessary restraint on all,vAiichis essentially required to promote 
the greatest possible amount of liberty for each. 
The word "liberty" as used in the constitutions means, in the 
negative sense, freedom from restraint; but in the positive sense, 
it involves the idea of freedom secured by the imposition of 
restraint. It is in this positive sense that the state, in the 
exercise of its police powers, promotes the freedom of all by 
the imposition upon particular persons of restraints which are 
deemed necessary for the general welfare of humanity. 
1. Black <3 Lav Dictionary, op. cit.. p. 827. 
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Moreover, the term 'liberty' when used in constitutional 
sense, devotes different aspects prescribed within that very-
constitution and the citizens have the right to exercise their 
freedom in the light of that framework: 
(Liberty) means more than freedom of action, 
freedom to own, control and use property, 
freedom to pursue any lawful trade, business 
or calling, and freedom to make all people 
contracts in relation thereto, '' 
The term (liberty) is Used in the sense of expression, 
rights, liberties and franchises and also^ 'as a word of the same 
general class and meaning with those words and privileges. This 
use of the term is said to have been strictly conformable to its 
sense as used in Magna Carta and in the English declarations of 
rights, statutes, grants etc."^ 
Thus, in a derivative sense, the people, the place, district 
or boundaries within which a specific franchise is enjoyed, an 
immunity claimed, or a ourisdiction exercised. Hence, in this 
sense, the term 'liberty' is commonly used in the plural as the 
"liberties of the city."^ 
(i). DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTY; 
(a) Civil Liberty: Civil liberty identifies those individual 
freedoms upon which neither government, individuals nor organisa-
tions can encroach. It is the liberty of a member of society 
and hence also described as his 'natural liberty'. Civil liberty 
1. Ibid., p. 827. 
2* XMd.. p, 828. 
^*- «^ 2^ «^» P* B28« 
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implies rights, that is each of the forms of liberty entails 
its corresponding right. Civil liberty is the power of doing 
whatever the human laws permit—the greatest amount of absolute 
liberty which can, in the nature of things, be equally possessed 
or enjoyed by every citizen in a state. Thus, civil liberty 
includes freedom of personal actions such as movement, assembly 
and association etc. and religion, speech and press. Guaranteed 
protection against interference with the interests and rights is 
sought from all the members or civilized men or the administrative 
body of the state. 
(b)Political Liberty; The term political liberty has a 
narrower meaning, for it refers mainly to the rights an individual 
needs in order to participate in the political activities of the 
1 
community. More briefly, one can say that political liberty is 
the liberty of the citizen to participate in the operation of 
government, and particularly in the making and administration of 
laws. In the light of the right to political liberty, a citizen 
has right to jpin any politi 
to freedom of speech and expression, which indirectly indicates 
that a citizen can express his feelings in favour of or against 
any political party. 
(ii). NATURAL AND PERSONAL LIBERTY; 
There are two kinds of liberty, natural and personal. 
Natural liberty or liberties are usually considered absolute in 
1c Stuart, Gerry Brown, "Liberty"i^ ^ Encyclopedia International, 
(ed.) by Grolier, New York, 1971, p.510. 
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a comparative sense as opposed to personal liberty that is 
ensured through some kind of contract or law between individuals 
and the state. 
(a) Natural Liberty; Natural liberty is the power of acting 
as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control unless by 
the law of nature^ the right which nature gives to all mankind 
of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they 
judge most consistent with their happiness. It is also on condi-
tion of individuals acting within limits of the law of nature 
with such consciousness as not to interfere with an equal exercise 
of the same rights by other fellow men. 
(b) Personal Liberty; It is the right of power of locomotion, 
changing situation or moving so as one's own inclination may direct 
or suit to oneself, without imprisonment or restraint unless by 
due course of law. Personal liberty, as indicated above, is 
ensured through some kind of rightful contract or law between 
citizens and the state or government. 
In some constitutions, thinkers have used the word "liberty" 
where as in the rest the expression "personal liberty" is taken 
into consideration. As, for example, in the first draft of the 
constitution of India the word "liberty" was used but later on 
the word "personal" was added. This was done so as to avoid any 
confusion with respect to the identity of other fundamental 
rights. 
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(iii). LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE; 
It is the liberty for each individual person to 'decide' 
for himself what is to him moral or religious. 
(iv). LIBERTY OF CONTRACT; 
The ability at will to make or abstain from making a 
binding obligation enforced by the sanctions of the law. The 
right to contract about one's affairs including the right to make 
contracts of employment, and to obtain the best terms and conditions 
one can as the result of private bargaining. Liberty of contract 
also includes the corresponding right to accept a contract proposal. 
There is, however, no absolute freedom of contract. The govern-
ment or state may regulate or forbid any contract calculated to 
affect injuriously public interest. 
(v). LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND PRESS; 
Individual has right to speech and expression. In law it 
also includes freedom of press and circulation. In law it is 
guaranteed that a person has right to express his feelings, to 
print and publish the truth from good motives for justifiable ends. 
A citizen has right to publish whatever he may please, but he is 
not allowed such publications as are based on blasphemy, 
obscentity or scandalous character because it can injuriously affect 
the interest of individuals and hence, such an act would be a 
public offence. However, immunity from previous restraint or 
(from) censorship is there in this right. 
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(vi). RELIGIOUS LIBERTY; 
In a democratic state, a citizen has right to exercise his 
religious freedom. It means freedom from dictation, constraint 
or control in matters affecting the coscience, religious beliefs 
and the practice of religion. Freedom to entertain and express 
any system of religious opinions, and to engage in or refrain 
from any form of religious observance or public or private religious 
worship, not inconsistent with the peace and good order of society 
and the general welfare. Thus, in a democratic state, a citizen 
has been provided the right to freedom of religiono 
A democratic state which provides its citizens the right to 
freedom of religion, too, secures for its every member freedom 
from the payment of taxes for promotion of any religion and worship 
in certain educational institutions. Such a state also guarantees 
to every citizen the freedom of conscience, practice and propagation 
of religion. It further provides its citizens the right to freedom in 
religious matters like, religious demonstration and denomination, 
management of affairs with respect to religion and establishment 
and maintenance of institutions for religious purposes. State 
does not make any law with regard to an establishment of any 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. A Citizen, in 
a democratic state, therefore, is free to exercise his will in 
religious matters, only on the condition that it is not inconsistent with 
the peace, morality and general welfare of the community. 
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(II), FREEDOM IN POLITICS; 
Politics is an activity that takes place at different 
levels involving relations between citizens and the state at 
both the individual and collective planes. It also studies 
relations between various classes in the state, as well as relations 
between one state and the other, that is international poli-
tioel relations. 
Politics, properly speaking, is a matter of the administra-
tive aspect of a society However, in modern times, politics 
has become, in a sense, a substitute of religion. Religion 
embraced all the sphers of human activity till the recent 
times. Now politics interferes with and penetrates in man's 
individual as well as his social, religious and communal life. 
One may usefully identify the political interactions in 
a society as its political system, rather than as government, or 
the state: power or a set of decision-making processes. How 
is one to distinguish this system from other systems of 
behaviour, such as the religious, economic, psychological and 
cultural ? In answering this question, we shall simultaneously 
obtain an initial, gross conceptualization of political science, 
one that can serve as a point of departure for distinguishing 
political science as a theoritically separate and autonomous 
discipline. Hence one may describe the political system as 
that "behavior or set of interactions through which authoritative 
allocations (or binding decisions) are made and implemented for 
a society." 
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In politics the word "freedom", with its synonym "liberty," 
has a strong laudatory connotation. It has, therefore, been 
applied to whatever actions, policies, or institutions may deemed 
valuable, from obeying the law to attaining economic affluence. 
Political writings seldom provide explicit definitions of "freedom" 
» 
in descriptive terms, but it is often possible to infer descrip-
tive definitions from the context. If this is done, it will be 
seen that the concept of freedom refers most frequently to social 
freedom which must be distinguished from other descriptive and 
valuational usages. Descriptive definitions of 'freedom' desig-
nate empirically specifiable states of affairs and can, therefore, 
be accepted by any one, regardless of his normative views on 
"liberty". Freedom in a valuational sense is used to commend 
rather than to describe; it, therefore, means different things 
2 
to writers committed to different ethical standards. 
A.J.M.Milne, in Freedom and Rights, regarding the relation-
ship of individual's freedom and the governmental power says: 
It is often said that there can be no freedom 
unless the scope of government is liiiited. 
What is normally meant is that if the govern-
ment can interfere in everything, if there is 
no limit to its meddling, little room is left 
for private life and for personal initiative 
and choice. This is of course true and it 
suggests one way of interpreting the idea of 
political freedom. This is a special case of 
negative freedom. It should be thought of as 
1. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, (ed.) David L. 
£)llls, ^ New XorJc: The Macmilian Company & the Free Press,1968), 
Vol. 12, p. 285. 
2, Ibid., Vol. V» p. 554. 
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negative political freedom: that is, as 
freedom from constraint by government. 
No government can govern without using 
constraint, which means that negative 
political freedom is always partial, 
never complete. But this is not denied 
by the doctrine of limited government. 
Its point is that just because govern-
ment involves the use of constraint, its 
scope should be limited. ^ 
Elaborating the reasons of limited governmental authority, he 
comprehensively maintains: 
According to the idea of the public interest, 
the scope of government is always limited. 
The task of the government is to promote the 
public interest, which means establishing and 
maintaining certain conditions in a society's 
way of life. It must do what is necessary to 
perform this task but has no business concern-
ing itself with anything else. The public 
sphere, which is the proper concern of govern-
ment, is always finite in extent. The private 
sphere, which falls outside its scope, is 
'openended' and extends indefinitely. In other 
words, the idea of negative political freedom 
is built in to the idea of the public interest. 
But the public interest is often a problem not 
a datum. Some of the steps taken by the 
government to promote it may well be controver-
sial. While the scope of government must in 
principle be limited, just what the limits 
should in fact be is by no means always clear. 
The public sphere is always finite, but just 
where the line should be drawn between it and 
the private sphere depends upon the circums-
tances prevailing at a given time and place. 
There is a sense in which negative political 
freedom is essentially residual in character. 
It can be encroached upon if the public inter-
est makes this necessary. At the same time 
these encroachmaits do not have to be accepted 
uncritically. The government is a fallible 
human agency. It has no monopoly of wisdom or 
virtue. To challenge the government to show 
why the public interest requires a particular 
measure is in principle always justified. ^ 
1. Milne, A.J.M,, 0£. Cit.,pp, 303-304. 
2. Ibid., p. 304. 
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The form of government that ensures greatest scope of 
freedoK is democracy, A.J.M. Milne^ further dealing with the 
issue of freedom in a democratic state, stresses upon the right 
of self-determination of an individual: 
There must be freedom to participate actively 
in politics, to issue the challenge and put 
pressure on the government to answer it. This 
is the freedom which the members of the citizen 
body have under a representative form of govern-
ment. Now being a member of a citizen body 
means being, or at least having the opportunity 
to be, self-determining as a citizen. To be a 
self-determining or free citizen is not to be 
like Sir Joseph Porter in H.M.S. Pinafore who: 
'always voted at his party's call 
and never thought of thinking for himself 
at all.' 
It is to make up one's own mind about political 
issues and acting in the light of the conclusions 
one reaches. This political self-determination 
of the free citizen involves something more than 
merely the absence of constraint by the govern-
ment, although that is a necessary condition and 
may appropriately be styled positive political 
freedom. Citizenship falls within the scope of 
rational activity at the level of social morality, 
which means that there is a close connection 
between moral freedom and positive political 
freedom. If you are denied membership of the 
citizen body, your sphere of moral self-determi-
nation is correspondingly reduced. Being a 
member enlarges your opportunities as a free 
moral agent to act responsibly and Justly as 
a member of your society. ^  
Again, in political discussion 'freedom' is also meant 
2 
"an ability to achieve chosen goals." Robert G. Olson 
1. Ibid.,pp. 304-305. 
2. Olson, Robert G., 0£. Cit., p. 100. 
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has rightly put it: 
If a man has freedom of speech or freedom of 
assembly, this means that if he chooses to 
speak or assemble with others for political 
purposes he will encounter no legal obstacles. 
He will not be clubbed by the police or thrown 
in jail. "^  
This is because in a democratic state a citizen has 
right of freedom. He also has, as explained earlier, » 
the opportunity of self-determination as a citizen. 
As stated before, generally the concept of political freedom 
refers most frequently to social freedom which must be distingu-
ished from other descriptive and valuational usages of the term. 
It, on the one hand, refers to interpersonal or intei—communal 
relationships. One person has to respect the freedom of others, 
and one group or class or community has to leave others free 
to act in their own desired ways. In the context of international 
relations the concept of social freedom is extended to the 
relationship of one nation with other nations. Every nation is 
obliged to respect the freedom of other nations, states and 
peoples. As an individual in a society is not free to violate 
the freedom of other citizens, similarly in international relations 
freedom o£ various states is curtailed in order to safeguard the 
freedom of all the states and nations. 
Coming back to social freedom in the context of inter-
personal relations, an individual is unfree to deviate from generally 
I* IM^«» P* 100. 
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accepted norms of the locality, group, community etc. This 
curtailment of individual freedom is essential for the general 
welfare as well as general freedom of an entire body of people, 
whether it may be society or community or an institution. This 
principle is applicable to relationships between various groups 
and their interactions also: 
» 
A person's social freedom does not depend on 
his actual behaviour. We often perform actions 
that we are unfree to do (for example, speeding) 
and refrain from actions that we are free to 
perform (for example, driving at any speed lower 
than the speed limit). ' 
Again, there is no such thing as freedom in general. As 
we know, every organised society consists of an intricate network 
of specific relations of both freedom and unfreedom as indicated 
before. Citizens in a democratic state have the political 
freedom to participate in governmental process through "free" 
elections. In Democracy, as we see, the voters, parties and 
pressure groups are thereby empowered to limit the freedom of 
their elected officials. Democracy also requires that "civil 
liberties" be protected by legal rights and duties, and these 
duties again imply limitations of freedom. Conversely, in a 
perfect dictatorship, the ruler has unlimited freedom with respect 
to his people, whereas they are totally unfree with respect to 
him. In a despotic form of government, which is not subject to 
1. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Ojg.Cit., Vol.V, 
p.555. 
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the rule of law, people have no freedom to exercise their will: 
A despotic government is not subject to the 
rule of law. ...The despotic government can 
intervene in their lives when and where it 
likes and can arbitrarily subject them to 
constraint, ' 
In a democracy, both liberties and restrictions of freedom are 
distributed more evenly, for example, among the various branches 
of government, between government and governed, majority and 
minority. In such a state, equal freedom, not greater freedom, is 
the essence of democracy. Strictly speaking, it is not meaningful 
to say that there is "more" freedom in one society or another; 
but it is possible to define degrees of social freedom in the 
sense that one actor has greater freedom in certain respect than 
another: 
A society in which liberties are evenly distri-
buted may be called a free society. However, 
here we came close to using freedom in valuat-
ional sense: a society is free in which those 
and only those freedom relations hold that are 
desirable. ^  
"Freedom", as indicated above, can be considered in the normative 
sense in which case, its evaluative character permits of different 
criteria applicable. It, therefore, means different things to thinkers 
committed to different ethical viewpoints. For example, according 
1. Milne, A.J.M., 0£. Ci^., p. 305. 
2. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, op» cit., p,557 
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to Montesquieu, "Liberty can consist only in the power of doing 
what we ought to will," Similarly, a person is often said to 
be free, not if he acts freely or develops his capacities, but if 
he realizes his "best" or "essential" self. For instance, as 
Laski holds, "Liberty may be defined as the affirmation by an 
2 individual or group of his or its own essence". Thus, some 
thinkers have held t-hat a person is most likely to realize his 
essence if he is left free to choose for himself. Conversely, 
according to other philosophers, like Plato and the followers of 
Christian thought and Neo-Hegelianism, man reaches the highest 
form of self-realization by submitting to some moral norm imposed 
by his own "higher self" which is usually identified with faith," 
reason or moral conscience. As Spinoza says: "I call him free 
who is led solely by reason," Similarly, Rousseau holds, 
"Obedience to a law which we prescribed to ourselves, is liberty," 
One of the most peculiar characteristics of freedom is the 
protection of basic rights. In this respect classical liberalism 
from Locke to Spencer and his followers advocated liiat government should 
restrict a person's freedom where and when necessary to protect 
another person's basic rights. In strict sense, liberty is 
1. Cf. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Vol. V, 
op. cit«, p. 558. 
2. Ibid., p. 558. 
3» Ibid., p. 558. 
4. Ibid., p. 558. 
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not a personal affair but is grounded in social cont-
ract. An individual has to observe it as whatever affects himself 
would also affect others. Being a social and ethicalbeing he has 
to consider and respect the freedom of others, for they have the 
same right to exercise their free will. The liberty of the indi-
vidual and the society is, therefore, interrelated and complemen-
tary to each other. J.S,Mill, in his Essay "On Liberty" presents 
three main principles as being the basis of the appropriate region 
of human liberty: 
...First, the inward domain of consciousness; 
demanding liberty of conscience in the most 
comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and 
feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and 
sentiment on all subjects, practical or specu-
lative, scientific, moral, or theological. The 
liberty of expressing and publishing opinions 
may seem to fall under a different principle, 
since it belongs to that part of the conduct 
of an individual which concerns other people; 
but, being almost of as much importance as the 
liberty of thought itself, and resting in 
great part on the same reasons, is practically . 
inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle 
requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of 
framing the plan of our life to suit our own 
character; of doing as we like, subject to 
such consequences as may follow: without 
impediment from our •fellow-creatures, so long 
as what we do does not harm them, even though 
they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, 
or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each 
individual, follows the liberty, within the same 
limits, of combination among individuals; freedom 
to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to 
others: the persons combining being supposed to 
be of full age, and not forced or deceived. 
No society in which these liberties are not, 
on the whole, respected, is free... ' 
1. Mill, J.S., "On Liberty", in Man and the State: The Political 
Philosophers, (•d.; T3y Saxe Commins & Robert N, Linscott, 
Wew York; Random House, 1947, p. 147. 
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A society is free, provided it is based on these laissez-
faire principles. In this way, a person who enjoys these legal 
rights and is subject to the corresponding legal duties is free, 
however unfree he may be in other regards and with respect to 
actors other than the government, (e.g. because of economic 
exploitation or social pressure). In the light of this 
fact, the United States Supreme Court once held that minimum wage 
and maximum hour laws violate the constitutional principle of 
liberty because such regulations are not necessary to the pro-
tection of the basic rights but constitute "arbitrary" limitations 
of "freedom of contact" of both employer and employee. This is, 
no doubt, an important aspect of freedom as protection of basic 
rights of human individual. 
There are two spheres of political freedom negative 
political freedom and positive political freedom. In negative 
political freedom or say 'freedom from constrain by government' 
the emphasis is on the external side. Ir\ this sphere, the latent 
internal side is not necessarily political. It is merely 
the minimum capacity for self-determination which is present in 
all negative freedoms. Negative freedom is a necessary condition 
for higher forms of freedom, and the same is true of the special 
case of negative political freedom. One cannot be a free moral 
agent if one is subject to constraint by government. Positive 
political freedom, in this respect, is best thought of as a 
1. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, op. cit., 
pp. 557 - 58r 
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special case of moral freedom. This has its prdper place in the 
scale of forms. It is far superior than negative political 
freedom. It is certaibly better to think of political freedom 
In terms of free citizenship than merely as the absence of 
constraint by government. But both the spheres negative and 
positive political freedom are complementary to each other. 
"Without "Dositive political freedom, negative political freedom 
is insecure." Moreover, they are essential to each 
other because "there cannot be positive political freedom without 
2 
the negative form." But one important point in this regard 
should be kept in mind: there can be negative political 
freedom without the positive variety. The negative concept, 
therefore, needs to be distinguished from the positive one. One 
can think of political freedom simply in negative terms without 
thinking of free citizenship and what it involves at all. 
From the view-point of freedom governmental system may be 
divided into two types: despotic and democratic. Despotic form 
of government allows its subjects negative freedom only, yet it 
is always uncertain and precarious. The government, as explained 
earlier, can intervene in the lives of its subjects when and 
where it likes and can arbitrarily curtail their freedom. On the 
other hand the democratic form of government ensures adequate 
1. Milne, A.J.Mo, oj^, cit., p. 305. 
2* I^id.. p. 306. 
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opportunities for positive political freedom. In one-party 
totalitarian government there is inequality of status between 
those who are members of the party and those who are excluded 
from it, and the latter are denied positive political freedom. 
They may be named as 'second-class' citizens and their opportu-
nities for moral freedom are less adequate then those of the 
* first-class'. It means that a society with an undemocratic 
representative form of government is something less than a free 
society properly so called. 
The government based on despoticism or dictatorship 
is most dangerous for human creativeness based on this freedom, 
namely: the scarcity of geniuses of high intellectual and specially 
of high moral qualities. Man, in such a state, leads a life of 
alienation and despair. Due to constraint he fails to unfold his 
creative potentialities. Rightly speaking, in a despotic system 
man becomes despondent: 
« 
Dictatorship is harmful for the freedom of man 
and his spiritual and cultural realization not 
in itself but because of a scarcity of genius 
dictators with highly developed intellectual 
and moral qualities. In this field as in 
general in all fields of our existence the 
average type of man predominates, and even the 
' number of intellectually and morally defective 
men considerably exceeds the number of geniuses. 
It is rather stupidity and cruelty which rule 
in our human world than wisdom and goodness 
which are very rare^flowers in the garden of 
our earthly life. 
1. Spakovsky, A.V,, O;Q. cit., p. 7. 
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Bie above discussion may be summarized in the following 
vjords of Milne: 
A democratic form of government is a necessary 
condition for social freedom and that political 
freedom, both positive and negative, is part 
of social freedom. Negative political freedom 
is included in social freedom as a special case 
of negative freedom: positive political freedom 
as a special case of moral freedom. But both 
need to be distinguished from social^freedom 
because both can exist without it. 
However, if we carefully examine the democratic system of 
government, we also find the limitation by the social majority 
upon the social freedom of man. We name the rule of the social 
majority by a general term "democracy". With regard to this 
view of social majority (democracy)limitation, A,V,Spakovsky 
declares: 
The degree Of this limitation depends upon 
the same factors, upon which it depends in 
dictatorship and oligarchy, i.e. upon the 
moral and intellectual quality of the social 
majority..., (similarly are) the dangers of 
democracy for a free cultural and spiritual 
creativity and for its bearers: the social 
minority of the talented persons and those 
of genius.... 
In a word, the more the summit of the 
intellectual and moral (spiritual - cultural) 
creative actiirity moves away from the inte-
llectual and moral level and form of the social 
majority, the more the bearers of this creative 
activity begin to feel the pressure from the 
social majority. This intellectual and' moral 
pressure creates in the social creative minority 
the feeling of an unfreedom as a direct result 
of the limitation of the free development of 
their creative activity, 2 
•^  • Miine; A.J.M., 0£« £it., pp. 306-307. 
2« Spakovsky, A.V., 0£, clt.. p. 11, 
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Moreover, absolute freedom in any form is neither possible nor 
desirable. It is an abstract idea. An absolute political or 
social freedom certainly destroys human dignity. Therefore, 
freedom, in all its forms is always relative. Spakovsky, in 
this regard, rightly remarks: 
An absolute social freedom will destroy human 
society, because it leads to an impetuous and 
unrestrained collision of individual purely 
egocentric interests, so that every kind of 
anarchism is unrealizable in human society as 
such, being its very negation. Social freedom 
must be therefore relative, and the egocentric 
willfulness of man must be limited by certain 
considerations of a general welfare of society, 
according to the already mentioned rule: my 
freedom begins where the freedom of my fellow-
man ends, and my freedom ends where the freedom 
of my fellow-man begins, and vice-versa, i.e. the 
ideal of social freedom is to be solidaristic. "^  
The positive political freedom is rightly and fully achieved 
under truly democratic government. It is, no doubt, an aspect 
of political freedom and is included in social freedom in the 
sense that a free society by virtue of having a democratic form 
of government will be self-governing society. But one should 
always think that self-government in the first sense is also 
essential for social freedom. According to Spakovsky, social 
freedom, in reality, consists in a possibility that every human 
person can express his thought, feeling and will without being 
2 
persecuted for this expression by the social milieu. 
1. Ibid., p. 18, 
2. Ibid., p. 5. 
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The co-existence of man with man necessitates certain 
limitations with regard to the social freedom. However, it 
is certainly true that a free society must be a politically 
independent society. It must be in the words of Kant "A 
Kingdom of ends", i.e. a state in which every citizen is free 
to pursue his end and no one is used as a means to attain the 
ends of others. , 
It may be concluded that political freedom is a necessary 
condition for social freedom, but it is certaibly not a sufficient 
condition for it. The creation of conditions conducive to social 
freedom is different from attaining political independence. Many 
countries of the third world, despite attaining political freedom 
are under despotic rule, that is they are ruled by monarchs, 
shaikhs or dictators. If they are to enjoy positive political 
freedom, they must have a democratic government also. It cannot 
be exported to them or made part of a foreign aid programme. But 
the fact that a society is not capable of democracy or even 
constitutionalism is not a good reason for withholding the 
individual's freedom. 
Similarly, the claim of the developed countries that their 
presence or intervention in the affairs of underdeveloped countries 
is for the sake of securing freedom of their citizens is a self-
contradictory claim. What that is imposed from outside is not, 
in the strict sense of the term, freedom. As an individual's 
freedom arises from within himself, in the same way a nation's 
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or s taters freedom also ought to be realized from within. 
At the end i t i s appropriate to point out that freedom, 
whether i t may be social or po l i t i ca l , of an individual or a 
group can never be absolute. Absolute freedom i s a notion 
isolated from natural , social and po l i t i ca l r e a l i t i e s ; i t i s an 
abstract idea that cannot be applied to any concrete s iu ta t ion . 
Freedom, in a l l i t s forms, i s always re l a t ive . One can ta lk 
of absolute freedom with regard to Almighty God only, for absolute 
freedom implies absolute power also. 
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(III). FREEDOM IN RELIGION; 
Before proceeding ahead it seems appropriate to know 
what religion is. If one promptly makes explicit the basic 
features of the concept of religion, it would be much easier 
for him to examine the doctrine of 'freedom' in religion. 
We shall start with the definition of James Martineau, 
according to which: "Religion is the belief in an ever living 
God, that is, in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and 
holding moral relations with mankind." Spencer, like Martineau, 
represents religion as some sort of belief or other cognitive 
state. To Frazer it is a ritual that is conceived in a utili-
terian fashion; while Bradley and Arnold hold religion as a kind 
of moral attitude and activity. According to McTaggart and 
1 
Tiele it is a certain kind of feeling. In a word, one might 
think of these definitions as one-sided, but the crux 
of the religion is, in a broader sense, a composite view 
of all these. 
With reference to Islam it may be said that the very 
name of this religion provides the most proper defintion of 
religion, 'Islam' literally means in<^ Arabic "submission", that 
is submission to Divine Will, Nevertheless it does not mean 
negation of human freedom. Submission to Divine Will enables 
a man to participate in the acts of Divine Will. 
1. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Op. Git., Vol. 7, p. 141. 
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No doubt every person is born in a particular society 
that has its specific religious or non-religious atmosphere. One 
is, in one way, free at his will to accept or reject any particular 
religion. But, in another way, one's religious faith is deter-
mined by one's society. In a free society religious diversity 
would be an open possibility. Mosques, Temples, Churches or 
other religious institutions are allowed to co-exist in a plural-
istic society. One may or may not join these institutions 
according to his will. In religious matters people are free to 
work out their religious positions for themselves. The under-
standing of religious matters and dimensions of human experience 
are displayed in a more mature and better way in a free society's 
religious policy. 'Religious freedom' is a way to express the 
attitude of a free society towards religion. 
We have discussed negative and positive sides of political 
freedom in ijie preceding part of this chapter. Religious freedom 
also has both a negative and a positive form. Negative religious 
freedom is simply freedom from constraint in all religious matters. 
In this sphere one does not have to join any church or religious 
institution if one does not want to. On the other hand, positive 
religious freedom means 'self-determination in the sphere of 
religion'. A man achieves it to the extent that he works out 
his attitude towards religion for himself and bases his practice 
upon the convictions he has reached rather than allowing his 
religious position to be settled for him by social custom or 
convention. In brief, in the words of Milne: "negative 
religious freedom is part of negative freedom: positive religious 
4KaUeffl3^«»?4-4«A.S-^ 5*-**^*. 
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1 
freedom is part of personal freedom." What follows from the 
above statement is that negative religious freedom i s a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for pasi t ive religious freedom. 
One must be free from constraint in matters of religion i f one 
is to be self-determining. But the fact that one is free from 
constraint does not mean that one will in fact be self-determining. 
One may simply ignore re l ig ion or follow fashion without thinking, 
ft 
Thus in a free society, there must be complete negative religious 
freedom and adequate opportunities for all to achieve positive 
religious freedom. 
But the question arises;are there to be no limits to 
negative religious freedom in a free society ? Should nothing be 
forbidden which is done in the name of religion, provided that 
it does not harm or inconvenience those not taking part in 
religious matters ? As for example, in the case of human sacri-
fice, or say 'Sati', one may or may not follow this religious 
rite. Ought 'Sati' in accordance with the views of some Hindus 
to be allowed in a free society ? Should, similarly, Muslims be 
allowed to slaughter cows showing disrespect to the feelings of 
Hindus ? (Though this kind of act is different from human sacrifice 
or Sati). The prohibition of such practices would not be a breach 
of positive religious freedom, for such practices do not form 
the core of any religious faith, but are related to rituals,that 
too, most often misconceived, 
1, Milne, A.J.M., Freedom and Rights, 0]^. Clt., p. 320. 
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Suicide is a sin in every religion, A more pertinent 
case is that of suicide. Even though it would seem as if the 
right to take one's own life should rest with the individual 
himself, yet religion imposes restraint on it to the extent of 
declaring it a sinful act. The Justification here would be 
that the sacredness of human life ought to be treated as the 
most fundamental of all values and it is the ptuty of any genur-
inely religious person to prevent people from doing so, "Pre-
venting them means preserving their opportunities for personal, 
1 
moral and rational freedom, albiet against their will." In 
Islam cow-slaughter is permitted, but is in no way a 'must' 
without which the basic condition of religiousity remains unful-
filled. Moreover, IslSm as a religion, in theory and practice, 
has been tolerant and respectful to other faiths. There are 
various instances in history that Muslims rulers prohibited cow-
slaughter to show respect to the feelings of Hindus and to win 
their good will. In short, such ritualistic aspects usually 
are not essential to the teaching of any religion. Therefore, 
their disconfirmation at the instance of state does not actually 
curtail one's religious freedom. Of course, if Muslims are 
restrained from offering regular prayers and the prayer call, 
or disallowed to go to Hajj pilgrimage, or to observe Muharram 
ceremonies, it would be undoubtedly an encroachment upon their 
religious freedom. These examples are cited to show the nature 
and extent of religious freedom that must be ensured in all 
democratic and free societies, 
I* Ibid*, p. 321, 
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Religious freedom, in its true sense of humanistic well-
being, is a doctrine of a special status. Man acts freely. In a 
real sense he is more social than individual because he can not 
survive and live alone. Ethics being a matter of interpersonal 
relations is meaningful only in a social context. Hence in 
personal or individual and social aspects of freedom, he is 
partially free and partially determined. In this connection 
Anatol Von Spakovsky has rightly remarked: 
Social freedom consists in a possibility that 
everybody can express freely his thought, feeling 
and will without being persecuted for this expre-
ssion by the social environment. But it is also 
quite natural that the coexistence of man with 
man necessitates certain limitations in regard 
to the social freedom of everybody. This coexis-
tence transforms the absolute freedom of man as 
a separate individual, as a separate "I", into 
the coordinated freedom of man as a part of.human 
society, as an element of a collective "We". 
Further, in this regard, he formulates a formula that indicates 
this co-ordinated social freedom of man as: "My freedom begins 
where the freedom of other man ends, and my freedom ends where 
2 
the freedom of other begins," One has both the ways open 
either to act within the framework of a particular religion and 
its tenets or to do otherwise. One can exhibit and exercise one's 
religious freedom in a social perspective. True religious freedom 
is that which establishes morality of a free society on a humanistic 
basis, and not on the basis of caste, colour, creed, sex, group or 
geographical conditions etc. This 'human •orality', 'human-welfare* 
should be the aim and ob^jective of a religious or social freedom. 
1. Spakovsky, A.V,, Freedom, Deterainlsm» Indeterainism, op, cit,. 
p. 5. 
2* IMd*, p. 5. 
CHCILPTER I I 
EXISTENTIAL CONEPTION OF FREEDOM 
CHAPTER - I I ^ ' ^ 
EXISTENTIAL CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM 
Before p roceed ing to d i s c u s s t h e e x i s t e n t i a l concep t i on of 
freedom i t seems a p p r o p r i a t e to p r e s e n t a b r i e f account of 
' e x i s t e n t i a l i s m ' . 
There can be no s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n t h a t can comprehens ive ly 
embrace t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s of e x i s t e n t i a l ph i l o sophy . I t i s no t a 
wholly new p h i l o s o p h y , fo r i t s r o o t s go as f a r back as S o c r a t e s . 
Even Kie rkegaa rd , t h e f a t h e r of modern e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , acknowledged 
t h a t h i s was a S o c r a t i c task- "know t h y s e l f " . 
The term " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m " i s thoroughly d i s c u s s e d and 
e l a b o r a t e d by many t h i n k e r s , who agree t h a t i t is an e x p r e s s i o a 
of the d i s i l l u s i o n e d and war a f f l i c t e d g e n e r a t i o n s of t h e 20 th 
cen tu ry Europe i n p a r t i c u l a r . I n genera l i t may be d e s c r i b e d as 
a r e v o l t a g a i n s t t r a d i t i o n a l Western ph i losophy . I t speaks out 
a g a i n s t v a r i o u s forms of ' dehuman i sa t ion ' t h a t . I t b e l i e v e s , 
r e s u l t fix)m i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , t echnocracy , m i l i t a n t n a t i o n a l i s m , 
m i l i t a r i s m and the s o - c a l l e d s c i e n t i f i c ob j ec t i v i sm and p h y s i c a l i s m . 
I t i s a n a t u r a l out-come of t h e modern s o c i e t y , which a c c o r d i n g 
to e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , c a u s e s a l i e n a t i o n a t t h e s o c i a l and i n d i v i d u a l 
p l a n e s , s e l f - d e c e p t i o n and d e n i a l of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . E x i s t e n t i a -
l i s t s p roc la im t h a t modern man's penchant fo r s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n 
i n s c i e n c e , i n p h i l o s o p h y , i n s o c i a l theory ^leads t o t h e l o s s 
of s u b j e c t i v i t y . The emphasis on methodology and n e g l e c t i n g a 
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proper ontology has deprived man of our age of the sense of 
values and humanistic outlook. Philosophy in general, is 
stripped of its character rnd content and man is lost in the 
labyrinth of technical jargon. Existentialism is a radical 
revolt against objectification and the concept of the 'typed' 
man. The two world wars have left man numb, cold and 
helpless. His dreams are shattered, his ideals are frustrated 
and his personality is injured, broken into many dissociated 
parts. Totality of being is lost to sense. He has been left 
alone and homeless in the midst of the brute objectivity of the 
world. Besides, 'reason' is dominant and no importance is given 
to the subjectivity of the individual human person. Under such-
circumstances existentialism provides a philosophy which is 
rightly called 'hominocentric'. 
Existentialism emphasizes the uniqueness and primacy of 
existence the inner, immediate experience of man's self-awareness 
"Emphasis on human existence is the beginning of the definition 
of existentialism". The fundamental drive or urge is to exist 
and to be recognized as an individual. If man is so recognized, 
existentialists assert, he may gain a sense of meaning and signi-
ficance in life. According to existentialism, the most meaningful 
point of reference of any person is his'immediate consciousness, 
which cannot be contained in a 'system' of abstractions. The 
1. Beck, Robert N., (edt.) Perspectives in Philosophy, (N.YorkiHnlt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 437. 
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advocates of existentialism hold that abstract thinking tends to 
be impersonal and to lead away from the concrete human situation. 
Robert N^Beck presents an extract regarding existentialistic out-
look of man; 
Man must be understood, existentialists insist, 
in terms of possibilities, anxieties, and 
decisions; in terms of the tragic and absurd 
situations in which he finds himself, Man is 
not an image or reflection of an antecedently 
existing essence that determines his actions 
and his values; he is a free being. What man 
is can only be inferred from how he is, that 
is, man's essence is to be found only in his 
concrete existence. The desire to know the 
meaning of the individual man in a more radical 
way than have other philosophers leads existen-
tialists to hold that the starting^oint of 
philosophy is the concrete situation of man in 
the world, '' 
In this way, according to exitentialist thinkers reality or 
being is "existence" that is found in the "I" rather than the 
"it". Thus the centre of thought and meaning is the existing 
2 individual thinker. 
As indicated ^ earlier, existentialism is a radical revolt 
against some features of traditional philosophy and modern society. 
The traditional or speculative world-view of man has totally 
been rejected by existentialists. For, according to them, in 
such "systems" the individual self or the thinker is lost in a 
1. Beck, Robert N., Perspectives in Social Philosophy. (New York, 
Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 196?)'; p. ^63, 
2. Titus, H,H., Living Issues in Philosophy, Op, Cit., p. 301. 
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supersensible world, in abstract universals or in universal ego. 
Therefore, existentialism is a protest in the name of human 
'individuality' against the concepts of "reason" and "nature" 
that were so strongly emphasized during the 18th century 
"Enlightenment". "The first and most obvious one is thattfais style of 
'I 
philosophizing begins frcm man rather than from nature," A 
traditional philosopher studies man in terms of some systematic 
'concept' or 'essence' derived from reason. While, on the 
contrary, 'the existentialist attitude' indicates that reflection 
on the existentialist experience can result in an important 
philosophical position. This very attitude is directed towards 
'human existence', "Existence means the state of being actual 
or occuring within space and time, or it refers to 'something 
2 
given here and now'," The 'essence', as traditional philosophers 
hold, is that which distinguishes a thing from other type of 
objects, "It is that which makes a thing what it is or that which 
all things called by the same name have in common,"^ Thus, 
according to those classical thinkers once a person has grasped 
the idea or concept of the essence of thing he can think of it 
quite apart from its existence, Plato and many traditional 
thinkers have the same view-point regarding human individual, 
"Perhaps one can most easily characterise the view of man and 
his world which is enshrined in Plato's Republic, For Plato 
1o Macquarrie, J,, Existentialism,; Penguin Books, New York, 
1972), p, l4o 
2o Titus, H,H., 0£, Crto, p. 301, 
5. Ibid., p. 301, 
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"exis tence" i s a p a l t r y , second-rate manner of being; exis tent 
e n t i t i e s are r e a l only in so f a r as they manifest a "form" or 
"essence" . To see the world as i t r e a l l y i s , according to 
P l a t o n i s t s , i s to see i t as an i n t e l l i g i b l e system of essence. 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s r e j e c t t h i s Platonic (or c l a s s i ca l ) 
view of man and a s s e r t t ha t t he re i s something which cannot be 
conceptualized and whose exis tence comes before i t s essence, 
t h a t i s the personal act of ex i s t i ng , or " tha t being is man or , 
as Heidegger has i t , the human r e a l i t y . " \There i s no knowledge, 
the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s say, apart from a knowing sub jec t . The 
argument of c l a s s i c a l th inke r s t h a t man can be understood in 
terms of some systematic ' concept ' or ' e s sence ' derived from 
reason i s wrong: 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s oppose such t r a d i t i o n a l 
conceptualism and i t s a b s t r a c t , general 
concepts of exis tence and i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
Neither systems of thought nor r a t i o n a l 
def in i t ions^can capture individual human 
ex i s tence . 
Man's inner l i f e must be understood, e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s i n s : s t , 
4 ] 
"with i t s moods, a n x i t i e s and dec i s ions . " E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , / 
1 . John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (New York: 
Macmillan, 19^7), P . 460 (quoted in Living I ssues in PhilosoTJhy. 
p . 302« 
2 . Sa r t r e , J . P . , Ex i s t en t i a l i sm and Humanism, (Tr . Ph i l i p Mairet) 
(London: Methuen & Co. , L td . , 1970), p . 28. 
3 . Beck, Robert, N, , Perspectives in Social Philosophy, Op. Cit .» 
p . 363. 
4 . T i tus , H. H., 0£. C i t . , p . 302. 
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in this way, stress on the primacy of the state of "existence" 
rather than the primacy of the supratemporal or supraempirical 
• essence'. 
\ 
Existentialism also opposes all forms of objectivity and 
objective functionalization of man. Objectivity, existentialists 
assert, has tended to make the person of secondary importance 
» 
in relation with things. Sartre, in this connection, says: 
"Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, 
-1 
instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower." 
Existentialism, thus, places a new emphasis on man's inner life 
and experience. It stresses man's immediate and subjective 
awareness. Stressing upon man's inner life, existentialism, 
raises the problem of man's individuality and personality. It 
represents man's rebellion against all attempts to ignore or 
suppress the uniqueness of his subjective experience* John Mac-
quarrie expresses the existentialist position in th^ following words: 
^husj one must further qualify the existentialist 
position by saying that for existentialist the 
subject is the existent in the whole range of his 
existing. He is not only a thinking subject but 
an initiator of action and a centre of feeling. 
It is this whole spectrum of existence, known 
directly and completely in the very act of exist-
ing, that existentialism tries to express. ^  
Kierkegaard, the father of modern existentialism, has rightly 
remarked that individual is real and 'subjectivity is truth'-
To him "individuals alone were real", and the genuine and the 
1. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism. Op. Cit., p, 28. 
2, Macquarrie, J., 0£. Cit.. pp. 14-15. 
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critical dilemmas of the individual's life "are not solved by-
intellectual exploration of the facts nor of the laws of think-
ing about them," The resolution emerges through conflicts and 
tumults in the soul, anxities, agonies, perilous adventures of 
faith into unknown territories. Sartre, with reference to 
Kierkegaard, further asserts: 
/ The reality of every one's existence proceeds 
/ thus from the "inwardness" of man, not from 
anything that the mind can codify, for object-
ified knowledge is always at one or more re-
moves from the truth. "Truth,", said Kierke-
gaard, "is sub-injectivity."2) 
Writing and advocating "individuality" as a constant theme, 
existentialists are themselves fervidly individual. That is why 
existentialism is sometimes called the philosophy of individual 
human person; 
(Existentialists) refuse to belong to schools 
and systems and, for the most part, they do 
not offer doctrines in the traditional sense. 
Indeed, they more often speak of philosophiz-
ing than philosophy, for their message is as 
much fo call to self-examination and decision 
as the giving of new information. 5 
The emphasis on personal existence and subjectivity has 
led in turn to a new emphasis on man's freedom and personal 
responsibility. According to existentialists the faculty that 
1. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism. Op. Cit., p. 6. 
2. Ibid.. p. 6. 
3. Beck, Robert N., Perspective^in Social Philosophy, Op. Cit., 
p. 363. 
m 
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akes a r ad ica l d i s t i n c t i o n between human and non-human being 
i s freedom. Themes, such as freedom, choice and r e spons ib i l i t y 
a re prominent in the wr i t ings of a l l e x i s t e n t i a l i s t phi losophers . 
John Macquarrie, with the reference to John Macmurray, a s s e r t s : 
These matters c o n s t i t u t e the core of personal 
being. I t i s the exercise of freedom and the 
a b i l i t y to shape the future tha t d is t inguishes 
man from a l l the o ther beings t ha t we know on 
ea r th . I t i s through free and responsible 
decisions tha t man becomes au then t ica l ly him-
se l f . In John Macmurray's language, the 'self 
as agent ' provides the cen t r a l themes for e x i s -
t en t i a l i sm, whereas t r a d i t i o n a l Western ph i lo -
sophy, spec ia l ly since the time of Descartes, 
has concentrated a t t e n t i o n on the ' s e l f as 
sub jec t '— and by ' sub jec t i s understood 
' th inking subjec t ' .1 ^ 
Freedom i s the core of ex is t en t i a l ^h i lo sophy . The human ind iv idua l 
can crea te h is world through h is act of free w i l l . According to 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h inke r s , man simply ' i s ' . He i s what he w i l l s , 
he i s responsible for everything he does. Therefore, he i s 
nothing e lse but that which he makes of himself. And t h i s doct r ine 
wi l l ing and making oneself i s the f i r s t p r inc ip le , of e x i s t -
p 
en t ia l i sm, A de ta i led study of tne concept of e x i s t e n t i a l 
freedom would be made in the following pages, here just the theme 
has been introduced, ^ 
\ 
While stressing the importance of man, existentialists also 
realistically face the facts of human weakness, insecurity and 
1e Macquarrie, J., 0£, Cit,, p, 16. 
2. Sartre, J,P,, Existentialism and Humanism, pp. 28-34, 
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l i m i t a t i o n s , I n e laborat ingihe e x i s t e n t i a l world outlook, they have 
brought to l imelight the s p e c i f i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes such 
as f i n i t ude , g u i l t , a l i e n a t i o n , despai r , anguish, death e t c . 
Anxiety, the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s a s s e r t , a r i ses as man undergoes the 
experience of the meaninglessness of hjs l i f e . Anguish and 
melancholy lead to e x i s t e n t i a l despair and t h i s very " c r i s i s " , 
they hold, prepares man for the "leap" into authentic ex is tence . 
This may come through " fa i th" and dependence on Gk)d, according 
to the theologians, or through "resolve" , an act of w i l l , according 
to some o thers , for the advocates of ex i s t en t i a l i sm are both 
t h e i s t s and a t h e i s t s . Hence ex i s t en t i a l i sm i s an a s se r t ion of 
of the s ignif icance of the self in the face of f r u s t r a t i o n and 
the impersonality of modern c i v i l i z a t i o n in an a r t i f i c i a l , man-
1 
made world, Sartre and Heidegger give th ree names " fa l lenness , 
2 being- in- the-midst-of- the-world and inau then t i c i t y " to the 
one and the same s t a t e of human weakness and insecur i ty tha t 
a l i ena t e s him from his authent ic and t rue being. In shor t , for 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h inke r s , "man i s never j u s t par t of the cosmos 
but always stands to i t i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p of tension with 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s for t r a g i c c o n f l i c t , " ^ 
Hence, ex i s t en t i a l i sm i s a movement having phi losophica l , 
t h e o l o g i c a l , l i t e r a r y and psychological dimensions, a l l reveal ing 
1 . Olson, Robert G., 0£. C i t . . p . 136. 
2 . I b i d . . p ,135. 
3 . Macquarrie, J . , 0£, C i t , , p , 17. 
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the common belief of its exponents, that is "existence comes 
1 
before essence". Existentialists maintain that every person's 
existence, as he himself experiences his situation in the world, 
is the only fruitful point of view for expressing and solving 
human problems. Theories and abstractions, existentialists 
believe, cannot cope with this basic fact. Man possessing free 
will and therefore, responsibility, moulds himself according to 
his objective. His fate and character are not determined in 
advance by God or society. Though his inescapable lot is anxiety, 
2 
he has a moral obligation to par t ic ipate actively in l i f e . 
Briefly i t can be said that "existentialism" is a movement 
of protes t , a diagnosis of man's predicament, a belief in the 
primacy of existence, an emphasis on man's subjective experience 
or personal involvement, a radical recognition of freedom and 
responsibi l i ty , and a projection of human sense of insecurity 
in the world. Having gone through this general survey of exis t -
en t i a l i s t philosophy, we can proceed to explain the ex i s t en t i a l i s t 
« 
concept of freedom in its proper perspective. 
Existentialism underlines "freedom and responsibility". 
Its philosophical endeavour is anti-deterministic. The emphasis 
of the existentialists on personal existence and subjectivity 
1. Sartre, J,P., Existentialism and Humanism, Op. Cit., p, 26, 
2. New Standard Encyclopedia. OQ. £it,, Vol. 5, p. E-259. 
62 
has led to a new emphasis on man's freedom and responsibility. 
Describing the purpose of the movement as it is primarily concerned 
with man's existence, his freedom and responsibility, Blackham, 
in his Six Existentialist Thinkers, eloquently asserts: 
'The goal of movement for an existing individual 
is to arrive at a decision, and to renew it! 
The (existentialist) thinker gives himself stable 
ethical reality by forming and renewing himself 
in critical decisions which are a total inward 
commitment. ..'Through having willed in this 
manner, through having ventured to take a deci-
sive step in the utmost intensity of subjective 
passion and with full consciousness of one's 
eternal responsibility... one learns something 
else about life, and learns that it is quite a 
different thing from being engaged, year in and 
year out,^in piecing together something for a 
system^ 
According to existentialist thinkers, determinism, whether 
hereditary, biological or environmental, does not offer an adequate 
explanation of man's inner potentialities and capabilities. In 
existentialist philosophy the main interest is directed not so 
much to mankind in general, to social institutions and their 
collective achievements, or to the impersonal world of nature, 
but to the 'existence' of human individual and his choices and 
decisions. Man translates into action his unique inner potentia-
lities and creative skill only because of his freedom. The 
existentialist viewpoint is that man, first of all, exists in the 
world, ^ ere through his freedom he makes and moulds himself and through 
his actions creates his values. He is the maker of himself, 
1. Blackham, H.J., Six Existentialist Thinkers,(New York: Harper 
Torchbook, 1959), p.9. 
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Man i s a pro;3®c't which possesses sub j ec t i ve l i f e . For man, 
apar t from t h i s project ion of se l f a l l t h a t ex i s t s i s a means 
to the r e a l i z a t i o n of his being. He f u l f i l s h i s project only 
through his freedom. He i s respons ib le for whatever he does 
and, in t h i s way, the whole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of his actions f a l l s 
so l e ly upon his shoulders . Ex i s t en t i a l i sm i s an asser t ion of 
the s igni f icance of personal exis tence and dec i s ions . For 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s freedom i s not something to be proved or argued 
about. I t i s a r e a l i t y to be experienced. Man has considerable 
freedom within his reach provided he w i l l s to exercise i t . Freedom 
i s a unique quest which l i e s in working out the demands of one 's 
inner nature and expressing one ' s genuine or authentic se l f . 
Freedom means facing choices, making dec is ions and accepting them. 
One can find the conception of freedom in a l l e x i s t e n t i a l -
i s t th inkers , viz.Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sa r t r e , Marcel, Jaspers 
e t c . But Jean-Paul Sar t re alone among a l l the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
has elaborated a systematic and de t a i l ed theory of freedom. 
After going through the Sa r t r i an e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy, one 
can e a s i l y understand the problem of human freedom. I t can 
be claimed that there i s l i t t l e i n S a r t r e ' s theory which contra-
d i c t s anything said on the subject by o ther e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , and 
there i s nothing in i t which i s incompatible with the major 
premises of e x i s t e n t i a l t h ink ing . There i s no other philosopher, 
except S a r t r e , who has t r i e d to develop a systematic theory of 
the freedom of the w i l l , even though, a l l e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
philosophers believe in i t . 
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Traditional philosophers use the term "freedom" mainly in 
two contexts, which are technically known as freedom of self-
realizatiorf and 'freedom of indeterminism' or 'freedom of the 
w i l l ' . 
Exis tent ia l is ts do not accept the c lass ica l theories 
regarding freedom of the wi l l . As Olson puts i t : 
The best introduction to the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theory wil l , therefore, be a consideration 
of the reasons which induced the existent-
i a l i s t s to re ject^non-exis tent ia l is t conce-
pts of freedom. 
Like other ex i s t en t i a l i s t s , Sartre , too, rejects the 
t rad i t iona l philosophical concepts of 'freedom'. The chief 
difference between Sartre and the exponents of c lass ical theories 
i s that , as he asserts : 
Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes 
free; he is wholly^and forever free or he is 
not free at a l l . 
Classical theories hold that human behaviour i s often determined 
by an objective si tuat ion and subjective motive. Moreover, 
according to classical thinkers i t i s only reason which indicates 
that if behaviour is so determined i t i s morally wrong or 
injurious to one's best long-range in t e res t s that free choice 
1 . Olson, R.G., Op. .Ci_t., p . 104. 
2, Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, (Tr, Hazel E, Barnes), 
(London: Methuan & Co., Ltd., 1957;, p. 441. 
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comes into play. Sartre, on the other hand, completely denies 
that either objective situation or subjective motives ever 
really move man to act. Human beings are not playthings of 
their passions, but, they choose their actions themselves. They 
are free at their will to decide and act. 
Freedom is the highest value in existential philosophy. 
It is the value par excellence. Flight from freedom leads to 
'fallenness' and inauthenticity, which is considered by existent-
ialists as the source of all evils: 
Heidegger calls flight from death inauthenticity. 
In this state man escapes responsibility, i.e. he 
gives up his right to exist as a free-being. 
Sartre says that freedom reveals in dread. This 
results in inauthenticity of existence. Authentic 
existence^is moral and inauthentic existence is 
immoral. 
There is no realm of value or means of justification or excuse 
other than freedom, which is the sole criterion of human existence. 
Sartre asserts that in this world "we are left alone without 
excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to 
be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is 
nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown 
2 
in to t h i s world he i s responsible for everything he does . " 
Another remarkable point i s t ha t the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h i n k e r , 
S a r t r e , does not bel ieve in the power of pass ion . He cons iders 
1 . Waheed Akhtar, " E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Elements i n l q b a l * s Thought", 
Indo-I ranica (The Quarterly Organ of I ran Soc ie ty ) , (Calcut ta : 
I ran Society, 1978), Vol. 31, No.1 & 2 (March & J u n e ) , p.AO. 
2 , S a r t r e , J . P . , Ex i s t en t i a l i sm and Humanism, op, C j t . « p . 3 4 . 
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a grand passion "as the destructive torrent upon which a man 
is swept into certain actions as by fate, and which, therefore, 
xs an excuse for them," He thinks that man is responsible for 
his passion. 
Every action implies freedom, Without it man can do nothing, 
There can be few themes in existentialism amidst which the most 
central and prominent is 'freedom'. As stated earlier, this 
theme is present in all the writings of existentialists. First 
of all, it became prominent in the writings of Kierkegaard, 
according to whom, to exist and to be free were almost synonymous 
expressions. The interest in freedom, or rather the passion for 
freedom, is not confined to any particular variety of existentia-
lists. Sartre, too, is just as insistent as Kierkegaard that 
freedom and existence are indistinguishable. According to him, 
one does not first exist and then becomes free; to be human 
is already to be free. Freedom is the core of human existence, 
which is grounded in it. 
According to existentialist thinkers, freedom, besides 
being identical with human existence, is also creativity. John 
Macquarrie has rightly remarked with reference to Nikolai 
Berdyaev that: 
1. Ibid., p. 3A-. 
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If freedom is almost identical with existence 
itself, there is no humanity without freedom. 
Freedom may be dangerous, but there is no 
human dignity without freedom, and the risk 
of increasing freedom must constantlybe taken, 
Berdyaev rightly links freedom with creativity. 
The highest reach of humanity is creativity, 
a sharing in the power of God the Creator. 
'Creativity is the mystery of freedom. Man can 
indeed create the monstrous as well as the good, 
the beautiful, and the useful'. ' 
As mentioned before, for existentialists, particularly for 
Sartre, there are no values external to man. Values are created 
by man and have no objective or permanent basis. Man only has 
freedom to create himself and his values as he wills and acts. 
Sartre declares that: 'everything is permissible' and, man is 
really "beyond good and evil" as Nietzsche thinks, Dostoyevsky 
writes: ••If God idid not exist, everything would be permitted". 
This very dictum has become the starting point of existentialism 
particularly for Sartre and Heidegger. 
According to Sartre, freedom and human reality are synonymous! 
Freedom is the nature of man; in anxiety man 
becomes aware of his freedom, knows himself 
responsible for his own being by commitment, 
seeks the-,impossible reunion with being-in-
itself... 
1. Macquarrie, J., 0£. cit., pp. 180-81. 
2. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism, op. cit., p.33. 
3. Magill, Frank N., 0£. cit.. p. 1080. 
For Sartre man is free to choose his actions. He has the will 
to do whatever he likes. The ultimate principle of Being, says 
Heidegger, is 'will*. Sartre concurs by saying that only in 
action is there any reality. Man is only the sum total of his 
actions and pruposes. Again according to him, man creates his 
own world with his actions. Freedom is the basis for all human 
activity. To act is to modify the shape of the world. 
Sartre, like Kierkegaard, insists that there are no external 
signs to guide man, Man must make his own rules and make them 
alone. He writes in The Age of Reason; 
There was in his world no evil or good save 
that he set up as such. All round things 
had formed a circle and waited without making 
a sign; he stood alone in the midst of a 
monstrous silence, alone and free, without 
recourse or excuse, irrevocably condemned, 
condemned to be free. ^  
It is rightly observed that all existentialists have taken 
the problem of freedom very seriously, Kierkeegard points out 
that freedom is man's greatness and grandeur. His charge against 
Hegel is that he has left no room in his philosophical system 
for human feeling or freedom. Heideggar holds that "truth's 
•5 
essence is freedom." True freedom according to Marcel, is 
1. Samuel E. Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre; (New York: Mc Graw-Hill 
Book Company, 1975;, pp. 484-485. 
2. Cf. Jean Wahl, Philosophies of Existence. Tr. F.M.Lory , 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19b9;, p. 59. 
3. Cf. Arne Naess, Four Modern Philosopher^^ Tr. Alertais Hannary 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 238. 
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achieved when the self is conscious of the many rich possibilities 
of insight and development that are open to it, Man, Marcel 
holds, is truly free only when he opens himself to hope, fidelity, 
and love and when he understands that freedom points beyond itself 
and to a transcendental reality or ego. Marcel very emphatically 
says that 'man* or an individual existential being "I" is defined 
only by its ^liberty*. Moreover, this liberty is the primary source 
of subject-object relationship. As Blackham underlines: 
The I is, so to speak, defined by its liberty, 
the possibility in the face of life to accept 
or to refuse it. ^ This is the primary subject-
object relation. 
Marcelholds further that love and intelligence are related to freedom 
and they are the most concrete as well as the most creative things 
2 
m the world. Similarly, the idea of freedom is also found 
at the centre of Jaspers* philosophical system. Replying to the 
questions how is it that we are free, and how is it that exist-
ence is essentially freedom ? Jaspers says that this is because 
transcendence is concealed from human beings. He points out that 
if transcendence is revealed to them directly, they would not be 
free, because transcendence would dominate them. In this state 
the domain of existence is the domain of freedom, and that of 
possibility, project and choice. The same is true of Sartre's 
1, Blackham, H,J., Six Existentialist Thinkers, Op, Cit,. p,71, 
2. Titus, H,H., 0£. Ci^., p. 310, 
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views whose entire thought system revolves around the idea of 
freedom. 
All the existentialist thinkers use the term "freedom" to 
refer to something which they consider to be a genuinely existing 
and valuable feature of the human condition. The existentialists 
do not deny that man has the power to achieve chosen goals by his 
own efforts, as the traditional philosophers understand by the 
term freedom. What leads the existentialists to reject or ignore 
the commonsense conception of freedom is their belief that the 
power to achieve particular goals is not itself of a great value. 
This theory rests upon three other notions. 
First, man is a being who exists only by projecting himself 
beyond the present into the future. To exist is to posit goals 
and to pursue them. There is no escape from our condition except 
flight or pursuit toward projected values. This means that if 
one empirical desire is fulfilled, we will and must replaee 
that desire with another. In this way, a state of complete 
desire fulfilment would be equivalent to 'death'. A part of the 
tragedy of human condition is that man is a desiring being and 
that desire , according to existentialists, is a state of 
'lack' or incompletion. In this regard Sartre says: "The 
existence of desire as a human fact is sufficient to prove that 
1. Olson, R.G., 0£. Cit_., pp. 100-107. 
1 
human reality is a lack." He further adds that desire is a 
2 
lack of being. Thus, a s t a t e of lack i s c e r t a i n l y incompatible 
with a s t a t e of per fec t ion . In t h i s pos i t i on , according to the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t th inkers , the common man has defined freedom on 
the basis of a mistaken notion t h a t there i s a s t a t e of happiness, 
s a t i s f i e d des i re or absence of f r u s t r a t i o n which can be achieved 
by f u l f i l l i n g empirical d e s i r e . Moreover, e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s hold 
tha t man must des i re in order to e x i s t only^ and in t h i s act of 
des i r ing he too cons t i t u t e s himself as incomplete and unfu l f i l l ed . 
This incompleteness or unfulf i l lment i s necessary if man i s to 
be ' f r e e ' even in the sense of being able to ove>^come obs tac l e s . 
Nietzsche makes t h i s point more c l e a r l y a s se r t ing tha t freedom 
can be measured by the r e s i s t e n c e which has to be overcome and 
by the e f fo r t s i t takes to maintain oneself on top . Sartre 
expresses the same point in h i s own language. Freedom, he says, 
" i t s e l f c rea tes the obs tac les from which we su f fe r . " But the 
obs tac les which stand in one ' s way would not ex is t as obstacles 
were i t not for h is free choice of va lues . In a word, to do or 
not to do, i t i s freedom i t s e l f . 
Secondly, e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s say t h a t even i f man could succeed 
in f u l f i l l i n g a l l his p a r t i c u l a r , empirical d e s i r e s , he would 
s t i l l not achieve happiness; for the des i r e of p a r t i c u l a r , 
empirical objects in the world i s always suspended from and merely 
1 . S a r t r e , J .P.f Being and Nothingness. Op. C i t . , p . 87. 
2 . I b i d . . p . 88. 
3 . I b i d . , p .495. 
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a specification of an overarching desire for the impossible. 
In this respect, the existentialists argument is that**a satisfied 
desire in the sense of an achieved desire does not bring satisfac-
tion in the sense of pleasure or happiness. 
Third, the last objection of existential philosophers 
against the common notion of freedom that even if man could 
escape from desire and could find pleasure or happiness in a 
state of total desire fulfilment , this could only be at the 
cost of intensity and the existential values. And of course 
existentialists hold that the intense life with the existential 
values would certainly be superior to a state of contentment or 
2 
happiness. 
These are the three arguments on the basis of which 
existentialists reject the commonsense conception of freedom 
indicating that the power to achieve particular goals is not 
itself a great value. 
« 
The existentialist argument against freedom through self-
realization, as the classical thinkers define it, rests primarily 
upon the belief that man has no readymade or pre-human nature, 
no divine essence which is to be automatically realized. Atheist 
Nietzsche and Sartre agree that there is no God, and that is 
why there is no divine essence or human nature. For Nietzsche 
1. Olson, R.G., O^. Cii., PP. 100-107. 
2. Ibid., pp. 100-107. 
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"God is dead" and for Sartre "there is no God", Thus he 
emphasizes: 
,.,There is no human nature, because there 
is no God to have a conception of it, Man 
simply is. Not that he is simply what he 
conceives himself to be, but he is what he 
wills, and as he conceives himself after 
already existing as he wills^to be after 
that leap towards existence. 
Further, Sartre himself defined existentialism as the view 
2 
which holds that "existence precedes essence," In this connection 
he also referred to the Leibnizian view that man's existence 
comes before his essence and he is defined by the choice of his 
ends. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre says: 
Adam's essence is for Adam himself a given; 
Adam has not chosen it; he could not choose 
to be Adam, Consequently he does not support 
the responsibility for his being, ,,, For us, 
on the contrary, Adam is not defined by an 
essence since for-,huraan reality essence comes 
after existence. 
In other words, according to existentialist thinkers, man makes 
his own history by his own choices, and his true life history 
or individual essence could not conceivably be known or defined 
until after his death. William Barrett, with reference to 
Heidegger points out that man makes history by his actions: 
We are not born at some moment in general, 
but at that particular moment in that parti-
cular milieu and in entering the world we 
also enter, however humbly, into its his-
torical destiny. The more concretely and 
1. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism. 0|>> Cjt.. p,28, 
2. Ibid., p. 28o 
3. Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, Op, Cit,. p.468. 
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humbly we grasp the temporal roots of 
human existence, the more clearly we 
see that this existence is in and of 
itself, through and through, historical. 
As temporality is to time, so is his-
toricity to history; as we make clocks 
to measure time because our being is 
essentially temporal, so man writes his-
tories or makes history by his actions^ 
because his very being is historical. 
Existentialists are deeply interested in the dignity of 
of the individual person; and according to them a being who 
does not personally support the responsibility for his individual 
history and who does not choose himself or makes himself, is, 
in reality a person without dignity. 
It is also very essential to keep in mind that for 
existentialist thinkers man is free by ontological necessity 
and that any attempt to escape from 'freedom' is necessarily self-
defeating. In one particular sense, then, freedom is a universal 
human phenomenon which does not permit of degrees. At the same 
time, however, the existentialists have an axiological doctrine 
of freedom according to which one is aware of freedom as an onto-
logical necessity andsoceases to try escape from freedom. An individual 
exposed to a situation which obliges him to become conscious of 
his freedom is thus more free than the individual not so 
obliged. 
As stated earlier the view of existentialists on freedom 
in general rejects the traditional arguments in favour of the 
1. Barrett W., Irrational Man, (London: Heineraann, 1961), p.204. 
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freedom of the will. Such an existentialist view against the 
classical conception of •freedom' is expressed in the writings 
of Nikolai Berdyaev. He voices the opinion of existentialists, 
when he emphasizes that the question is not at all that of 
'freedom of the will', as stated in naturalistic, psychological 
or pedagogical-moralistic usage. The difficulty in these tradi-
tional arguments, Berdyaev points out, was that they attempted 
to 'objectify' freedom; to treat it as an object that could 
somehow be perceived, investigated, and either proved or disproved 
from outside. But for the existentialists (as for Kant), he 
argues, freedom is not to be proved, but is rather a postulate 
2 
of action. In the strict sense, "Freedom is not something to 
•z. 
be proved or argued about; it is a reality to be experienced". 
Freedom is already there as a condition of our existing (including 
our thinking). Berdyaev holds: "To understand an act of freedom 
rationally is to make it resemble the phenomena of nature" ; and 
this very phenomenon belongs to a 'secondary' world. Freedom, 
according to him, must be already there before one can even think 
of such a world. While speaking of this type freedom that is 
prior to the phenomenal world, Berdyaev's language assumes a 
1. Macquarrie, J., 0£. Cit., p. 178. 
2. Ibid., p. 178. 
3. Titus, H.H., O^. Cit., p. 303. 
4. Cf, John Macquarrie's, Existentialism, op. Cit., p. 178, 
76 
metaphysical or rather a mystical over tone. To stress the 
priority of freedom he often^like Sartre^ says that freedom 
has the primacy over beingj 
But freedom cannot be derived from being; 
it is rooted in nothingness, in non-being, 
if we are to use ontological terminology. 
Freedom is baseless,^ neither determined by 
nor born of beiiig. 
Similarly, Sartre, in his"Essay on Phenomenological Ontology" 
(i.e. "Being and Nothingness") declares thus: 
Freedom is not a being; it is the being of 
man i.e., his nothingness of being. ... 
Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes 
free; he is wholly and forever free or he 
is not free at all. ^  
In brief, the existentialist philosophers do not use the 
term "freedom" in the classical or traditional sense or as 
common men use it. The ordinary man believes that he is most 
free when he is not obliged to choose or when circumstances 
clearly dictate which one choice is the best. The existentialist 
thinker, on the contrary, believes that man is most free when 
he recognizes that he is obliged to choose. The ordinary man 
says that freedom is valuable because it leads to happiness, 
security and contentment. The existentialist says that freedom 
is valuable because through it man may realize his own dignity, 
2. Sartre, J,P., Being and Nothingness, Op. Crt., p. 441. 
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and triumph over the unhappiness to which he is irrevocably-
condemned. Again, the ordinary man tries to ignore the unpleasant 
facts of life, and if he is exposed to an "impossible situation" 
where no choice could conceivably be a choice of happiness, he 
is without recourse. Conversely, the existentialist thinker 
refuses to ignore the unpleasant facts of life and spends most 
of his time trying to find some suitable techniques by which 
to triumph over them. For an existentialist freedom reveals in 
dread. In the state of dread or anguish an existing human 
individual becomes aware of his freedom: 
It is in anguish that man becomes the 
consciousness of his freedom, or if 
you prefer, anguish is the mode of 
being of freedom as consciousness of 
being; it is in anguish that freedom 
is, in its being, in question for 
itself. '• 
To summarize the existentialist view regarding freedom, it seems 
appropriate to refer to Berdyaev's notion of freedom indicating 
its mystical roots: 
Freedom is indeed 'meontic', a nothing 
rather than a something, a possibility 
rather than an actuality, It cannot be 
grasped by thought but only known 
through the exercise of freedom; and 
perhaps even then it is only in those 
rare moments of the experience of 
anxiety in the face of freedom that 
we perceive something of that abyssal 
and primoridal character of freedom, 2 
1 . Gumming, R. Denoon, ( e d t . ) The Phi losophy of Jean-Pau l S a r t r e . (London: Methuen & Co. L t d . , 1 9 5 8 ; , p , 115 , 
2o Macquar r i e , J . , 0£ , C i t . « p , 179. ^it*^/^'^^'^^ iiUb-^ki, 
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I t may be concluded that a l l ex is ten t ia l thinkers have 
a conspicuously anti-determinist ic outlook. Broadly speaking, 
i t can be said that "the common in te res t which unites existen-
t i a l philosophers is the i r in te res t in human freedom. »1 
<^[^^ 
^ 
f S i S ^ 
r/r^/r 
1. Mary Warnock, Existentialism. (Oxford University Press, 1977), 
p. 01. 
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CHAPTER - III 
SARTRE'S NOTION OF FREEDOM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
FOR INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), a French philosopher and 
writer, is the leading proponent of French atheistic existen-
tialism. His philosophical views are distinct from other thinkers 
of the same school and his impact on modern thought is unprecedented. 
The writings of Sartre have probably been more influential in the 
West than those of any other thinker and literary figure since 
the World Wars, In his theoritical writings, Sartre has laid the 
foundations for an original doctrine of human predicament in modern 
age. His concern, however, has been to relate his theory to human 
response and the practical demands of living. To achieve this 
end, he has carried his philosophical concepts into his novels, 
short stories, plays, film scripts, literary and political essays; 
and subjected them to the test of imaginative experience^His unique-
ness lies in the success with which he demonstrates the validity 
of existentialist doctrine in his literary v/orks that are of the 
highest literary merit. In brief, Sartre has become the popularizer 
of his own philosophical thought as well as existentialist philosophy. 
Among all the existentialist thinkers (both theists and 
atheists), Sartre alone has very clearly represented the existential 
philosophical system^ According to him, "existence precedes 
essence" i.e. man's existence comes before its essence. According 
1. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism, o£. clt., p. 28, 
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to him, there is at least one being whose existence comes before 
its essence. A being which exists before it can be defined by 
any conception of it. That being is man, or as Heidegger explains 
it, the human reality. Sartre explains this dictum saying 
that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in 
the world and defines himself afterwards. He points out that if 
man, in the view of an exi"stentialist thinker, is undefineable, 
"it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be 
anything untill later, and then he will be what he makes of 
2 himself." Man, says Sartre, is nothing else but that which he 
makes of himself. This is the first principle of his philosophy. 
Sartre has systematically developed the theory of freedom 
of the will. His conception of freedom is elaborated in all his 
writings, especially in Being and Nothingness ("L'etre et le meant") 
and Existentialism and Humanism ("L'Existentialism est un human-
isme"). 
Sartre's philosophical magnumopus. Being and Nothinpjness, 
is divided into six sections. It opens with an introduction in 
which the author introduces most of his key terms and discusses 
his method of philosophizing. Then follow four parts: the 
first about "Nothingness", nihilation, negation and bad faith; 
1. Ibid., p. 28. 
2. Ibid.. p. 28. 
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the second about consciousness and i t s be ing- fo r - i t se l f« The 
t h i r d takes up be ing- for -o thers , or 'my s e l f looked at by 
o the r s . This par t deals with community, love and hate and many 
other socia l aspects of l i f e . I t i s in t h i s context xhat man 
r e a l i s e s his r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Pa r t four of the book cons is t s 
of a detai led i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of consciousness r e su l t ing in the 
development of h is theory of freedom. I t may be said with j u s t i -
f i ca t ion tha t the crux of h i s wr i t ings i s embodied in t h i s pa r t 
of "Being and Nothingness". The conclusion, the s ixth sect ion 
of the book, includes a short d iscuss ion of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
an e th ics based on the preceding account. However, i t would not 
seem appropriate to discuss in d e t a i l a l l the sect ions of Being 
and Nothingness, what i s re levant to our theme i s the par t four. 
In support of our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S a r t r e ' s theory of freedom, 
h is other wri t ings would also p a r t l y be refer red t o . While 
dealing with the impl ica t ions of h is theory of freedom and i t s 
p rac t i ca l consequences for ind iv idua l and soc ie ty , one should 
examine the th i rd pa r t of h is Being and Nothingness afso. 
Being and Nothingness, s u b - t i t l e d as "An Essay on Phenomeno-
l o g i c a l Ontology", s t a t e s c l e a r l y the cen t r a l in ten t ion of Sar t re . 
The theme of the 'Essay' v iv id ly ind ica t e s t ha t being i s never 
exhausted by any of i t s phenomenal a spec t s ; no p a r t i c u l a r perspe-
c t ive reveals the e n t i r e charac ter of being. There are two modes 
of 'being ^being-in- i tself and be ing - fo r - i t s e l f» According to 
Sar t re , b e i n g - l n - i t s e l f (en-so i ) i s f ixed , complete, wholly given 
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absolutely contingent, with no reason for i t s being. I t i s 
roughly equivalent to the iner t world of objects and things: 
Bein^~in-itself (Sar t re ' s en-sol) is the self-
contained being of a thing. A stone is a stone; 
i t i s what i t i s ; and in being just what i t i s , 
no more and no l e s s , the being.of the thing 
always coincides with i t s e l f . 
On the contrary, being-for- i tself (pour-sol) i s incomplete, fluid 
indeterminate and i t corresponds to the being of human conscious-
ness: 
Being-for-itself (pour-soi) i s co-existensive with 
the realm of consciousness, and the nature of con-
sciousness i s that i t i s perpetually beyond i t se l f . 
Our thought goes beyond i t se l f , toward tomorrow or p 
yesterday, and toward the outer edges of the world. 
Sartre , further, points out that being- in- i tse l f i s prior to 
being-for- i tself and the l a t t e r i s dependent upon the former for 
i t s origin, Being-for-itself i s derived from being-in- i tself by 
an act of n ihi la t ion (nothingness), for being-for- i tself i s a 
nothingness in the heart of being. Lastly, the author concludes 
his phenomenological essay elucidating the nature and quality of 
freedom and delineating his programme of exis tent ia l psycho-
analysis. Freedom is discussed in re la t ion to the wi l l , in 
relat ion to fac t ic i ty and f inal ly in re la t ion to responsibi l i ty . 
Sartre points out that freedom is the nature of man 
and in anxiety man becomes aware of his freedom, knows himself 
1. Barret t , W,, o£. c i t . , p . 218. 
2. Ib id . , p . 218. 
83 
responsible for h is own being by commitment. He seeks the 
impossible reunion with b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f , and in despair knows 
himself forever at odds with the "others" who by the i r glances 
can threa ten a man, turning him into a mere ob jec t . 
According to Sar t re the w i l l can never be the condi t ion 
of freedom; i t i s simply a psychological manifestation of i t . 
The wi l l presupposes the foundation of an o r ig ina l freedom in 
order to be able to c o n s t i t u t e i t s e l f as w i l l . He says the w i l l 
i s derived or pos i ted by r e f l e c t i v e dec is ion . I t i s a psycholo-
g ica l manifes ta t ion which emerges within the complex of motives 
and ends already pos i ted by the f o r - i t s e l f (mode of be ing) . 
Rightly speaking, according to Sa r t r e , i t i s not tne "Will" tha t 
i s f r ee . "Man i s f r e e , man i s freedom". The w i l l , he assumes, 
i s simply a manifes ta t ion of man's primordial freedom. 
Freedom in r e l a t i o n to f a c t i c i t y gives r i s e to the s i t u a t i o n . 
One should be very c l e a r about the term " f a c t i c i t y " , E x i s t e n t i a l -
i s t s use the /-ord " f a c i l i t y " to designate the l imi t ing fac tor 
in ex i s tence . "Fac t i c i t y ( the word has been coined to t r a n s l a t e 
the German ' F a k t i z i t a t ' and French f a c t i c i t e ' ) does not mean 
"2 
the same as 'factuality'. When one says that something is 
factual one is pointing to an objective state of affairs observable 
in the world. To existentialists, facticity, on the other hand> 
1, Sartre, J,P., Existentialism and Humanism, op. cit., p. 34, 
2o John Macquarrie, Existentialism, op. cit., p. 189. 
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might be cal led trie inner s ide of 'f ? . c tua l i ty ' , In the words of 
John Macquarrie: 
I t i s not an observed s t a t e of a f f a i r s but 
the inward, e x i s t e n t i a l awareness of one 's 
own being as a f ac t tha t i s to be accepted. 
No one has chosen to be . He simply finds 
himself in ex i s t ence . V/e discover ourselves , 
so to speak, as f ree e x i s t e n t s in the midst 
of a world of t h i n g s . We did not put our-
selves i n t ha t world. . . .The f a c t i c a l i s 
the given, and aboV e^ a l ] , the givenness of 
our ex i s t ence . That we are here i s , i f you 
l i k e , an inexp l i cab le bru te f a c t . "^  
Or more p rec i se ly , i n the words of Sa r t r e ' f a c t i c i t y ' i s : 
F a c t i c i t y ( f a c t i c i t e ) . The F o r - i t s e l f ' s 
necessary connection with the I n - i t s e l f , 
hence with the world and i t s own pas t . I t i s 
what allows us to say tha t the For - i t s e l f J ^ 
or g x i s t s . The f a c t i c i t y of freedom i s the p 
fac t t ha t freedom i s not able not to be f ree . 
Thus, freedom in r e l a t i o n to f a c t i c i t y , c e r t a in ly gives r i s e to the 
ex i s t en t i a l situation.The s i t u a t i o n i s t ha t ambiguous phenomenon 
in which i t i s impossible c l e a r l y to d i s t ingu i sh the cont r ibut ion 
of freedom and the determinants of brute circumstances. This 
•5 
accounts for the paradox of freedom. In speaking about the 
"paradox of freedom" Sar t r e holds that human-reality everywnere 
encounters res is tances and obs tac les which i t has not created, 
1. Ibid., pp. 189-90. 
2. Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p. 530. 
3. Magill, Frank N., (Ed.) Masterpieces of World Philosophy, op.cit, 
p. 1080. 
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but these resistances and obstacles having meaning only in and 
through the free choice which human reality is, A man is 
condemned to be free, so, according to Sartre, he did not create 
himself. In a particular concrete situation and anxiety man, 
Sartre asserts, becomes aware of his freedom and knows himself 
responsible for his own being by commitment and for the world 
in which he is thrown. Sartre, in this regard, writes in his 
Being and Nothingness: 
...Man being condemned to be free carries the 
weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he 
is responsible for the world and for himself 
as a way of being, ...Furthermore, this absolute 
responsibility is not resignation; it is simply 
the logical requirement of the consequences of 
our freedom. ...Every thing which happens to me 
is mine... Thus there are no accidents in a life; 
a community event which suddenly bursts forth and 
involves me in it does not come from the outside. 
If I am mobilized in a war, this war is nr^  war; 
it is in my image and I deserve it. I deserve 
it first because I could always get out of it by 
suicide or by desertion; these ultimate possibles 
are those which must always be present for us 
when there is a question of envisaging a situation. 
For lack of getting out of it, I have chosen it. ^  
With a view to resolve the 'paradox of freedom', Sartre points 
out that there is freedom only in situation, and there is a 
situation only through freedom. He delineates five structures 
of the situation in which freedom and facticity interpenetrate 
1« Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. A89. 
2. Ibid., pp. 553-54. 
3. Ibid., p. 489. 
86 
each other: (i) my place, (ii) my past, (iii) my environment, 
(iv) ray fellow men, and (v) my death. Insofar as freedom 
always interpenetrates facticity, man becomes wholly responsible 
for himself. He is responsible for everything except for the 
fact of his responsibility. He is free, but is not free to 
obliterate fully his freedom. He is condemned to be free: 
Condemned, because he did not create himself, 
yet is nevertheless at liberty and from the 
moment that he is thrown into this world, he 
is responsible for everything he does. ^ 
This abandonment to freedom is an expression of his facti-
city. Yet he must assume responsibility for the fact that his 
facticity is incomprehensible and contigent. The result is that 
his facticity or his final abandonment consists simply in the 
fact that he is condemned to be wholly responsible for himself. 
Although freedom and facticity interpenetrate, it remains incon-
testable that freedom is accorded a central place in the Sartrian 
conception of man. 
As mentioned above, Sartre is a radical representative of 
existentialism. Besides him, Nietzsche, Albert Camus, Dostoyevsky 
and Heidegger also fall in the same group (atheistic one). None 
of these thinkers has volunteerly called himself an advocate 
1. Ibi^. ,pp. 489-531. 
2, Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism; p. 34. 
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of ex i s t en t i a l i sm as Sar t re does. He i s very emphatic in a s s e r t -
ing himself to be a r ep resen ta t ive of a t h e i s t i c ex i s t en t i a l i sm . 
He, in t h i s connection, avers : 
Athe is t ic e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , of which I am a 
r ep re sen t a t i ve , dec lares with great cons i s -
tency t h a t . . . God does not e x i s t . . . Of course, 
there i s no Gtod. In o ther words and t h i s i s , 
I be l ieve , the purport of a l l that we in France 
c a l l radicalism^ nothing wi l l be changed i f God 
does not e x i s t ; we s h a l l re-discover the same 
norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and we 
sha l l have disposed of God as an out-of-date . 
hypothesis which w i l l die away quie t ly of i t s e l f . 
Sa r t r e draws important conclusions from atheism. He cons t ructs 
h is phi losophical thought and espec ia l ly a theory of freedom on 
the bas i s of his a t h e i s t i c outlook. 
Sar t re a s s e r t s tha t there i s no God and hence "everything 
i s permi t ted ." Had there been God human freedom would have been 
c u r t a i l e d . In case God does not e x i s t , Sar t re points out , t he re 
i s only one being whose exis tence comes before i t s essence and 
that being i s 'man*, Man i s undefinable because, to begin with 
he i s nothing: 
Freedom i s p rec i se ly the nothingness which 
i s made to -be at the hear t of man and which 
forces haman-real i ty to make i t s e l f ins tead 
of to b e , . , for human r e a l i t y , to be i s to 
choose onese l f ;noth ing comes to i t e i t h e r 
from outs ide or from within which i t can 
receive or accept . . . .Thus , freedom i s not a 
being; i t i s the being^of man i . e . , h i s 
nothingness of be ing . 
1. S a r t r e , J . P , , Ex i s t en t i a l i sm and Humanism, op, c i t , , pp,27 and 
33. ~"" 
2o I b i d , , ppc A40-441, 
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A human individual wi l l not be anything unless and u n t i l l he wi l l 
be what he makes of himself. Hence, according to S a r t r e , 
there i s no human nature because there i s no God to have such a 
conception of i t . As he says: 
For i f indeed existence precedes essence, one 
wi l l never be able to explain one ' s act ion by 
reference to a given and spec i f i c human nature ; 
in other words, there i s no determinism man 
i s f r ee , man i s freedom. ' 
Man i s not what he conceives himself to be, but he is_ what he 
„3 
2 
wills, what he chooses and "what he makes of himself" through 
freedom and "that is the first principle of existentialism. 
Moreover, freedom, according to Sartre, is the sole foundation 
of all values. 
As stated earlier, in his Being and Nothingness, Sartre 
has devoted nearly 184 pages exclusively to freedom, in the fourth 
part entitled "Having, Doing and Being", Freedom, according to 
Sartre, is precisely nothingness: 
Freedom in its foundation coincides with the 
nothingness which is at the heart of man. Human 
reality is free because it is not enough. ^  
1. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism, op. cit., p. 34. 
2. Ibid., p. 28o 
3. Ibid., p. 28. 
4o Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p.440. 
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He holds that "the e s s e n t i a l freedom, the ult imate and f i n a l 
1 
freedom that can be taken from a man i s to say 'No ' " . Nikolai 
Berdyaev has made s imi l a r remarks saying; ".. .Freedom can not 
be derived from being; i t i s rooted in nothingness, in non-being, 
if we are to use on to log ica l terminology. Freedom i s b a s e l e s s , 
2 
neither determined by nor born of being." For Sartre, 
freedom in its very essence is negative, though this negativity 
is also creativity. By this "No" Sartre means that, "Man is the 
being by whom nothing comes into being." In other words, it 
can be said that although all existentialists are interested 
in tne problem of freedom, it is Sartre alone among tnem who has 
presented a rigorously constructed theory of freedom, and he uses 
the terms 'freedom' and 'human reality' synonymously. According 
to him, "the free project is fundamental for it is my being" , 
and "to be human is to be free". 
According to Sartre there is no universally obligatory 
moral law and no set of absolute fixed values, for there is no 
« 
God. Quoting in his lecture on "Humanism" the sayings of 
Dostoyevsky, Sartre asserts that if God does not exist everything 
would be permitted. This conclusion is the starting poing for 
existentialism according to Sartre, He holds that man is the 
1. Barrett, W», 0£. cit., p. 215. 
2 , Cf. John Macquarrie 's Exis ten t ia l i sm, op. c i t . , p . 179. 
3* B a r r e t t , W., ££. c i t . , p . 216. 
4. Cf. The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre^ (Edt.) Robert Denoon 
Gumming, op. cit., p. 267. 
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sole source of values, and it rests with the individual to create 
or choose his own scale of values, and his own ideal. But thjs 
phrase "rests with" leads to the condemnation of freedom: 
The fact is that man cannot help being free, 
and he cannot help acting in the world. Even 
if he chooses to commit suicide, he chooses 
and so acts. And these acts are performed 
with motives. ^  
Again, according to Sartre, it is man himself who makes the 
motive a motive, and who gives it value and meaning. And, in 
this respect, the choice of particular values depends on an 
initial project, an initial choice of an idppl. He "ays 
The individual, simply because he is a free, 
self-transcending subject, cannot help pro-
jecting an initial, freely-chosen ideal, in 
the lightpof which he determines particular 
valueSo 
The individual human person, as mentioned above, is for Sartre, 
the sole source of all values and his freedom being their found-
ation. Regarding this theme, he, in his polemical v/ork Existen-
tialism and Humanism, emphatically expresses: 
We can not decide a' priori what it is that should 
be done, ...Man makes himself; he is not found 
ready-made; he makes himself by the choice of his 
morality, and he cannot but choose a morality, 
such is the pressure of circumstances upon him. 
We define man only in relation to his commitments; 
it is therefore absurd to reproach us for irres-
ponsibility in our choice. -^  
1. Copleston, F., Clpntemporary Philosophy, (London: Search Press, 
1973), p. 189. 
2. Ibid., p. 189. 
3. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism, pp. 49-50. 
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Thus, according to Sar t re man's freedom i s un res t r i c t ed , 
and there i s no given un ive rsa l ly -ob l iga to ry moral law on account 
of which ne ought to a c t . There are no absolute given va lues . 
Man himself i s the source of a l l va lues . In the absence of given 
values or un ive rsa l ly -ob l iga to ry moral law, man's freedom, in 
f ac t , according to S a r t r e , i s r e s t r i c t e d . He poin ts out that 
man's freedom i s r e s t r i c t e d because of h i s own pecul ia r charac te r , 
by h i s physico-psychological make-up and f i n a l l y by the h i s t o r i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n in which he f inds himself ' t h e r e ' i n the world. In 
t h i s way, Sar t re t r i e s to make the ind iv idua l responsible for 
h i s physico-psychological make-up and for the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n 
i n which he finds himself and i n which he has to a c t . He i s 
responsible for every th ing , because he i s an ex i s t ing being tha t 
alone possesses freedom. He i s condemned to freedom: 
My h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n i s what i t i s for me; 
and what i t i s for me depends on the end which 
I have se t before myself. And since I choose 
my ideal or end f r e e l y , i t also depends on me 
what my h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n i s . My l i b e r t y 
i s thus u n r e s t r i c t e d . ^ 
According to Sartre, a human ind iv idua l i s never determined. He 
e x p l i c i t l y says t ha t man cannot be sometimes free and sometimes 
determined: he i s e i t h e r e n t i r e l y and always free or he i s 
3 
never f ree at a l l . The r e a l motive of human behaviour, Sar t re 
1. Copleston, F . , 0£. c i t . . p . 189. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 190o 
3 . S a r t r e , J . P . , Being and Nothingness, op. c i t . . p . 441. 
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holds , i s an o r i g i n a l p ro j ec t of being f ree ly chosen at the 
moment one wrenches oneself away from the i n - i t s e l f to c r ea t e 
one ' s own world. I t i s i n terms of t h i s o r ig ina l p ro jec t of 
being tha t human behavior rece ives i t s ul t imate explanat ion. No 
type of science can expla in human behaviour. S a r t r e , i n h i s 
Being and Nothingness, very emphatically says tha t though "Heredity, 
education, environment, phys io logica l cons t i t u t ion" are "the grea t 
explanatory ( f ac to r s ) of our epoch", but they explain nothing. 
The one and only genuine cause of human behaviour i s the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
fundamental p ro jec t of be ing . And tha t very pro jec t , says S a r t r e , 
2 i s a "Choice, not a s t a t e " ; i t i s not buried in "the darkness 
of unconscious". I t i s r a t h e r a "free and conscious determinat ion" 
of oneself . 
Another crucial concept involved in Sartre's doctrine of 
freedom is 'anguish'. For existentialists, especially for Sartre, 
the term "anguish" stands for every specific meanings. Anguish 
is explained as: 
The reflective apprehension of the self as freedom, 
the realization that a nothingness slips in between 
myself and my past and future so that nothing 
relieves me from the necessity of continually choos-
ing myself and nothing guarantees the validity of the 
values which I choose. Fear is of something in the 
world, anguish is anguish before myself. ^ 
1. Ibldo, p<» 559. 
2. Ibid., po 573. 
3. Ibid., p. 573. 
4. Ibid., p. 628. 
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In this way, Sartre's ultimate proof that an individual's behavior 
is fully determined by a free, prereflective choice of himself, is 
of course, the experience of anguish in which the individual finds 
himself compelled to reconstitute his being in utter isolation and 
without external help. According to Sartre, as mentioned before, 
human reality and freedom are synonymous: "What we call freedom 
is impossible to distinguish from the being of human reality. ... 
there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free 
(etra-libre)". In other words, far from being a rare visitor 
freedom is billeted on man for life and, therefore, man is "const-
rained to be free". Further, when in self-reflection, man appre-
hends his own freedom, when he realizes that consciousness is not 
determined by the past because past is constantly "nihilated", 
and in this way, grasps his total separation from the world and 
with it the impossibility of excusing one's choices, in such a 
state, there occurs anguish. Sartre, in this connection, says 
in his Being and Nothingness: 
In each instance of reflection anguish is born 
as a structure of the reflective consciousness 
in so far as the latter considers consciousness 
as an object of reflection;... ^ 
Theoretically speaking, in the face of anguish one should be 
able to adopt various attitudes, but the immediate and the most 
natural behavior when confronted with anguish is flight. In this 
10 Olson, Robert G., 0£. cit., p. 121. 
2. Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 25. 
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state man flees from the responsibility of choice and escapes it 
by depicting himself as a thing, determined by his past. This 
results in inauthenticity of existence, according to Sartre. He 
says: 
Psychological determinism, before being a theoritical 
conception, is first an attitude of excuse, or^if you 
prefer, the basis of all attitudes of excuse. 
In short, what is called the anguish of freedom could more accura-
tely be called "anguish before the necessity of choosing," The 
anguish of freedom, Sartre holds, is really anguish over the fact 
that one must choose: "For human reality", Sartre asserts, 
"to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from the 
2 
outside or from within which it can receive or accept." He 
further adds that in every situation one has to choose, and even 
not to choose is also a choice. "I can always choose, but I must 
know that if I do not choose, that is still a choice. The anguish 
of freedom arises only with the realization that one must always 
decide for oneself, and that efforts to shift the burden of respon-
sibility upon others are necessarily self-defeating. Not to choose, 
as mentioned above, is also to choose, for even if we deliver our 
power of decision to others, we are still responsible for having 
done so. It is always the individual who decides that others 
will choose for him. At times he may dull the awareness of 
1. Ibid., p. 40. 
2. Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 4A0, 
3» Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism, op. crt., p. 48, 
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his original and inalienable responsibility, but he can never 
wholly suppress that awareness. It will always be there even 
on the surface of consciousness as a vague sense of guilt or 
uneasy feeling or personal inadequacy. In this regard Sartre 
says: 
I am condemned to be free. This means that no 
limits to my freedom can be found except freedom 
itself or, if you prefer^ that we are not free 
to cease being free. To the extent that the 
for-itself wishes to hide its own nothingness 
from itself and to incorporate the in-itself as 
its true mode of being, it is trying also to 
hide its freedom from itself. 1 
Thus, of all the existentialists, Sartre has most stressed the 
anguish of freedom. The manner in which he has developed the 
set of ideas connected with this form of anguish has, therefore, 
a special interest and concern. Pointing out the importance of 
•choice' Sartre says that the universe would be vain and meaning-
less if man does not endow it with meaning by an unceasing act 
of choice. Freedom is the summum bonum of Sartre's ethical system 
as well as his socio-political thought. The very being of 
the For-itself (existing human individual) which is "condemned 
to be free", insists Sartre, "must choose itself i.e., make 
itself. To be free does not mean 'to obtain what one has wished' 
but rather "by oneself to determine oneself to wish" (in the 
1. Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, pp. 439-AO. 
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broad sense of choosing). In other words, to Sartre, "Success 
-1 
is not important to freedom." 
So far we have given the salient features of Sartre's notion 
of freedom for existing individual person. Now we propose in 
brief to assess the implications of his doctrine of freedom for 
society and politics. 
Here again Sartre's major philosophical work "Being and 
Nothingness" would mainly be considered for elaborating the issue. 
The part four, "Having, Doing and Being" in general and its third 
sub-part "Freedom and Responsibility", in particular would be 
sufficient to expoundthe crux of the problem. Sartre has also 
dealt with this problem in Existentialism and Humanism, and 
The Problem of Method as well. 
Man being "condemned to be free" carries the weight of the 
whole world on his shoulders. He is responsible for the world 
and for himself as a way of being. Besides his own being, he has 
to realise the existence, freedom and responsibility for others. 
According to Sartre, the word "responsibility" means in its 
ordinary sense: "consciousness (of) being the incontestable 
2 
author of an event or an oboect," In this sense the responsibility 
1. Ibid.., pp. 483 and 631. 
2. Ibid., op. cit., p. 553. 
7 
of the for-itself or an existing individual is overwhelming 
since he is the one by whom it happens that there is a world 
and since he is also the one who radically makes himself to be, 
whatever may be the situation in which he finds himself. The 
for-itself must wholly assume this situation with its peculiar 
co-efficient of adversity, even though it be insupportable. 
Sartre points out in this connection that: 
(Man) must assume the situation with the proud 
consciousness of being the author of it, for 
the very worat disadvantages or the worst threats 
which can endanger my person have meaning only 
in and through my project; and it is on the ground 
of the engagement which I am that they appear. '^ 
Sartre says further: 
It is, therefore, senseless to think of complaining 
since nothing foreign has decided what we feel, 
what we live, or what we are. ^  
Again, Sartre holds that one must not consider this absolute 
responsibility in terms of resignation but in reality, "it is 
simply the logical requirement of the consequences of our freedom."-^ 
For everything, every happening, existing human being is respon-
sible. Everything occurs in a human situation and not in a non-human 
situation. That is why Sartre says: 
1. Ibid., p. 554. 
2" Ibid.. p. 554. 
5» Ibido. p. 554. 
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What happens to me happens through me, and I 
can neither affect myself with it not revolt 
against it nor resign myself to it. ...Every-
thing which happens to me is mine. By this 
we must understand first of all that I am 
always equal to what happens to me qua man, 
for what happens to a man through other men 
and through himself can be only human. The 
most terrible situation of wars, the worst 
tortures do not create a non-human state of 
things; there is no non-human situation. It 
is only through fear, flight, and recourse to 
magical types of conduct that I shall decide on 
the non-human, but this decision is human, and ^ 
I shall carry the entire responsibility for it. 
Sartre asserts that there are no accidents in a life and a 
community event which suddenly bursts forth and involves one 
in it does not come from the outside. For every decision 
human individual is responsible. To start a war or to stop a war, 
man is free to decide what course of action is to be chosen. It 
is so, because of the fact that "the peculiar character of human-
2 
reality" says Sartre, "is that it is without excuse." 
Sartre uses the term "responsibility" in his own particular 
context. In general its usage is mainly individualistic'. As 
indicated earlier, by "responsibility" Sartre means the sense of 
being "the incontestable author" of one's being,^ The feeling of 
anguish (or "human freedom" as some existentialists call it) 
is an awareness either "muted or in full-strength" that "an 
1. Ibid., p. 554. 
2» Ibid., p. 555. 
3. Ibid., p. 553 
4. Olson, R.G,, o£. cit., p. 30. 
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abrupt metamorphosis of ray i n i t i a l p ro jec t i . e . , by another 
choice of myself and my e n d s . . . t h i s modificat ion i s always 
p o s s i b l e . " Thus, for the person who has known the f u l l - s t r e n g t h 
experience of anguish there can be no ques t ion , according to 
Sa r t r e , that one i s the free author of one ' s ac tua l behaviour or t h a t 
one could subsequently make a free choice to change t o t a l l y one 's 
i n i t i a l p r o j e c t . I t i s evident tha t Sa r t r e comes close to defining 
the experience of anguish as one which br ings a r e a l i z a t i o n of 
these f ac t s to the very surface of consciousness. But here the 
quest ion a r i s e s as to how i s the person who has not personal ly 
had the f u l l - s t r e n g t h experience of anguish to know tha t i t i s 
•poss ib le ? S a r t r e ' s answer, regarding t h i s i s sue i s not as c lea r 
as i t could have been. However, i t appears to mean as follows: 
The p re re f l ec t ive or nonref lec t ive aware-
ness of anguish and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s 
manifested on the surface of consciousness 
in the sense of pr ide or shame. . . 2 
And Sar t re holds that i t i s pe r f ec t ly c l e a r even to the r e f l e c t i v e 
« 
consciousness that one i s often proud or ashamed of fea tures of 
one ' s behaviour (being) which one has not chosen at the l eve l of 
one ' s consciousness.-^ Fiirther, according to him man i s aware of 
himself on the level of r e f l e c t i v e consciousness . To the r e f l e c t -
ive consciousness man's behaviour appears to be determined 
1. S a r t r e , J . P . , Being and Nothingness, op. c i t . , p .464. 
2 . Olson, R.G., o£. c i t . , pp. 122-23. 
3 . I b i d . , p . 123. 
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chiefly by passion and environmental circumstances, Sartre is 
completely aware of such possible way of attack. He writes in 
this regard: 
We are fully conscious of the choice we are. 
And if someone objects that... it would be 
necessary to be conscious not of our-being-
chosen but of choosing ourselves we shall 
reply that this consciousness is expressed 
by the twofold "feeling" of anguish and res-
ponsibility. Anguish, abandonment, responsi-
bility, whether muted or full strength, 
constitute the quality of our consciousness ^ 
in so far as this is pure and simple freedom. 
Anguish, as we know, according to Sartre, is the reflective 
apprehension of the self as freedom. It is the realization that 
a nothingness slips in between oneself and one's past and future 
so that nothing relieves one from the necessity of continually 
choosing oneself. In any case one has to choose and there is no 
guarantee to the validity of one's particular choice. Anguish 
is anguish before those who have borne responsibilities. It is 
also a condition of one's action. In jExistentialism and Humanism, 
Sartre explains the theme of 'anguish' and 'responsibility' by 
giving an example of a military leader: 
Everything happens to every man as though 
the whole human race had its eyes fixed 
upon what he is doing and regulated its 
conduct accordingly. So every man ought 
to say, "Am I really a man who has the 
right to act in such a manner that humanity 
regulates itself by what I do," If a man 
1. Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, p. 454. 
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does not say that, he is dissembling his 
anguish. Clearly, the anguish vdth which 
we are concerned here is not one that could 
lead to quietism or inaction. It is anguish 
pure and simple, of the kind well known to 
all those who have borne responsibilities. 
When, for instance, a military leader takes 
upon himself the responsibility for an attack 
and sends a number of men to their death, he 
chooses to do it and at bottom he alone 
chooses. No doubt he acts under a higher 
command, but its orders, which are more general, 
require interpretation by him and upon that 
interpretation depends the life often, fourteen 
or twenty men. In making the decision, he cannot 
but feel a certain anguish. All leaders know 
that anguish. It does not prevent their acting, 
on the contrary it is the very condition of 
their action, for the action presupposes that 
there is a plurality of possibilities, and in 
choosing one of these, they realise that it has 
value only because it is chosen. Now it is anguish 
of that kind which existentialism describes, and 
moreover, ... makes explicit through direct 
responsibility towards other men who are concerned. 
Far from being a screen vsiiich could separate us ^  
from action, it is a condition of action itself. 
Many critics of existentialism raised this issue that 
"Existentialism" being a philosophical interpretation of "human 
individual" has nothing to do with interpersonal relationship 
or say the life of "others" or the community. But this charge, 
against existentialists seems unjustified. The fact is, what 
Olson says: 
The existentialists have stressed the fundamental 
significance of interpersonal relationships for 
the individual more than the members of any other 
philosophical movement with the single exception 
of humanism, ^  
1. Sartre, J,P,, Existentialism and Humanism, op. cit,, p. 32, 
2, Olson, Robert G., o£, cit,, pp, 166-67. 
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Again, Sartre's critics ask: why should a movement which is 
radically individualistic devote so much space to the analysis 
of human relationships ? Furthermore, is there not an 
inconsistency in maintaining the importance of other persons 
in our lives while at the same time vigorously asserting that 
in the last analysis each of us stands alone and must himself 
as an individual bear full responsibility for this being ? 
Regarding all the above charges of critics against exist-
entialism, actually it may be said that there is no inconsistency 
in the position of Sartre and other existentialists in this matter. 
There are three factors here examined by Olson in this context. 
In the first place, in general, individuality does not 
usually consist in living alone or isolating oneself from others. 
The individualist has to be defined by the manner in which he 
relates to others. In this respect, Socrates and Kierkegaard 
were both intense individualists. They were 'individualists' 
because of theij' personal or say existential experience: 
Kierkegaard despised the plebs; and Socrates 
was executed because of his open contempt 
for "the opinion of the many," which he believed 
a true philosopher or lover of wisdom ought 
totally to ignore. Their dress and behaviour 
was non-conformist to the point of eccentricity; 
and even their2physical appearance set them apart 
from others. 
''• Ibid*, pp. 167-680 
2, Ibid., p. 167. 
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But even then,in"tiieir soc i a l con t rac t s and in t ens i ty of t h e i r 
personal re la t ionsh ips few men are able to match them. For 
Kierkegaard i t was merely the "subject ive sphere" or the 
"inwardness" of man through which he became aware of the 
re la t ionsh ip of o thers ' s u b j e c t i v i t y and of God. S imi la r ly , 
Socrates was a s t r e e t phi losopher , who made i t h is business to t a l k 
with anybody who would spare the t ime. In a s imi lar way, 
S a r t r e ' s much-talked-about cafe l i f e i s as nothing compared to 
i t . 
Secondly, even the man l i v i n g in seclusion, as Nietzsche 
did a good par t of h is l i f e , i s not thereby cut off from o thers 
s p i r i t u a l l y . For, according to him, physical i s o l a t i o n does 
not mean indifference to o t h e r s : 
Physical i s o l a t i o n i s simply one way in which 
men r e l a t e to o thers and thereby define t h e i r 
own being. I f there were but one man in the 
world i t would be impossible for him to with-
draw or r e t r e a t from other human beings. -^  
« 
In other words, the life of the individual would be incomplete 
without the relationship of other individual persons. Even a 
state of recluse may also be defined as a social concept. In 
this regard, Olson refers to Sartre and Camus that even after 
the quarrel their relationship was deep and each influenced 
the life of the other: 
1. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism, (Introduction), 
ojp. cit., p. 06. 
2. Olson, R.G., o£. cit., p. 167. 
3«. Ibid., p. 167. 
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The very concept of a recluse is a social concept; 
one could not be or be defined as such except in 
a social world. After the death of Camus, Sartre 
wrote a tribute to him. In it he mentioned that 
they had quarreled and ceased to see much of one 
another. But, Sartre adds, this was of no import-
ance. They were still close in the sense that 
they read what each other wrote and reacted 
strongly to it. Even after the quarrel each ^ 
figured prominently in the life of the other. 
In simple words, man in his lonliness tries to relate himself 
with others in different types of thinking, feeling, writing, 
creating or doing etc. 
In the third place, it seems absolutely illogical to assume 
the impossibility of retaining one's aloneness in the sense of 
not allowing others to dictate one's choices while simultaneously 
maintaining valuable physical or spiritual contact with others. 
Those critics who feel that there is some sort of logical incon-
sistency in stressing at one and the same time the uniqueness 
of the individual and besides this, his dependence upon others 
« 
are merely betraying the fact that they themselves do not share 
the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ' s bel iefs about the nature and value of personal 
relationshipso Definitely they f a i l to understand the following: 
(a) Kierkegaard's conception of "subjectivity" or the 
2 
"individuals" who according to him "alone are real',' and the 
analysis of the relationship between Gtod and man; (b) Heidegger's 
analysis of "being" (in German, "das Seiende" & "das Sein"), 
1. Ibid., pp. 167-68. 
2, Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism, op. cit., p. 6. 
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His concept of das Man or ' the public at l a rge ' ; Daseirv——man• s 
"being there"——who must l ive out of his l i f e _in and through his 
i; escapable relat ionship to the world; (c) Jasper 's conception 
o philosophical problems, the problem of "communication" or 
H , thou" relat ionship and the idea of Gk)d and Transcendence; 
( [) Marcel's study of 'Being' , man in different s i tuat ions, the 
• f 
i bier sp i r i tua l and worldly l i f e of the individual; (e) Sar t re ' s 
i lalysis of "Being" ( in French, I ' e t an t & I ' e t r e ) . His concepts 
cf nothingness, being-for- i tself , being-in-i tself , being-for-
( thers, freedom and responsibi l i ty , metaphysics and e th ics . 
According to ex i s t en t i a l i s t thinkers there are mainly three 
ignificant values tha t make human relat ionships. These are: 
,i) in tensi ty , ( l i ) dignity, and ( i i i ) personal love. 
The f i r s t value i s in tens i ty . Since human relationships 
involve a reciprocity between free human agents, there i s an 
uneliminable element of threat and danger. In this way, the 
awareness of danger or dread i s the source of a l l intense s ta tes 
of consciousness. 
The second value involved in human relationship i s ' d i g n i t y ' . 
Since there i s a necessary reciprocity in human relat ionships, 
one's freedom can always be pi t ted against the freedom of the 
other. Ex is ten t ia l i s t s hold that no matter how adverse the 
1» Olson, R.G., 02» £il»» PP» 170-171« 
. / 
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circumstances there is always possibility of triumph, so long as 
one maintains the consciousness of one's own freedom. It is but 
natural that on the one hand, man wishes to be recognised within 
the group of human persons, while, on the other hand, he always 
desires to maintain the consciousness of his own personal freedom 
and identity, Sartre delineates the substance in the following 
words: 
The man who discovers himself directly in the 
cogito also discovers all the others, and dis-
covers them as the condition of his own exist-
ence. He recognises that he cannot be anything 
(in the sense in which one says one is spiritual 
or that one is wicked or^jealous) unless others 
recognise him as such. 
Again in the same context he explains that one is unable to know 
the reality of one's ownself, unless one has the ability to mediate 
another. In this connection Sartre says: 
I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, 
except through the mediation of another. The 
other is indispensable to my existence, and equally 
so to any knowledge I can have to myself. Under 
these conditions, the inti&iate discovery of myself 
is at the same time the revelation of the other as 
a freedom which confronts mine, and which cannot 
think or will without doing so either for or against 
me. Thus, at once, we find ourselves in a world 
which is, let us say, that of "inter-subjectivity". 
It is in this world that man has to decide what 
he is and what others are, ^  
1, Sartre, J,P,, Existentialism and Humanism, op, cit,, p. 45, 
^* Ibid., p, 45, 
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In the sphere of dignity, on the one hand, man has relationship 
with others, and realizes personally of his freedom, on the other. 
Finally, according to some existentialists (especially 
Marcel) the human condition permits personal love as the source 
of human relationships. Love is an enterprise and an intense 
relationship between two persons, i.e., two free human agents. 
Love, a substitute term for existential experience, works'as the 
unitive creative factor. It is not only necessary for the mutual 
recognition of one's own and the others' freedom but also a 
sufficient condition for it. Two persons who mutually recognise 
the irreducible human reality of the other cannot but love one 
another. They may remain engrossed in their own egocentricity and 
be involved in their own personal projects. Yet it can be said 
that each will necessarily remain for the other a live presence 
and a being of inestimable worth. In this regard Olson remarks: 
Mutual recognition of the other's freedom 
separates two persons and guarnatees their 
uniqueness, but at the same time it reveals 
them to one another as individuals and 
guarantees the possibility of genuine commu-
nication or exchange,'' 
But for Sartre, love in its sexual as well as its emotive forms, 
far from being a cohesive force, is a source of conflict. Love 
2 
i s "the desire to assimilate the other to myself," But on accent 
of the fact that the For- i t se l f can never be reduced to an in - i t se l f 
the attempt to assimilate the subjectivity of the other or to be 
1, Olson, Robert G,, 0£, c i t « . p , 171. 
2 . Macquarrie, J»» Existentialism. op» c i t . , p . 116, 
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assimilated by the other is bound to result in frustration and 
ambiguity. Further "even the desire to become merely flesh in 
its character as en-soi. In any case, whatever partial satis-
faction may be obtained in the sexual act is dispersed by its 
consummation." Sartre says that while man attempts to free 
himself from the hold of the other, the *other' is trying to 
free himself from him. In this way both the parties seek to 
enslave the other. Sartre gives the name "conflict" to this 
reciprocal or object-in-itself and moving relation. He says: 
These projects put me in direct connection 
with the other's freedom. Itpis in this-
sense that love is a conflict. 
In the light of these facts, Sartre observes that, the other's 
freedom is the foundation of man's being. But if he exists by 
means of other's freedom, he has no security. He feels insecure 
in this type of freedom. Man has to exist, in any case, as a 
free being. Sartre says: 
My project of recovering my being can be 
realized only if I get hold of this freedom 
and reduce It to being a freedom subject to 
my freedomP 
1 . I b i d . , p . 116. 
2 . S a r t r e , J . P . , jBeing and Nothingness, op. c j . t . . p . 366. 
3 . I b i d . , p . 366. 
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Sartre introduces a concept of ' a l iena t ion ' closely 
akin to that of Marx, but with features that preserve coherence 
with the philosophical outlook presented in Being and Nothingness. 
He i s of the view that man*s own action is alienated, if i t s 
effect i s as though i t were the act of another person or of 
"the others" . In the case of such an action, Sartre claims, one 
becomes as though one were the others, and not himself. 
Through subjugation to public opinion a man behaves otherwise 
than would be natural for him; he acts as the others, and each 
one of the others does the same. Thus, he does not remain 
himself but becomes a "prey for others". I t i s in such a 
s i tuat ion that alienation takes place. 
Sartre conspicuously stresses upon man's freedom and 
f a c t i c i t y . No doubt man i s condemned to be free and has his 
unique subjective being. I t i s a fact that he i s far more 
radical ly alienated from his being-for-others than from his 
f a c t i c i t y . But th i s s t a t e , together with the fact that his 
being-for-others must be lived on the prereflective level in 
pride or shame, makes of his being-for-others a far more fearful 
structure of being than f ac t i c i t y . In other words, according 
to Sartre, the presence or "The existence of Others" makes man to 
1^ . Ib id . , p. 543. 
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feel a sense of guilt, shame, fall and alienation. He says; 
If there is an Other, whatever or 
whoever he may be, whatever may 
be his relations with me, and 
without his acting upon me in any 
way except by the pure upsurge of 
his being then I have an outside, 
I have a iiature. My original fall is 
the existence of the Other, Shame 
like pride is the apprehension of 
myself as a nature although that 
very nature escapes me and is un-
knowable as such.'' 
He further underlines the above theme in the chapter three: 
"Concrete Relations With Others" in part three: (Being-
For-Others) of his philosophical magnum opus 'Being 
and Nothingness': 
It is before the Other that I am 
guilty. I am guilty first when 
beneath the Other's look I expe-' 
rience my alienation and my naked-
ness as a fall from grace 
which I must assume. This is 
the meaning of the famous 
line from Scripture: "They knew 
that they were naked." Again 
I am guilty when in turn 
I look at the Other, because 
by the very fact of my own 
self-assertion I constitute him as an 
object and as an instrument. 
1. Ibid., p. 263. 
I l l 
and I cause him to experience t h a t same 
a l i ena t ion which he must know assume. Thus 
o r ig ina l s in i s my upsurge i n a world where 
there are o t h e r s ; and whatever may be my 
fur ther r e l a t i o n s with o t h e r s , these r e l a t -
ions wi l l be only v a r i a t i o n s on the o r ig ina l 
theme of my g u i l t , 1 
Generally S a r t r e ' s ph i losophica l out- look appears to be an 
" i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c " one, because "man" i s the cen t ra l theme of h i s 
thought system. Around t h i s e x i s t i n g human individual or " I " 
with freedom, Sar t re developed h i s phi losophical system. On the 
bas is of an individual man and h i s freedom, Sar t re developed his 
views on d i f fe ren t s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , moral and re l ig ious i s s u e s . 
Among them socia l problem occupies the most important place in 
h i s philosophy. However, fo r him, freedom of choice, individual 
d ign i ty , personal love and c r e a t i v e e f fo r t are the p r inc ipa l 
va lues , which are a l l grounded i n the highest value, i , e . , freedom. 
As mentioned prev ious ly , i n S a r t r e ' s e x i s t e n t i a l ph i loso -
phica l out-look human ind iv idua l plays the cen t ra l and p ivo ta l * 
r o l e . His famous dictum "exis tence precedes essence" has become 
the s t a r t i n g point and the c e n t r a l po in t for "ex is ten t ia l i sm" 
as we l l . The one being whose exis tence comes before i t s essence 
i s human r e a l i t y . Freedom i s a p a r t and parcel of man's being. 
He i s condemned to be f r e e . Sa r t r e says: 
"Man i s nothing e l se but what he purposes, he 
ex i s t s only i n so fa r as he r e a l i s e s himself 
he i s t he re fo re , nothing e l se but the sum of 
h i s ac t ions , nothing e l se but what h i s l i f e 
is .w^ 
1 . I b i d , . p , 410. 
2, Sartre, J,P,, Existentialism and Humanism, op, cit., p. 41. 
112 
Actually what Sartre wants to say is that man should first 
of all realise himself. How far is he free and what is his 
responsibility towards his own being and other beings ? He 
makes his own position clear by saying: 
The first effect of existentialism is that it 
puts every man in possession of himself as he 
is, and places the entire responsibility for 
his existence squarely upon his shoulders. ' 
In Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre very clearly indicates 
that man's responsibility is not merely for his own existence, 
(though in Being and Nothingness, as discussed earlier, he 
stresses it mainly for human existence and his dignity) but 
he is responsible for the world as well; 
When we say that man is responsible for himself, 
we do not mean that he is responsible only for 
his own individuality, but he is responsible for 
all men. 2 
By defining the term "subjectivism", Sartre makes a radical 
attempt to analyse the concept of freedom and its implications 
« 
for individual and society. He explains: 
'•Subjectivism" means, on the one hand, the 
freedom of individual subject and, on the 
other, that man cannot pass beyond human 
subjectivity. It is the latter which is 
the deeper meaning of existentialism. ^ 
1. Ibid., p. 29. 
2. Ibid., p. 29. 
3. Ibid., p. 29. 
5 ISi^iJt ^^ ,is^V 
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This latter aspect *man cannot move out (or go beyond) his 
subjectivity' has its very relation, Sartre insists, for 
•others' also. In other words, it is here that one finds the 
Implication of Sartre's notion of freedom for society. As,in 
this connection he remarks: 
When we say that man chooses himself, we do 
mean that everyone of us must choose himself; 
but by that we also mean that in choosing 
for himself he chooses for all men.1 
Sartre argues that all the actions of man are directed to create 
himself and his environment. Human freedom bestows upon man the 
responsibility of creating social conditionas that are necessary 
for living as free beings. To choose between this or that is 
at the same time to know and affirm the value of that which is 
choosen; because men are unable to choose the worse. Sartre 
asserts that one will not choose worse because it is not good for 
him and at the same time for others like hims 
What we choose' is always the better; and nothing p 
can be better for us unless it is better for all. 
Moreover, when one wills to exist he fashions his image accordingly, 
and this very image is valid for all men and for the entire epoch 
in which we find ourselves. In this regard, Sartre observes that 
man's responsibility is greater than it was conceived to be any 
time earlier in the history of human thought. He emphatically 
1. Ibid., p. 29. 
2. Ibid., p. 29. 
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says : 
Our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s thus much grea te r than 
we ri^ ad supposed, for i t concerns mankind as 
a wr-ole. 
In h i s vrorK, 'The Problem of Method,' Sa r t re has also made 
an attempt to examine the socia l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e of an indiv idual 
This work i s t he f i r s t pa r t of h i s new theory of man as a soc ia l 
and p o l i t i c a l b e i n g . I t i s a theory avowedly Marxist in a very 
o r i g i n a l s ense . For Sar t re has the aim of re invigora t ing Marxism 
by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a new method the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t method. 
As he himself c l e a r l y says: 
I h3ve shown in 'The Problem of Method' t h a t t h i s 
i s riecessary if a l i v i n g Marxism i s to incorporate 
intci i t s e l f the d i s c i p l i n e s which have h i the r to 
reuialned external to i t . ^ 
Existent!sJLism, says Sar t re in the Preface of h is new work: 
The Problem of ?fethod (preface of Cr i t ique de l a ra ison d ia lec t ique) 
must find i t s p l a c e -withinthe frame work of Marxist philosophy: 
" . . I consider Marxism to be the unsurpassable-
( i ncepas sab l e ) philosophy of our t ime, and 
be<:ause I look upon the ideology of exis tence 
(a r:.ew name for h i s e a r l i e r "ex i s ten t ia l i sm") 
and its 'comprehensive'method as an enclave 
wi t i - in Marxism i t s e l f which at the same time 
embraces and r e j ec t s i t . " ^ 
1. Ibid., p. 29. 
2. Sartre, J.P-, Critique of Dialectical Reason, (Trans.) Alan 
Sherdan-Smiiii, and ed. Jonathan Ree,(Paris: Editions Gallimard, 
1982), p. 15. 
3. Sartre, J.F., The Problem of Method. (Paris: Gallimard, I960), 
pp. 9-10, iCf. Arne Maess' ^ ed.^  ''Tour Modern Philosophers" 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 19b9, pp« 27b-277). 
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Sartre strongly criticizes contemporary Marxists in 
the communist parties and socialist countries for having lost 
sight of Marx's recognition of the peculiarity of 'human existence'. 
Moreover, they look upon Marxism as though it was already a science, 
and not, as simply a set of statements about which way man has to 
go. Sartre says: 
...We reproach contemporary Marxism for arbitrarily 
casting aside all the concrete conditions of human 
life and for preserving nothing from the totality 
of history but the abstract skelton of universality. 
The result is its total loss of the sense of what 
man is: it has nothing with which to cover, up this 
lack by the absurd psychology of Pavlov. 
Therefore, what one should do, Sartre emphasizes, is not to 
2 
reject Marxism, but "recapture man in the heart of Marxism." In 
brief, in 'The Problem of Method', Sartre represents his new 
theory of man as a social agent. He aims at reinvigorating Marxism 
by existentialist concepts of human freedom and individuality, and 
the existential method of explaining human experience in terms 
of human choices. When Marxism has thus been fully modernized 
and humanized, Sartre argues, existentialism as a separate philoso-
phy will cease to exist. 
In order to understand Sartrian conception of a free society, 
Marxism may provide a way to look at it. In this attempt to 
I* Ibid>» p. 277. 
2. Ibid., p. 277. 
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to incorporate his existentialism into a new Marxist synthesis 
Sartre has laid emphasis on man as a member of a society, a 
member of a class, a (free) representative of an epoch, that 
is his existence as a free and creative constituent of collective 
human existence. Having gone through the entire works of Sartre, 
one finds clearly that his philosophy is very ambiguous with 
regard to social and political issues, especially in the matter 
of the relationship of an individual and his society. His doctrine 
of freedom seems much individualistic rather than socialistic. 
However, his philosophical writings contain long phenomenological 
analysis. Sartre's fame as a novelist and dramatist should 
certainly not lead one to underestimate him as a philosopher or 
to think that he is a mere dilettante. 
However, Sartre's creative writings present his ideas of 
human existence and its historicity, freedom and socio-political 
responsibility in a concrete form through men and women acting 
and creating themselves with others and the world as well. His 
triology. Roads to Freedom, a set of three novels, "The Age of 
Reason". "The Reprieve", and "Iron in the Soul", w^hich deal 
with the human predicament in a Europe shettered by the Second 
World War. These novels present different characters choosing 
to be what they should be. At the same time there are certain 
other characters that flee from choosing freely and lose themselves 
amidst the faceless crowd of the war-victims and emigrants. 
Sartre himself chose to join and lead the 'Resistence Movement' 
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of the French people living under the dictatorial regime of the 
Nazi Germany. Sartre depicts both 'silence' and 'action' as two 
ways of choosing freedom. If one chooses to keep silent, it 
means he refuses to have any communication with the Nazi rule. 
In Republic of Silence Sartre describes the situation of the 
French Resistance from 1 9 ^ to 19A5 in the following words: 
We were never more free than during the German 
occupation. We had lost all our rights, beginn-
ing with the right to talk. Every day we were 
insulted to our faces and had to take it in 
silence. Under one pretext or another, as workers, 
Jews, or political prisoners, we were deported 
en masse. Everywhere, on billboards, in the news-
papers, on the screen, we encountered the revolt-
ing and insipid picture of ourselves that our 
suppressors wanted us to accept. And because of 
all this we were free. Because the Nazi venom 
seeped into our thoughts, every accurate thought 
was a conquest. Because an all-powerful police 
tried to force us to hold our tongues, every word 
took on the value of a declaration of principles. 
Because we were hunted down, everyone of our 
gestures had the weight of a solemn commitment... 
Exile, captivity, and especially death (which 
we usually shrink from facing at all in happier 
days) became for us the habitual objects of our 
concern. We learned that they were neither 
inevitable accidents, nor even constant and inevi-
table dangers, but they must be considered as our 
lot itself, our destiny, the profound source of 
our reality as men. At every instant we lived 
up to the full sense of this commonplace little 
phrase: "Man is mortal!" And the choice that 
each of us made of his life was an authentic 
choice because it was made face to face with death, 
because it could always have been expressed in 
these terms: "Rather death than..." And here I am 
not speaking of the elite among us who were real 
Resistants, but of all Frenchmen who, at every 
hour of the night and day throughout four years, 
answered No. '' 
1 . Cf. 
PP 
I r r a t i o n a l Man by William B a r r e t t (Heinmann, London) 1961, 
, 213-214 . 
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Again, after 19A^ 7 Sartre reasserted his philosophic exposition 
in this connection in his work : What is Literature; 
We have been taught to take Evil seriously. 
It is neither our fault nor our merit if we 
lived in a time when torture was a daily 
fact, Chateaubriand, Oradour, the Rue des 
Saussaies, Dachau, and Auschwitz have all 
demonstrated to us that Evil is not an 
appearance, that knowing its cause does not 
dispel it, that it is not opposed to Gk)od 
as a confused idea is to a clear one, that it 
is not the effect of passions which might be 
cured, of a fear which might be overcome, of 
a passing aberration which might be excused, 
of an ignorance which might be enlightened, 
that it can in no way be diverted, brought 
back, reduced, and incorporated into idealistic 
humanism, like that shade of which Leibnitz has 
written that it is necessary for the glare of 
daylight... 
Perhaps a day will come when a happy age, 
looking back at the past, will see in this 
suffering and shame one of the paths which 
led to peace. But we are not on the side of 
history already made. We were, as I have 
said, situated in such a way that every lived 
minute seemed to us like something irreducible. 
Therefore, in spite of ourselves, we came to 
this conclusion, which will seem shocking to 
lofty souls: Evil cannot be redeemed. ' 
« 
I t i s not poss ib le here to quote ex tens ive ly from the 
l i t e r a r y works of J . P . S a r t r e , However, i t would not be out of 
place to reproduce here some excerpts from William B a r r e t ' s 
book I r r a t i o n a l Man, deal ing with S a r t r e ' s s u b s t a n t i a l i z a t i o n 
of h i s doct r ine of freedom: 
His f i r s t novel, Nausea (1938), may well be 
h is best book for the very reason tha t in 
1 . I b i d . , p . 214. 
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the i n t e l l e c t u a l aid the c r ea t i ve a r t i s t come 
c loses t to being jo ined . Much as ideas and 
the e laborat ion of ideas f igure in the book, 
the author has not shirked the n o v e l i s t ' s 
t a s k s , and the remarkable th ings i s the l i f e 
with which the ideas are invested, which forms 
the int imate t ex tu r e of the hei^o's experience 
and s e n s i b i l i t y . The mood of t h i s l i f e i s 
d i sgus t , which can as well as any o ther mood 
become the occasion of discovery, a r ad ica l 
plunge into one*s own existences I t i s authen-
t i c a l l y human, t h i s d i sgus t , and turns out to be 
n o v e l i s t i c a l l y exc i t i ng , though i t has nothing 
l i k e the grand scope and implicat ions of C e l i n e ' s 
d i sgus t . S a r t r e ' s treatment i s more se l f -conscious 
and more sub t l e , ph i losophica l ly , but also more 
s t a t i c ; h is disgust i s not embodied, as Ce l ine ' s 
i s , in the desperate picaresque of common l i f e 
and the anonymous depths of s t r e e t cha rac t e r s . 
Nausea i s not so much a f u l l novel as an ex t r a -
ordinary fragment of one. In his l a t e r f i c t i o n 
Sar t re has turned away from the narrow and 
in tense form of the ear ly book to a broader 
panorama, and not always with e n t i r e l y happy r e s u l t s . 
These l a t e r novels——originally a t r i logy^ Less 
Chemins de la Liber te (The Roads to Liber ty ; an3 
now a t e t ra logy may go on being issued as endless ly 
as the roman fleuve of Ju les Remains, i f S a r t r e ' s 
volcanic a c t i v i t y as a wr i t e r cont inues . One does 
wish tha t Sar t re would pause for a while and regroup 
h i s fo r ce s . The man r e a l l y wri tes too much. 
Perhaps if l i t e r a t u r e becomes a mode of ac t ion one 
gets so caught up in i t t ha t one cannot stop the 
ac t ion . These l a t e r novels of h i s contain remarkable 
things great scenes and passages and their theme 
is the central Sartrian one of the search for liberty, 
or rather for the realization in life of that liberty 
that we always and essentially are, sometimes even 
in spite of ourselves. Yet they are so uneven in 
achievement, one regrets to see Sartre's great 
talents wandering and thinning out like spilt milk. 
Of his plays,too, it may be said that his two 
earlier and shorter ones Les Mouches (The Flies) 
and Huis Clos (No Exit)>'—are his best. They are 
at any rate the things to recommend to the reader 
who wishes to get the concrete drift of Sartre's 
philosophy but has no stomach for the elaborate 
dialectic of Being and Nothingness. 
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The Flies, first produce while the Resistance 
was still going on, is in form something of a 
set piece, since it deals with the myth of 
Orestes and the Furies; but it is charged 
throughout with a passion and eloquence born 
of Sartre's own personal convlotions, Orests 
is the spokesman for the Sartrian view of 
liberty. The solution of the play is not at 
all like that in Aeschylus, for here there 
are no supernatural agencies that can deliver 
Orestes from his guilt. He has to take that 
guilt upon himself, and he does so at the end 
of the play in a superbly defiant speech before 
the cosmic Gestapo chief Jupiter; he accepts 
his guilt, he exclaims, knowing that to do so 
is absurd because he is a man and therefore 
free. In discharging his freedom man also wills 
to accept the responsibility of it, thus becoming 
heavy with his own guilt. Conscience, Heidegger 
has said, is the will to be guilty t^hat is, to 
accept the guilt that we know will be ours 
whatever course of action we take. 
No Exit, the most sensational of Sartre's 
dramatic successes, displays perhaps to their 
best advantage his real talents as a writer: 
the intense driving energy of the play, the 
passion of the ideas expressed, we can recognize 
as authentically his. The three characters of 
No Exit are planted in Hell; they are being 
punished, rather in the manner of Dante, by 
being given exactly the fruit of their evil 
itself. Having practiced "bad faith" in life 
which, in Sartre's terms, is the surrendering 
of one's human liberty in order to possess, or 
try to possess, one's being as a thing—the 
three characters now have what they had sought 
to surrender themselves to. Having died, they 
cannot change anything in their past lives, 
which are exactly what they are, no more and 
no less, Just like the static being of things. 
These three persons have no being other than 
that each has in the eyes of others; they 
exist in each other's gaze, in fact. But this 
is exactly what they longed for in life——to 
lose their own subjective being by identifying 
themselves with what they were in the eyes of 
other people. It is a torment that people 
do in fact choose on earth; the bourgeois 
salaud and the anti-Semite, Sartre says, have 
chosen as themselves their public stance or role. 
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and thus really exist not as free beings for ^ 
themselves but as beings in the eyes of others. 
The absurdity of historic situation that has stripted off 
human existence of its freedom and authenticity is depicted in 
the following passages quoted from different dialogues of the 
different characters in Sartre's play Altona: Regarding making 
decision Werner complains to his Father: 
"To decide! To decide! To be responsible for 
everything. Alone. On behalf of a hundred p 
thousand men. And you have managed to live!" 
Johanna, the wife of Werner, proclaims that Werner has a 
righttomake a choice without her own or his father's help, which 
actually implies her assertion that every individual has to choose 
for himself: 
"...We love each other more than that, father. 
We have always decided everything that con-
cerned us, together. ...If he swears under 
constraint, if he shuts himself up in this 
house in order to remain faithful to his vow, 
he will decide without me and against me. You 
will separate us forever."^ 
Again Johanna says that her very existence is because of freedom 
and she loves her husband Werner because of his love for 
independence. As he has lost his freedom, he is merely an 
object to be handled by others. She says: 
1. Ibid., pp. 224-226. 
2. Sartre, J.P., Altona. Men Without Shadows. The Flies. 
(Penguin Books in Association with Hamish Hamilton, 1962),p.20. 
3. Ibid., p. 22. 
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",«,I loved Werner for his independence, and 
you know very well that he has lost it."'' 
She does not want to be the slave of anyone including Franz 
(her brother-in-law). She, very angrily, asserts: 
"I have nothing more to say. Who Franz was, 
what he did, what has become of him, I donot 
know. The only thing I am certain of is 
that if we remain, it would be to become 
slaves to him."2 
Again, regarding the freedom of choice Johanna opines: 
"Werner, the game's up. It's up to us to 
choose. We shall either be servants of the 
madman whom they prefer to you, or we shall 
stand in the dock. What is your choice ? 
Mine is made. The Assize Court. I'd rather 
a term^in prison than penal servirtude for 
life."^ 
Werner also wants to be free: 
"On the contrary I am freeing myself. What . 
do you want me to do ? Turn them down flat?" ... 
"Father, I support you unreservedly. All lives 
are valuable. But, if one must chopse, I think • 
the life of a son must come first."-' 
Johanna encourages Werner to make a decision and choose his way 
in freedom: 
"...So that's a family conference! ... Werner,g 
I am leaving. With or without you. Choose." 
1. Ibid., p. 23. 2. Ibid., p. 27. 
3. Ibid., p. 29. h. Ibid., p. 30. 
5. Ibid., p. 46. 6. Ibid., p. 50. 
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Johanna seems bold in making decisions, though she knows that 
she is powerless and alone: She tells her Father: 
"...The interrogation has begun. I am turning on 
the spotlight, ...Where should I stand ? Here? 
Good. Now, under the cold light of whole truths 
and perfect lies, I declare that I will not make 
any confession for the simple reason that I have 
none to make. I am alone, without strength and 
completely aware of my powerlessness. I am going 
to leave. I shall wait for^Werner in Hamburg. 
If he doesn't come back..." 
Regarding history, Franz says to Leni: 
"Everything is in place. History is sacred. If p 
you change a single comma, nothing will be left." 
It is man that makes history with his actions which are closely 
observed and judged all the time. Regarding this,says Franz to 
his sister, Leni: 
"...You, me, all the dead, mankind. ... Be on your 
guard. They're watching you. ...No one is alone. 
...Laugh while you can, my poor Leni, the thirtieth 
will«arrive like a thief in the night; turn of a 
handle, the Vibrating Night, You'll land in the 
middle of them."5 
Franz replies to Leni: 
"In the thirtieth century. Are you sure this 
comedy is being played for the first time ? 
Are we living, or reincornated ? ...Be on your 
guard I If the decapods are watching, us, you 
may be sure they find us very ugly," 
1« Ibid., p. 56, 
3. Ibid., p, 67. 
2. Ibid,, p, 66. 
4. Ibid., p. 67. 
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According to Leni, her brother Franz is a coward and a victim 
of his own shame. He has no courage to face the reality, therefore, 
he Just speaks incessantly without performing any courageous deed. 
She makes him realize his own predicament: 
"I forbid you! I shall die; I am already 
dead, and I forbid you to plead my cause. 
I have only one Judge-myself-and I aquit 
myself. Oh, witness for the defence, 
testify before yourself. You will be in-
vulnerable if you dare to state: 'I have 
done what I wanted, and I want what I have 
done,•"' 
In Franz's speech we find helplessness also that restrains him 
from making a choice. When Johanna asked for his help he replies: 
"No! ... I don't belong to this century. I 
will save the world as a whole, but I will 
not help any one in particular. ... I forbid 
you to draw me into your affairs. I am ill, 
do you understand ? They take advantage of 
it to force me to live in the most abject 
dependence and you ought to be ashamed, you who 
are young and healthy, to ask someone who is 
weak and ©pressed to help. ...I am delicate, 
Madam, and my peace of mind comes before 
everything. Doctor's orders. You could be 
strangled before my very eyes and I would not 
lift a finger. ...Do I disgust you?" 
Franz complains that he had not been given full freedom and 
everytime he was kept under constraint. When he is reminded by 
Johanna that what had happened and is happening, it was and is 
because of his own choosing. He says: 
1» Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
2. Ibid,, pp. 78-79. 
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"Mine? But I never choose, my dear g i r l ! 
I am chosen. Nine months before my b i r t h , 
they had chosen my name, my ca ree r , my 
cha rac t e r and my f a t e . I t e l l you tha t 
t h i s p r i son rout ine has been forced upon 
me, and you should understand that I would 
not submit myself to i t unless i t were 
v i t a l l y necessary." ' ' 
Johanna confesses her ignorance of her own choice: 
"Of what I am going to t e l l you, . . . I would 
r a the r not know what I know."2 
In S a r t r e ' s eyes Franz, a charac te r in Altona, i s dumb and 
paralysed in the face of dread: 
"Ahl (The smile remains a moment, then h is 
f ea tu res become t e n s e . He i s a f r a id . ) 
Deprofundis clamavi! (He i s overwhelmed by 
su f f e r ing . ) Grind! Grind! Grind away! (He begins to t remble . )"3 
Silence i s a lso a means of communication. I t i s the s t rongest 
weapon against the oppressor , the in t e r roga to r and the i n q u i s i t o r . 
Such a s i l ence i s sues from one ' s refusal to co-operate with 
« 
injustice. Hence it is more communicative than speech. Sometimes 
words cannot express truth, and they become a veil to hide a lie. 
In Johanna's words: 
"Well, so I lie. ^ To Werner in silence, to 
Franz in words." 
At an other place Franz says: 
1. Ibid., p. 8A. 2. Ibid., p. 86. 
3. Ibid., p. 94. 4. Ibid., p.101. 
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" . . . A pyramid of s i lence over my head. A s i l e n t 
millennium. That 's k i l l i n g me. And what i f 
they don ' t even know I e x i s t ? What i f they 
have forgot ten me? What i s to become of me 
without a t r i a l ? What contempt!"'' 
When one i s forced by a s i t ua t i on , one usua l ly deceives oneself 
knowingly and pretends accordingly. In Johanna's confession 
t h i s s t a t e of bad f a i t h finds fu l l expression: 
"I'm my own worst enemy. My voice l i e s , and my 
body cont rad ic t s i t , I t a l k about the famine, and 
I say t h a t we are dying of s t a r v a t i o n . Look at „ 
me now! Do I look starved? I f Franz saw m e . . . " 
"Nothing except that he i s t ry ing to run away, and 
t h a t we are helping him in i t by our l i e s . Come 
on! You want to have i t both ways. I t e l l you 
tha t one word-zis enough to k i l l him, and don ' t 
even flinch."-^ 
Father trembles in dread: 
" . . .Twelve years ago I became aware of my son ' s 
f ea r s through ce r t a in remarks which he l e t f a l l . 
He believed tha t they wanted to wipe out Germany, 
and he shut himself up in order not to witness our 
exterminat ion. If i t had been j )0ss ib le at t h a t 
time to reveal the future to him, he would have 
been cured at once. Today i t w i l l be more d i f f i -
c u l t to save him. He has acquired c e r t a i n h a b i t s . 
Leni s p i l s him, and a c l o i s t e r e d l i f e has c e r t a i n 
advantages. But never f ea r , the only cure fo r h i s 
i l l n e s s i s the t r u t h . H e ' l l take i t badly a t 
f i r s t , for i t w i l l remove a l l h i s p r e t ex t s for 
sulking, but within a week he wi l l be the f i r s t 
to thank you."^ 
1 . I b i d , , p . 127. 2 . I b i d . , p . 102. 
3 . I b i d . , p . 103. 4 . I b i d . , p . 103. 
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Franz ' s f a the r does not allow h i s son and daughter- in-law to 
exercise t h e i r freedom as they intend to go out to another 
p lace to l i v e . However, he of fers them a condi t ional freedom. 
He commandingly says to Johanna to ask her b ro ther - in - law to 
accept some proposals i f he wants freedom:-
" . . .Wa i t ! I ' l l make you a propos i t ion . . . . S a y 
nothing to your husband. Go and see Franz one 
l a s t time and t e l l him t h a t I request an 
In te rv iew. I f he accepts , I ' l l re lease Werner 
h i s oa th , and you both go whenever you wish. 
. . . Johanna, I'm offering you freedom,"'' 
These words are meant to emphasize t ha t freedom i s not gained 
or bought on cond i t i ons . Franz, a pr ison of h is own bad f a i t h 
and inac t ion , r e a l i z e s i n him self-imposed i s o l a t i o n , the absurdi ty 
and hopelessness of l i f e : 
"Take i t easy. . . . D o n ' t hurry me. All roads 
are c losed, there i s n ' t even the choice of 
a l e s s e r e v i l . But there i s one road t h a t ' s 
never c losed, s ince i t leads nowhere the 
worst one. Shal l we take i t ? " ^ 
The act of depriving o the rs of t h e i r freedom and imposing upon 
them one ' s choice makes man a machine, the Robot of the age of 
science and technology: 
"Yes. A machine to give o rde r s . . . .Another 
summer, and the machine i s s t i l l t u rn ing . 
Empty as u sua l . . . . I ' l l t e l l you my l i f e , 
but don ' t expect any great v i l l a i n i e s . Oh 
no, not even t h a t . Do you know why I reproach 
1. I b i d . , p . 104. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 123. 
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myself? I ' v e done^nothing. . . .Noth ing! 
Nothing I Never!" 
Ghalib, one of the g r e a t e s t Urdu and Pers ian poe t s , sa id: 
"If, 0 God, Thou punisheth me for the s ins I 
have committed, 
Also comment me for the s ins I longed for 
and yet did not commit," 
Sa r t re , in a d i f f e r en t way, makes man responsible for h is undone 
goods or e v i l s t oo : 
" . . .You are g u i l t y , God won't judge you by 
your deeds, but by what you haven ' t dared 
to do, by the crimes which should have been p 
committed, and which you d i d n ' t commit. . . . " 
How s i lence can express man's freedom of choice i s fu l ly substan-
t i a t e d in the dialogue of the volunteers of the Resistence 
Movement captured by the Nazi occupation Forces. Sar t re and 
Heidegger consider s i l ence or to say "No" as one of the funda-
mental condi t ions of communication, t h a t i s the free choice of 
human ex i s t ence . Some passages ( i n addi t ion to Altona as we 
have already quoted in t h i s regard) from S a r t r e ' s o ther two 
plays e spec ia l ly Men Without Shadows and The F l i e s exemplify the 
a s s e r t i o n of such a freedom of choice : 
In 'Men Without Shadows', Lucie very emphatically a s s e r t s 
her r igh t to remain s i l e n t : 
1 . I b i d . . pc129. 2, I b i d . , p . 132. 
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"What about me? Must I stuff my ears too? 
I don ' t want to l i s t e n to you because I don ' t 
want despise you. Do you need words to give 
you courage ? I ' v e seen animals die,^and I 
want to die l i k e them in s i l e n c e . " 
A s t a t e of d i s t r e s s and anguish within one 's ownself i s depicted 
in the following words of Sorbier : 
"I want to know myself. I knew they'.d end by 
catching me, and one day I ' d be up against a 
wal l , face to face with myself, absolute ly 
h e l p l e s s . I used to say, w i l l you be able to 
stand i t ? I t i s my body t h a t worries me, you 
see . I ' v e a miserable body, badly made, with 
nerves l i k e a woman. Well, the moment has 
come. They're going to use t h e i r instruments on 
me. But I have been cheated. I'm going to suffer p 
for nothing, and I s h a l l die without what I'm worth." 
Furthermore, a s t a t e of anger and aloofness f inds expression in 
h i s following s ta tement : -
"I sa id: ba s t a rd . You and I , we ' re both 
b a s t a r d s . " . . . 
"Leave me alone! Leave me alone! I ' l l t a l k . 
I ' l l t e l l you everything you want to know." . . . 
"Let me go. I c a n ' t bear h i s cha i r any more! 
« I c a n ' t bear i t ! I c a n ' t bear i t ! " 3 
A sense of gu i l t of being a l i ve seems evident in the speech 
of Henri: 
" . . . I f only I could say to myself, I did what I 
could. But i t i s probably too much to ask. 
We've done something. I f e e l g u i l t y . For t h i r t y 
years , I ' v e f e l t g u i l t y of something. Guilty of 
being a l i v e . Jus t now, houses are burning because 
of me, innocent people are dead, and I am going 
g u i l t y to my grave. My whole l i f e has been one 
long mistake."^ 
1 . I b i d . . p« 176. 2 . I b i d . , p . 179« 
3 . I b i d . , p . 199. 4 . I b i d . , p . 181. 
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Another example of g u i l t mixed with the f ee l i ng of cowardliness 
i s also found i n the words of Sorbier when he says; 
" . . . L o t s of people die in t h e i r beds, with a 
c l e a r conscience. Good sons, good husbands, 
good c i t i z e n s , good f a t h e r s . . . .Ha ! They 
a re cowards l i ke me and t h e y ' l l never know 
i t . They're j u s t lucky, . . . Make me shut up! 
Why don ' t you make me shut up ?"'' 
In S a r t r e ' s 'Men Without Shadows' we find fur ther t ha t Clochet ' s 
speech to Henery depicts an experience of dread: 
" . . . W a i t . He's beginning to f e e l i t . Well? 
Of Course, I understand. Pain means nothing 
to a man of your i n t e l l i g e n c e . Or does i t ? 
I th ink i t does. . . . You're sweating. I can 
f ee l of you. . . . T u r n . H e ' l l scream. He 
won't scream? You're moving. You can stop 
yourself screaming, but you c a n ' t help moving 
your head. How i t h u r t s . . . .Your jaws are 
l i k e i ron ; you must be in such agony. Are 
you afra id? What a r e , you th inking? ' I f 
I can only hold out for one moment, one 
l i t t l e moment.. . ' But a f t e r t h a t moment, 
another w i l l come, and another an another, 
u n t i l l the pain i s too much and you won't be 
able to think of anything. We sha l l never 
l e t you go, . . .Al ready , your eyes are 
beginning to f a i l . You c a n ' t see c l ea r ly any 
more. What do you see? Handsome boy. Turn. 
. . . Y o u ' r e going to scream, Henri , you're going 
to scream. I can see the cry swelling in you 
t h r o a t ; i t ' s reached your l i p s . One l i t t l e 
e f f o r t . Turn. . . . How ashamed you must be. 
Turn. Don't s t o p . . . " 2 
Everyone i s bound in t h i s world. His freedom i s c u r t a i l e d through 
d i f fe ren t c o n s t r a i n t s , and, i n such circumstances one fee l s 
1. I b i d . , p . 188. 
2 , I b i d . , pp . 195-196. 
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disappointment and agony i n l i f e and prefers to die or a l i e n a t e 
oneself from the whole soc i e ty , Luci expresses t h i s fee l ings 
in the following words: 
" . . . T h e r e ' s nothing to r e g r e t , you know; l i f e 
has no r e a l importance any more. Good-bye,^my 
da r l ing bro ther , you did what you c o u l d . . . " . . . 
" I ' v e become another person. I d o n ' t know myself. 
Something has got blocked in my h e a d . . . " . . . 
".. .Now I have no future« I expect nothing but 
ray dea th , and I sha l l die a lone, . . . l e a v e me p 
a lone . We have nothing to say to each o t h e r . . . " . . . 
"Decide what? What does my consent matter? I t ' s 
your l i v e s you're^saving not mine, I have 
decided to d i e . " 
She fur ther a s s e r t s : 
" . . . I must d ie and a l l my shame with me, 
. . . I cannot bear myself, and a f t e r my death 
I pray tha t everything on ear th may be as 
though I had never l i v e d . " . . . 
"My ha te and my shame and my remorse——does 
none of tha t m a t t e r ? " ^ . . . 
"I am dr ied up. I f ee l so a lone . I don ' t want 
to th ink of anyone but myse l f , " , , , 5 
" . , .Every th ing has been poisoned." 
Sar t re represents d i f f e r en t modes of human exis tence such as 
anguish, dread, shame, g u i l t , s i l e n c e , bad f a i t h , and freedom 
thixjugh the ac ts and words of the charac ter in h i s p l a y s . His 
exposi t ion of human fee l ing and chaos in d i f fe ren t s i t u a t i o n s in 
h i s imaginative works i s f a r more vivid and sub t le than in h is 
1 . I b i d . , p . 212. 2 . I b i d . , p . 213. 
3 . I b i d . , J). 226. 4 . I b i d . , p . 226. 
5 . I b i d , , p . 227. 
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treatment of the same themes in ph i losophica l Jargon, 
In h is remarkable p lay . The F l i e s , Sar t re t r i e s to bring 
in to lime l i g h t a l l above mentioned modes of human being through 
d i f ferent characters of the p lay . 
The experience of dread and g u i l t y conscience i s 
ref lec ted in the words of Zeus, the god of gods in the Greek 
mythology, who i s presented as the god of f l i e s and death, when 
he depic ts the p i c tu re of the people of Argos to Orestes , a brave 
person s t ruggl ing for h i s freedom. In t h i s passage Sar t re presen ts 
God as a force r e s t r a i n i n g man from ac t ing f reely: 
" . . .These people are grea t s inners but , as you 
see , t h e y ' r e working out t h e i r atonement. Let 
them be, young fel low, l e t them be; respect 
t h e i r sorrowful endeavour, and begone on t i p t o e . 
You cannot share in t h e i r repentance. Since 
you did not share t h e i r crime your brazen inno-
cence makes a gulf between you and them. So 
i f you have any care for them, be off! Be Off, 
or you w i l l work t h e i r doom. If you hinder 
them on t h e i r way, i f even for a moment you 
turn t h e i r thoughts from t h e i r remorse, a l l 
t h e i r s ins w i l l harden on them ^like cold f a t . 
They have g u i l t y consciences , t h e y ' r e afraid— 
and fear and g u i l t y consciences have a good 
savour in the n o s t r i l s of the gods. Yes, the 
gods ' take p leasure i n such poor sou ls . Would 
you oust them from the favour of the gods? 
What, moverover, could you give them in exchange? 
Good d i g e s t i o n s , t h e grey monotony of provincia l 
l i f e , and the boredom ah, the soul-destroying 
boredom—of long days of mild c o n t e n t . . . " ' 
Ores te ' s commitment to freedom enables him to act independently. 
He i s free from a l l types of s u p e r s t i t i o n and r e l ig ious or 
I b i d . , p .243 . 
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family ties. His Tuitor addresses him thus: 
".••Your mind is free from prejudice and 
superstition, you have no family ties, no 
religion and no calling; you are free to 
turn your head to anything. But you know 
better than to commit 
lies your strength. x^. se l f and t h e i r 
Orestes a s s e r t s h i s freedom to a c t . In order to obtain h i s and 
h i s fellow men's freedom he i s ready to sac r i f i ce everything 
even h i s own self and h is deares t mother. He says: 
". . .Whereas I - ! I ' m free as a i r , thank God. 
My mind's my own, g lor ious ly aloof. ,,,"^** 
"But, mind you, i f there were something I 
could do, something to give me the freedom 
of the c i t y ; i f , even by a crime, I could 
acquire t h e i r memories, t h e i r hopes and 
f e a r s , and fu l l with these the void within 
me, yes , even i f I had to k i l l my own 
mother " 2 . . . 
" I t i s not n ight ; a new day i s dawning. We 
are f ree , E l ec t r a . I fee l as i f I ' d brougJr,t 
you intO:rl i fe , and I , t oo , had jus t been 
born. . ."--^. . . 
"I am f ree , E l ec t r a . Freedom has crashed down 
on me l i k e a thunder b o l t . " ^ , . . 
"And the anguish tha t consumes you do you 
think i t w i l l ever cease ravaging my h e a r t ? 
But what matter ? I am f r e e . Beyond anguish, 
beyond remorse. Free, And at one with my.-self. 
No, you must not loa the yourself E lec t ra . ^ i v e 
me your hand. I sha l l never forsake y o u . * ^ , . , 
"She (Elec t ra ) i s dearer to me than l i f e . But 
her suffer ing comes from wi th in , and only^.«he 
can r id herse l f of i t . For she i s f r ee . " * . . 
1 , 1 . I b i d . . p . 246. 2 . I b i d . , p . 248. 
^» I b i d . , p . 296. 
6« ZM^*> P* 304. 
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"Neither slave nor master. I am my freedom. 
No sonner had^you created me "tEan I ceased 
to be yours ," 
Another dialogue r e i t e r a t e s s imi la r f ee l ings and ideas: 
" . . . T h a t was the l a s t t ime, the l a s t , I saw my 
youth. Suddenly, out of the blue , freedom 
crashed down on me, and swept me off my f e e t . 
Nature sprang back, my youth went with the 
wind, and I knew myself a lone, u t t e r l y alone 
i n the midst of t h i s well—^meaning l i t t l e 
universe of yours. I was l i k e a man who^s 
l o s t h is shadow. And there was nothing l e f t 
in heaven, no Right or Wrong, nor anyone to 
give me o r d e r s , " 2 . . . 
" . . . I am doomed to have no other law but mine. 
. . . F o r I , Zeus, am a man, and every man must 
find out h is own way. Nature abhors man, and 
you too, god of gods, abhor mankind." , . . 
" . . . I am f ree ; each of us i s alone, and our 
anguish i s akin ."5 
In the l a s t speech of Orestes too , one finds an expression of 
dread, shame, commitment or determination and boldness , a l l 
ushering from his love for freedom. Orestes addresses the people 
of Argos i n these words: 
" . . .As for your s ins and your remorse, your 
n igh t - fea r s and the crime Aegistheus committed-
a l l are mine, I take them a l l upon me. Fear 
your Dead no longer; they are nrjr Dead. And, 
see, your f a i t h fu l f l i e s , have l e f t you, and come to 
me. But have no fea r , people of Argos. I sha l l 
not s i t on my victims throne or take the s c e p t r e 
in my blood-stained hands. A god offered i t to 
me, and I said 'No ' . I wish to be a king without 
a kingdom, without sub jec t s . 
Farewell , my people. Try to reshape your 
l i v e s . All here i s new, a l l must begin anew. 
And for me, t o o , , a new l i f e i s beginning. A 
strange l i f e . . . " 
1 . 
3 . 
I b i d . , p, 
I b i d . , p, 
309. 
311. 
2o I b i d . , 
4 . I b i d . , 
p. 
p. 
310. 
316. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM IN MUSLIM THOUGHT 
(i)• SociO"polltlcal Conditions in early Islamic Society; 
It is a fact that the problem of freedom of the human will 
has been a crucial and a vexed question from the beginning of 
man's creation to the present day. It has always agitated human 
mind in all ages and in all countries but, despite the various 
solutions advanced from time to time, it has remained a complex 
question. Like other communities of the world, the problem of 
freedom has also been raised as a problem with significant socio-
political implications in the early Islamic society: 
Like other nations of antiquity, the pre-
Islaralte 'Arabs were stern fatalists. The 
remains of their ancient poetry, sole record 
of old ''Arab thought and manners, show that 
before the promulgation of Islam the people of 
the Peninsula had absolutely abandoned themselves 
to the idea of an irresistible and blind fatality. 
Man was but a sport in the hands of Fate, This 
idea bred a reckless contempt of death, and 
an utter disregard for human life, '' 
With the advent of Islam a new vision of life came into being. The 
teaching of Islam created a revolution in the "Arab mind. With 
the recognition of a supreme Intelligence governing the whole 
universe, they were taught to believe and practice an attitude 
of self-dependence, self-awareness and personal responsibility 
1. Ameer ^ Ali., The Spirit of Islam> (Bombay, Delhi: B.I,Pub-
lications, (lndTair"EdTtiony7T578T7 P» ^ 5 . 
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as well as the consciousness of moral ob l i ga t i on founded on the 
Islamic teaching of freedom (qadar) o r human v o l i t i o n . The 
Holy Qur'an i s very eloquent on the i ssue of human freedom and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : 
One of the remarkable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
Qur^an i s the cur ious , and, a t f i r s t s i gh t , 
incons is ten t , manner in which i t combines the 
existence of a Divine Will , which not only 
orders a l l th ings , but which ac ts d i r e c t l y 
upon men and addresses i t s e l f to t he springs 
of thought in them, with the a s se r t i on of 
a free agency in man and of the l i b e r t y of 
i n t e l l e c t . 1 
Though t h i s pecul iar feature of human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s also to 
be found in some other Holy Books l i k e B ib l i ca l records e t c . , 
But the Mother of Books (Umm al~Kitab t_^l::£)l/-l), the Holy Qur'an, 
has i t s own uniqueness in t h i s regard . In the Qur'an the conception of 
human respons ib i l i ty i s so s t rongly developed and emphasized tha t 
the question na tura l ly occurs to the mind as to how these two 
ideas Destiny and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or say Divine Will and human 
will can be reconciled with each o t h e r . 
If one simply goes through the verses of Qur'an one w i l l 
find both types of verses , one group of verses s t r e s s ing upon 
human freedom and the other emphasizing the Omnipotence of God. 
Ihere seems to be a con t rad ic t ion between the two types of v e r s e s . 
On the one hand, i t i s mentioned in the Qur>an t h a t : 
I b i d . , p . 403. 
,,1 
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"Lo! Allah is able to do all things. 
2 
"And He is able to do all things." 
"Unto Allah (belongeth) whatsoever is in the 
heavens and whatsoever is in the earth; and 
whether ye make known what is in your minds 
or hide it, Allah will bring you to account 
for it. He will forgive whom He will and He 
will punish whom He will. Allah is able to 
do all things."3 
"Allah is Mighty Wise."'^  
"Neither those who disbelieve among the people 
of the Scripture nor the idolaters love that 
there should be sent down unto you any good 
thing from your Lord. But Allah chooseth for 
His mercy whom He will, and Allah is of infi-
nite bounty."5 
"Allah createth what He Will. Lo! Allah is able 
to do all things."° 
1. Al-Qur>an. (II:20)(English Translation from "The Meaning of |he GlorTous Qur^an" by Marmaduke Pickthall, Delhi, Taj Company, 
Edition, 1983;. 
2« Ibid.. XXX:50, 3. Ibid.. II ; 284. k. Ibid., 11:228 & 240 
5* Ibid.. 11:105, 6. Ibid.. XXIV:45. 
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"For thy Lord is ever Powerful. «1 
».> -». >/ 'v • r ' ' ' : '- ir >»•> -»*» '' ^ i -
ab^ l ^ i >\is i;<\ j^Ki ^  i ^ v?^\ a iU^v OP 
"Say: 0 Allahl Owner of Sovereignty! Thou 
g ives t sovereignty unto whom Thou w i l t , 
and Thou withdrawest sovereignty from whom 
Thou w i l t . Thou exal t es t whom Thou wi l t 
and Thou abasest whom Thou w i l t . In Thy 
hand i s the good. Lo! Thou a r t Able to do 
3.11 "tiiinfirs "^ 
"He forgiveth whom He will, and chastiseth 
whom He will. Allah's is the Sovereignty 
of the heavens and the earth and all that 
is between them, and unto Him is the jour-
neying, "3 
On the o ther hand, one also c l ea r l y f inds in the Qur'an tha t 
God (Allah) has given man freedom and power. The Holy Book v iv id ly 
ind ica t e s t h a t : S.^^^^^^^'''"•^^^'^^ 
" Lo! Allah changeth not the condit ion of a 
folk u n t i l l thy ( f i r s t ) change tha t which 
i s in t h e i r h e a r t s , , . " ^ 
"And tha t man hath only tha t for which he 
maketh e f f o r t . " 5 
1 • I b i d . . XXV:54, 
3 . I b i d . . V:18. 
5* I b i d . , L I I I : 3 9 . 
2c I b i d . , 111:26, 
4 . I b i d . , x i l l : 1 1 , 
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"Vnioso committeth s in committeth i t only 
against h imse l f . " ' ^ 
"And forsake those who take t h e i r r e l i g i o n 
for a pastime and a j e s t , and whom the 
l i f e of the world begui le th . Remind (man-
kind) hereby l e s tpa soul be destroyed by 
what i t e a rne th , " 
"And when they do some lewdness they say: We 
found our fa thers doing i t and Allah hath 
enjoined i t on us , say: Allah, v a r i l y , en-jo ine th not lewdness. Tell ye,concerning 
Allah tha t which ye know not . "^ 
OfiW\^ 0^C>^3 7.4--yJ>:*i ^0lJi :^W*\3(i(>JlA\o^ 
CI •^  .^u^ yo ^iii l l i i i i^lU^T^N^ 
"So whosoever i s guided, i s guided only for 
( the good of) h i s soul , and whosoever e r r e t h , 
e r r e t h only against i t . And I am not warder 
over you."^ 
"So Allah sure ly wronged them not , but they 
did wrong themselves."^ 
1. I b i d . . IV:111. 2 . I b i d . . VI:70. 
3 . Ib id» .VII ; 28. 4 . I b i d . . X:108. 
5» I t ) id . . IX: 70. 
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"There doth every soul experience that which 
it did aforetime, and they are returned unto 
Allah, their rightful Lord, and they -which 
they used to invent hath failed thenic"'' 
There are innumerable verses on human freedom in the Qur^ 'an. We 
have quoted above a few of those to pin-point the issue. 
It seems inconsistent at first sight that man should be 
judged by his works, a doctrine which forms the foundation of 
Islamic morality, though all his actions are ruled by an All-
powerful Will. 
Prophet Muhammad(S) set up an example by his conduct that 
may be of great value in resolving this riddle. The Imams of 
the Prophet's Family (the Ahl al-Bayt(A)) suggested a via media 
between fatalism and absolute freedom of man: 
The earnest faith of Muhammad in an active ever-
living Principle, joined to his trust in the pro-
gress of man, supplies a key to this mystery.2 
He (the Prophet (A)) struck a balance between the two 
extreme positions. In the light of vast Hadlth literature one 
« 
is easily led to the conclusion that the question of human 
freedom is not a simple one. The Prophet(A) is reported to have 
forbidden the Muslims to indulge in this controversy. However, 
the problem, when raised by some groups of the Muslims during the 
1. Ibid.. X:30. 
2. Ameer Ali, o£. cit.. p. 404. 
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Caliphate of Imam ^Ali(A), elaborate lectures on this issue were 
delivered by him, as we may find in Nah.j al-Balaghah, A few 
examples of ^Ali's treatment of the issue of freedom may be 
quoted here: 
'...They had been allowed time to seek deliverance, 
had been shown the right path and had been allowed 
to live and seek favours, the darkness of doubts 
had been removed, and they had been let free in 
this period of life.».'1 
'...0' people who possess eyes and ears and health 
and wealth,., The present is an opportune moment 
for acting. 0' creatures of Allah since the neck 
is free from the loop, and spirit is also unfett- p 
ered... You have opportunity of acting by will...' 
The notion of freedom of human will is repeatedly emphasized and 
radically elaborated in many Sermons (Khutbat), Letters and Sayings 
of Imam *Ali. According to him Gtod has bestowed upon man wisdom, 
knowledge and power to act freely. He will be rewarded for his 
good deeds and punished for evil ones. Whatever he does, he is 
responsible, for God has given him freedom. To substantiate the 
« 
above mentioned p o i n t s , some more r e l e v a n t p a s s a g e s from Nahn a l -
Balaghah may be g iven h e r e : 
' , . . Y o u w i l l be d e a l t wi th as you d e a l wi th o t h e r s , 
you w i l l r eap what you sow, and what you send today 
w i l l meet you t o m o r r o w , , , ' 3 
1 . Nah.jul a l -Ba laghah of Hazrat ^Al l . ( E n g l i s h T r a n s l a t i o n ) Qum: 
I r a n , AnsSriyan P u b l i c a t i o n , 1401 A.H. (1981 A.D.) p , 1 5 5 , 
(Sermon: 8 1 ) , 
2» I b i d . , p , 159, (Sermon:81) 
3 . I b i d , , p . 254, (Sermon:151) , 
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"... Allah has clarified to you the way of 
truthfulness and lighted its paths. So 
(you may choose) either ever-present mis-
fortune or eternal happiness... Know, 0' 
creatures of Allah, that your ownself is 
a guard over you..."'' 
"Allah has sent down a guiding Book wherein 
He has explained virtue and vice..."^ 
"No doubt Allah sent down the Prophet as a 
guide with eloquent Book and standing 
command. No one would be^ruined by it except 
one who ruins himself..." 
Furthermore, in a Saying of Imam *'Ali(A), one finds the theme of 
freedom vividly, when a man enquired from Amir al-Mu'minin; "Was 
our going to fight against the Syrians destined by Allah?" Imam 
^Ali(A) gave a detailed reply. A selection from which is given 
as under: 
"Woe to you. You take it as a final and unavoidable 
destiny (according to which we are bound to act). 
If it were so, there would have been no question 
of reward or punishment and there would have been 
no sense of Allah's promises or warnings. (On the 
one hand) Allah, the glorified, has ordered His 
pe6ple to act by free will and has cautioned them 
and refrained them (from evil). He has placed 
easy obligations on them and has not put heavy 
obligations. He gives them much (reward) in return 
for little (action). He is disobeyed, not because 
He is over-powered. He is obeyed but not under 
force. He did not send Prophets just for fun. He 
did not send down the Book for the people without 
purpose. He did not create the skies, the earth 
and all that is in between them for nothing. And 
He created not the heavens and the earth in vain. 
"That is the imagination of those who disbelieve; 
them wpe to those who,disbelieve because of 
fire." Qur^ an, 38:27." 
^' IM£«» PP» 261-62,(Sermon: 155). 2. Ibid,, p, 278 (Sermon: 165) 
3. Ibid,, p. 279, (Sermon:166) 4. Ibid.,pp.506-07(Saying: 78). 
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In the light of this quotation, it may be held that two 
different types of the Qur'anic verses are not, in reality, 
contradictory to each other. When one goes through the defini-
tion and explanation of the Qur'anic verses emphasizing the 
Absolute Power of Allah, one will see that "the decree of Grod" 
clearly means 'the Law of nature,* The stars and the planets 
have each their appointed course; so has every other object in 
creation. The movement of heavenly bodies, the phenomena of 
nature, life and death are all governed by a 'law'. The second 
type of the Qur'anic verses unquestionably indicate the idea of 
Divine agency endowing man with freedom to act. But these verses 
are again explained by other verses, in which it is stressed that 
'human will* is conditioned by God Almighty. This is also very 
important to note that it is to the seeker for Divine help that 
God renders His help. It is on the searcher of his own heart, 
who purifies his soul fixjm impure longings, that God bestows 
grace (lutf; CLJuC^) . God has given consciousness and will to 
human person so that he may be able to differentiate between 
right and wrong, good and evil etc., and act accordingly. In 
this way, God has set down certain rules for the welfare of human 
beings for He is the merciful Creator of all the creatures. He 
is Omniscient and Omnipotent. Ameer ^ Ali describes: 
...There is nothing more assuring, nothing 
that more satisfies the intense longing for 
a better and purer world, than the conscious-
ness of a Power above humanity to redress 
wrongs, to fulfil hopes, to help the forlorn. 
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Our belief in God springs from the very 
essence of Divine ordinances. They are 
as much laws, in the strict sense of the 
word, as tne law which regulate the move-
ments of the celestial bodies. But the 
will of God is not an arbitrary will; It 
is an educating will, to be obeyed by the 
scholar in his walks of learning as by the 
devotee in his cell, '^ 
The above quoted passage from Ameer'All's 'The Spirit of 
Islam' brings into limelight the spirit of Islam regarding the 
freedom of the human will as against the stern fatalism of 
pre-Islamic 'Arabs. He says fvirther: 
The teachings of Islam created a revolution 
in the 'Arab mind; with the recognition of a 
supreme Intelligence governing the universe, 
they received the conception of self-depen-
dence and of moral responsibility founded on 
the liberty of human volition. One of the 
remarkable characteristics of the Koran is 
curious, and, at first sight, inconsistent, 
manner in which it combines the existence of 
a Divine Will, which not only orders all 
things, but which acts directly upon men and 
addresses itself to the springs of thought in 
them, with the assertion of a free agency in 
man and of the liberty of intellect. 2 
« 
With the advent of Islam as a perfect and dynamic system for 
human life, the whole phenomenon of the'Arab mind underwent 
a radical change. Ameer 'Ali says: 
Arabian philosophy, nurtured afterwards in 
other cradles, drew its first breath in the 
school of Medina. The freedom of human will, 
based on the doctrine that man would be 
1. Ameer'Ali, 0£. crt., p. 406. 
2' Ibid..p. 403. 
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judged by the use he had made of his reason, 
was Inculcated in the teachings of the Master, 
along with an earnest belief in a Supreme Power 
ruling the universe. The idea assumed a more 
definite shape in the words of the Disciple, and 
grew into a philosophy. From Medina it was 
carried to Damascus, Kufa, Basra, and Bagdad, 
where it gave birth to the eclectic schools, 
which shed such lustre on the reigns of the 
early Abbasides. "^  
Iqbal, like Ameer ^ Ali, has cogently pointed out that the most 
degrading type of fatalism has prevailed in the world of Islam 
for many centuries: 
This is true, and has a history behind it 
which requires separate treatment. It is 
sufficient here to indicate that the kind 
of fatalism which the European critics of 
Islam sura up in the word 'qismat' was due 
partly to philosophical thought, partly 
to political expediency, and partly to the 
gradually diminishing force of the life-
impulse, which Islam originally imparted to 
its followers. 2 
However, Ameer *Ali and Iqbal are not fully justified in say-
ing that the world of Islam had been under the influence of 
fatalism. In the early history of Islam we find true believers 
agitating and revolting against the tyrannical rule of Umayyads, 
who took recourse to the Qur^anic verses emphasizing the 
Absolute Will of Allah in order to justify their evil deeds. 
They not only did misinterpret the Qur'an, but also shifted all 
responsibility of their crimes to God. This view was vehemently 
''• Ibid., pp. 410-411. 
2. Iqbal, S.M,, Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam, 
££• cit., p. 110. 
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opposed by the Imam*Ali ibn al-Husayn(A), Sayyid-e Saj jad, in 
his re joinder to Ibn-e Ziyad, the governor of Kufa respons ib le 
for Martyring Al-Husayn(A) and h is companions, and YazTd, the 
Umayyad King and the successor of Mu^awiyah, in t h e i r c o u r t s . 
Ghil*an al-Dimashqi, a slave of the Third Caliph, ^Uthman, 
asked Hasan a l - B a s r i , the well-known mystic of the f i r s t e ra of 
Islam, as to whether the Umayyah r u l e r s ' defence of t h e i r ghas t ly 
crimes against the pious Muslims l i k e Imam al-Husayn ibn ^Ali(A) 
was j u s t i f i e d , Hasan a l -Basr i answered tha t the Banu Umayyah 
were the enemies of Allah, After t h i s Ghilan arose in revol t 
and was martyred, A s imi l a r case i s recorded about another 
t rue be l i ever , Ma^bad al-Juh'anl, who was also k i l l e d by the ty ran t 
_ _ - I 
Banu Umayyah, 
These political activities may be considered as the fore-
runners of the Qadarite school that culminated in the Mu^tazilah. 
This issue at the level of philosophical thought was an 
outcome of the socio-political situation in'the early Islamic 
society. During that time vested interest in the Muslim world 
pretended to believe that God was the real author of all that 
happened in the universe, because of the fact that he was 
Omnipotent and Omniscient, It was due to this misunderstanding 
of the rulers of the early Islamic times, that is the Umayyads, 
that they did many sinful things and attributed their acts to the 
1. (i), yunna al-Fakhuri and Khalil al-Jarr, Ta'rikh Falsifah 
dar Jahan-e Islam!. (Persian tr.) by **Abd al-Muhammad 
Ayatl, (Tehran: Zaman, Second Edition, 1358 Shamsi), 
Vol. I, pp. 122-125. 
(Contd.., 
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Rida' (Will) or decree of Gk)d. Highlighting this point Iqbal has 
said: 
...The practical materialism of the opportunist 
Omayyad rulers of Damascus need a peg on which 
to hang their misdeeds at Kerbala, and to secure 
the fruits of Amir Muawiya's revolt against the 
possibilities of a popular rebellion. Mabad is 
reported to have said to Hasan ol Basra that the 
Omayyads killed Muslims, and attributed their 
acts to the decrees of God. ^ 'These enemies of God' 
replied Hasan, 'are liars' . 
Muslim thinkers had been pondering over the problem of freedom 
of human will and other related issues during the liftime of 
the Prophet of Islam. Among the other issues, the issue debated 
more seriously after the death of the Prophet(S), was that of 
the freedom of human choice. In Muslim World it may be said with 
authentic reasons that the problem of freedom was emerged as a 
socio-political conditions of the time: 
After the Prophet(A) the Muslims differed 
among themselves on some other issues too. 
Some of such issues assumed immense 
importance during the tyrannical rule orf the 
Umayyad rulers. Of such issues the most 
crucial was related to the problem of freedom 
of human will and action, on which opinion 
was sharply divided, giving emergence to the 
groups of the Qadrites and Jabrites. As early 
as the year 80 A.H. al-Hasan al-Basri is 
reported to have refuted the position of the 
Jabrites by dubbing them as the enemies of 
Islam. The doctrine of predestination was 
(Contd, . from back page) 
( i i ) . I qba l , S i r Muhammad, Reconstruction, op. c i t . , p . 111. 
( i i i ) . Sh ib l i Nu^'mani, ^Ilm al-Kalam, ( )(Urdu) ^Azamgarh 
( I n d i a ) : Ma*arif 'Azamgarh, Part I , pp. 17-19. 
2 . ( i ) . Hunna al-Fakhtiri and Khali l a l - J a r r , 0£. c i t . , p . 122. 
( i i ) . Sh ib l i Nu mani, o£. £ i t . , p , 29. 
1 . I q b a l , Reconstruct ion. 0£. c i t . , p . 111. 
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propagated by the r u l e r s and t h e i r agents 
in order to j u s t i f y t h e i r i n j u s t i c e s ; they 
shif ted the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e i r own 
acts to Divine Will , saying t h a t man was 
he lp less and whatever happened was wil led by 
God, Thus t h i s controversy, perhaps the f i r s t 
of i t s nature in the Islamic world, had i t s 
roots in the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l condi t ions of the 
t ime. ^ 
Thus, i t was at t h i s time tha t the problem of ' J ab r ' ( J S ? " ) 
and ' Qadar' ( JsS—5 ) or ' I k h t i y a r ' pe r t a in ing to human 
freedom was openly discussed and came in to prominence as a 
con t rovers ia l issue in the h i s to ry of ph i losophica l thought of 
Is lam, As explained e a r l i e r , Banu Umayyah themselves were doing 
wrong and to support t h e i r vested i n t e r e s t s used to preach fa ta l i sm, 
and a t t r i b u t e t h e i r ev i l ac t s to the decree of Allah. In the 
words of Iqbal : 
Thus arose, i n s p i t e of open p r o t e s t by Muslim 
d iv ines , a morally degrading f a t a l i sm, and the 
cons t i t u t i ona l theory known as the 'accomplished 
fact ' in order to support vested i n t e r e s t , 2 
The Muslims having f a t a l i s t i c ideology or otherwise have always 
sought the j u s t i f i c a t i o n from the Qur'an, and even though at the 
expense of i t s p l a in meaning, the f a t a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has 
had very far-reaching e f fec ts on Muslim masses. The whole 
h i s t o r y of Islam i s r ep le t e with severa l ins tances of obvious 
mis in te rp re ta t ion of the Qur 'anic verses regarding freedom and 
determinism. I t was and i s , s t i l l due to t h i s rad ica l fac t of 
1 . Waheed Akhtar, " In t roduct ion to Imamiyyah Scholars; Al-
Shaykh*al-§aduq and His Works", Al-Tawbld« (Tehran I r a n : 
Sazman-e Tabllghat-e I s lamI , (Oct , - Dec. 1985), Vol. I l l , No.1, 
p . 102. 
2o Iqba l , Reconstruction, op . c i t . . p . 111. 
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misunderstanding of the doctr ine of ' J ab r ' C JS»^) and 'Qadar* (J^ X->) 
t h a t Muslims at the time fa i l ed to understand the s p i r i t of 
Islam. The doct r ine of Jabr( _JS^) (p redes t ina r i an i sm) , 
which had been and i s a c r u c i a l i ssue in the Muslim p o l i t i c a l as 
a moral thought, was resolved by Imam Ja*^far al-Sadiq (A), the 
Sixth Imam of the Ahl al-Bayt ( ^ZL^iJ^\) (The Prophet ' s Family), 
who has very luc id ly expressed h is view on the issue in the 
following words: 
"Those who uphold Jabr make out God to be 
a p a r t i c i p a t o r in every s in they commit, 
and a ty ran t for punishing those s ins 
which they are impelled to commit by the 
compulsion of t h e i r being: t h i s i s i n f i d e -
l i t y . " ^ 
In the same context , giving the analogy of a servant sent by h i s 
master to the market to purchase something, which he, the master, 
knows well tha t he cannot b r ing , not possessing the wherewithal 
to buy i t , and never the less , the master punishing him,the Imam 
very emphatically declared t h a t "the doc t r ine of Jabr converts 
2 
God into an unjust Master," 
Imam Ja*far al-Sadiq(A) has been quoted in Usui al-Kafi 
by Muhammad Ya*qub al-Kulayni as saying: 
OR. 
1. Ehti.ia.i Ul-Tabrasi. p. 236, (Cf, The Spirit of Islam by Ameer 
Ali, o£. cit., p. 411). 
2* Ibidc. p. 411. 
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'There is neither determinism nor freedom 
(or delegated freedom) but the matter is 
between the two.' 
Or a similar saying is ascribed to the eighth Imam of the Ahl al-
y .>< 
^. 1 Bayt, ( c^jJlJ^O "^Ali ibn Musa al-RIda>. 
Moreover, with regard to the doctr ine of Qadar ( ^(> >) 
(Tafwidi de legat ion of author i ty) meaning not the freedom of 
the human w i l l , but unqualified d i s c r e t i o n in the choice of 
wrong and r i g h t , the Imam Jafar al-Sadiq(A) declared fu r the r tha t 
to affirm such a p r inc ip le would destroy a l l the foundation of 
mora l i ty , and give a l l human beings absolute l i cence i n the 
induglence of t h e i r an imal i s t ic d e s i r e s ; for each ind iv idua l i s 
vested with a d i s c r e t i o n to choose what i s r i gh t o r wrong;otherwise no 
2 
sanct ion and no law can have any fo rce . 
From the above discussion i t i s c l e a r t h a t Ikhtjyar ( J V^j^i) 
i s r a d i c a l l y d i f fe ren t from the doctr ine of Tafwid ( L/^^), 
Ameer Al i , with reference to the eighth Imam "^Ali ibn Musa a l -
R i d 3 ' , w r i t e s : 
"God has endowed each human being with the 
capaci ty to understand His commands and to 
obey them. They who exert themselves to 
l i v e purely and t r u l y , them He he lps : they 
are those who please Him; whils t they who 
disobey Him are s i n n e r s . " These views a re 
repeated with grea te r emphasis by the e ighth 
Imam, ^Ali ar-Riza', who denounced Jabr ( p r e -
dest inar ianism) and Tashblh (anthropomorphism) 
as absolute i n f i d e l i t y , and declared the 
upholders of those doctr ines to be "the enemies 
1o Abu Ja^far MuJI^ ammad ibn Ya^qub ibn lahaq al-Kulanl (d.328 or 
329 H . ) , Usui a l -Kaf l , (Persian Trans. (Tehran ( I r a n ) : 
I n t i s h a r a t - e Isl^miyyah) Vol. I , pp. 222 and 224 ( In Kiiab a l " 
Tawhid: Chapter "Al-Jabr wa al-Qadar wa al-amr bayn al-^amrayln; 
2 . Ameer'Ali, op. c i t . , p . 411. 
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of the Faith." He openly charged the advocates 
of Jabr and Tashblh with the fabrication of 
traditions. At the same time he warned his 
followers against the doctrine of discretion or 
Tafwig. He laid down in broad terms, "God has 
pointed out to you the two paths, one of which 
leads you to Him, the other takes you far away 
from His perfection; you are at liberty to take 
the one or the other; pain or joy, reward or 
punishment, depend upon your own conduct. But 
man has not the capacity of turning evil into 
good, or sin into virtue.""^  
The Banu Umayyah, many of them after embracing Islam, were 
like their forefathers, fatalists. They were doing wrongs, 
killing innocents and attributing all this to God. Under them 
arose a school which purported to derive its doctrines from the 
"ancients", (the salaf CJLX^) , a body of Pre-Islamic '^ Arabs, They 
bribed some persons to narrate Traditions in favour of them and 
their views to fabricate traditions and pass it as handed down 
by one or other of the Companions of the Prophet(S), Hence a 
school was founded on this line called the Jabrites. Jahm bin 
^ 2 
Safwan was the founder of this school, which was called Jabira. 
'Jabrites' were the staunch opponents of 'free-will' of man. They 
maintained that: 
"Man is not responsible for any of his actions 
which proceed entrirely from God; that he has 
no determining power to do any act, nor does 
he possess the capacity of free volition; that 
he is the subject of absolute Divine sovereignty 
in his actions, without ability on his part, or 
will or power of choice; and that God absolutely 
creates actions within him just as He produces 
1. Ameer Ali, o^. cit., pp. 411-412. 
2o Ibid., p. 412. 
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activity in all inanimate tnings; ...and that 
reward and punishment are subject to absolute 
Divine sovereignty in human actions." The 
Jabrias maintained certain views regarding 
Divine attributes'which have no particular 
significance. ""^  
In fact, what happened was that all "the Jabria doctrines found 
favour with the Ommeyyade rulers, and consequently soon spread 
2 
among the people." 
A group of people in Damascus rose to oppose fatalism and 
they started to advocate the doctrine of human free-will. They 
were against the Jabrite tradition of the denial of free-will of 
man, and thus were called themselves "Qadarlyyah". The uncom-
promising fatalism of the Jabrites occasioned among the intellec-
tuals a revolt which was headed by Mabad al-Juhani, Yunus al-
Aswari, and Ghallan Dimashqi (i.e. of Damascus), who had evidently 
derived many of their ideas from the ^Alawtds'. They boldly 
asserted in the capital of the Ummayyads, in the very stronghold 
of predestinarianlsm, the free agency of man. Qadariyyah as 
mentioned earlier is a name commonly used by Muslim thinkers for 
representing a group of theologians who reiterated "in one form or 
another the' principle of Liberum arbltrlum (free will) in the 
early period of Islam, from about 70/690 to the definitive 
consolidation of the Mutazilah at the beginning of the 3rd/9th 
century." A few of the authentic sources of the Qadariyyah 
1. Ibid., p. 412. 
2. Ibid., p. 413. 
3» Ibid., p. 413. 
4. Encyclopedia of Islam, op. cit.. Vol. IV, p. 368. 
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are as follows: 
Forty names from Basrah, about 15 from Syria, 6 from 
Mecca, 5 to 7 from Medinah, about 5 from Kufah, 3 from Yemen and 
not a single one from Egypt and the whole of East. There may 
be some in other countries. However, these figures express 
only a part of the reality so far as the stand of Muslims in 
general is concerened. It is generally accepted that the 
biographical lists of the Qadariyyah were apparently compiled in 
2 
Basra, where the pupils of Hasan al-Basri, and his pupils began 
to quarrel over the correct interpretation of his doctrine. In 
Syria the Qadarites stood against the tyranny of the Umraayyah 
rulers and started a revolutionary movements 
Elsewhere fuller information existed for 
Syria, where in the last twenty years of 
Omayyad. rule, Qadarite played a part in 
history through their revolutionary 
activity. -5 
It is further stated that the advocates of human free-will 
vehemently came forward as the yanguard of socio-political move-
ment in Syria during the Ummayyah period. "According to the 
nature of information, the Qadariyyah is seen in Syria primarily 
as a political movement; in Basra on the other hand it is 
4 
viewed as a school of theology." The political argument developed 
from the principle that a ruler was answerable for his actions 
1o Encyclopedia of Islam, op. cit,, p. 369. 
2» Ibid., p. 369. 
^* Ibido. p. 369* 
4. Ibid., p. 369. 
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and in case of unrighteousness should therefore be deposed or 
should abdicate. The theological stance arose from the idea 
that one must not "ascribe evil to God", because He is good and 
does not like evil. Man is bestowed with wisdom and free-will 
to act freely and choose good and avoid evil. God creates 
only good; evil stems from man or from Satan (Devil). Man chooses 
1 
freely from the two. Thus, the Qadarites were strongly opposed 
to the Jabrite doctrine of predestinatianism and vehemently 
advocated the free agency of man. But in the assertation of 
human liberty they sometimes verged on the doctrine of Tafwid 
( 0^>ftJ) meaning not the freedom of human will, but unqualified 
discretion in the choice of v/rong and right. Qadar or Ikhtiyar 
( JV-JoL&.|) are, therefore, different from Tafwid, because God had 
* 
endowed each human being wi th the c a p a c i t y t o unders tand His 
commands and to obey them. They who e x e r t themselves to l i v e 
p u r e l y and t r u l y , a re he lped byGod.^They a r e t hose who p l e a s e Him; 
Whilst they who disobey Him a r e s i n n e r s .^ 2 
However, the advocates of freedom of human will, the 
Qadariyyah spread throughout the Muslim world. From Damascus 
the dispute was carried to Basrah and there the differences 
of the two parties assumed the form of two sections. The fatalists 
or Jabrites merged into a new sect, called the Sifatiayyah, literally 
meaning the "Attributists", who with predestinarianism, combined 
the affirmation of certain Attributes in God as distinct from His 
1• Ibid., po 369. 
2, Ameer Ali, 0£. cit,, p. 411. 
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1 
Essence, which the Jabrites radically denied. 
The Attributists or Sifatiayyahs claimed to be the direct 
representatives of the Salaf (ancients). According to *Abd al-
Karim al-Shahristanl these followers of the Salaf maintained 
that certain eternal Attributes pertain to God, namely, knowledge 
power, lif^, will, hearing, sight, speech, majesty, magnanimity, 
bounty, beneficence, glory and greatness,-—making no distinction 
between Attributes of Essence and Attributes of action. They also 
asserted certain descriptive Attributes ('^ •d)^ L^ftj^ ), for example, 
hands and face,taking the Qur'anic words literally and 
accordingly, they gave them the name of descriptive Attributes.' 
Like the Jabrites the Attributists adhered to the doctrine of 
predestination in all its gloominess and intensity. Consequently 
a new group of the Sifatiayyah sprang out under the name of 
« 
Mushabbihah. According to ShahristanI this new group linked the 
Divine Attributes to the Attributes of created things and they 
turned God into a similitude of their own selves. Thus, every-
where at that time, in the early Islamic society the problem 
of freedom and determinism (Jabr and Qadar) was being discussed 
and scholars started to Interpret the Quranic verses and Ahadlth 
( ci!:^ L^>.|) (Traditions) in support of their arguments for or 
against the freedom of human-will. At that time one of the most 
1. Ameer'Ali, op. cit., p. 413. 
2. cf. The Spirit of Islam by Ameer'^Ali, p. 413, 
o^ Ibid.. po 414. 
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renowned scholars and teachers , Hasan a l - B a s r i , belonging to 
the a n t i - p r e d e s t i n a r i a n pa r ty , who had imbibed the l i b e r a l and 
r a t i o n a l i s t i c ideas of the Imaras(A) of the family of Muhainniad(S), 
on s e t t i n g at Basrah from Medlnah had s t a r t ed a l ec tu re c l a s s 
which was soon thronged by the s tudents of I r a q . Here he d i s -
coursed on the metaphysical quest ions prevalent i n those days 
i n the s p i r i t of h is masters . One of h i s most prominent p u p i l , 
Wasil ibn "^Ata', d i f fered from him and founded a l i b e r a l and 
r a t i ona l school named "Mutazilah" following the foots teps of 
the Imams of the Ahl a l -Bayt . Thus, in Muslim phi losophical 
thought the problem of the freedom of the human wi l l emerged 
as a problem with s ign i f i can t s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l impl ica t ions . On 
the one hand, the Ummayyads' ty rannica l a t t i t u d e was i n t e r p r e t i n g 
the Qur'anic verses in favour of p redes t ina t ion ; and l i b e r a l 
and r a t i o n a l minds following the Imamiyyah philosophers were asser t -
ing man's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and free w i l l , on the o ther . 
mm 
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(ii). Emergence of ^Ilm al-Kalam;(pialectlcal Theology);-
Islam is a religion of peace and goodwill. It has progre-
ssive and systematic ideals for humanity, Isl'am has in its 
essence the rationalistic and the philosophical spirit. It 
continued to adapt itself to the changing environment by assimi-
lating the growth of learning and incorporating that form of 
reasoning which was suited to the times and circumstances. It 
was but natural that Muslim thought underwent various stages of 
development. In its primary stage it was synonymous with simple 
and pure reasoning, intelligible even to the people of common 
understanding. Slowly and gradually, with the passage of time 
it evolved rationalistic, scholastic, mystical and other forms 
in response to the need of the day. 
To meet the challenge of Greek and other Western philoso-
phies, Muslim scholars, during the course of evolution of Islamic 
ideals, brought into being a science of reasoning under the name 
of 'Kalam'. 
I^lm al-Kalam is translated as 'dialectical , 
philosophy', because both the words kalam 
and dialectics mean dialogue. This branch 
of Islamic philosophy can be defined as 
^the discursive approach to Islamic beliefsi 
That is why Muslim scholars usually combine 
kalam with ^aqaMd, and this branch is call-
ed al-kal'am wa al-'^ aqa^  id. Usually attempts 
are made to trace back the origin of ^ilm al-
kalam in non-Islamic philosophies. But it 
actually originated in the intellectual 
climate created by Islam, which encouraged 
free enquiry and rational approach to the 
tenets of faith. ^  
le Waheed Akhtar, o£, clt.. p. 102. 
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Hikmat and Kal'am are the two aspects of reasoning or 
* ————— 
exoter ic epistomology, 'Hikmat *, which may be defined as 
"free thinking" i s philosophy proper in the Western sense of 
the term. I t aims at a t t a i n i n g t ru ths regarding the fundamental 
problems of the universe , soul and God by r a t i ona l argument 
acceptable to the general humanity, i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r confor-
mity or now conformity to the r e l i g i o u s dogmas of Islam. But, 
according to Muzaffar-ud-Din Nadvi, Hukama' ( islamic philosophers) 
maintain tha t "the t r u t h s and f indings of reason invar iably 
conform to the r e l i g ious induc t ions" . 
Soon a f t e r the death of the Prophet(S) of Islam the Muslims 
were divided in to two major groups: the supporters of Abu Bakr 
and the supporters of ^Ali . After the assass ina t ion of ^Uthman, 
the t h i rd Caliph, the d iv i s ion assumed specia l s ign i f i cance . 
Muslims were divided in to two d i s t i n c t groups: the Shl^ah of 
Uthman and the Shi''ah of ^Ali . But i t would be incor rec t to 
be l ieve tha t those who were ca l led Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama^at 
or the Sunnis were as a s ing le body in the camp of the Shi'^ah 
of '•Uthman, The fac t i s tha t the majority of Muslims accepted 
' 'Ali as the fourth r i g h t l y guided Caliph (Khallfah a l -Rashid) . 
I t was only a minority that Joined hands with Mu^awiyah, the . 
governor of Syria , whom ^Ali had dismissed from his of f ice and, 
t he re fo re , he s t a r t ed a compaign against the un iversa l ly accepted 
Caliph, '•Ali, in the Muslim world ra i s ing the slogan: "We want 
1. Nadvi, M.D., Muslim Thought and I t s Source. (Delhi: Idarah- i 
Adablyat-i Delhi, 198^ (Repr in t ) , p , 105. 
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the assass ins of ^UtJinian," Mu*^awiyah and h i s supporters knew well 
tha t ^Ali had no hand in t h i s a s sas s ina t ion , and tha t he had t r i e d 
h i s best to save the l i f e of the th i rd Cal iph. However, p o l i t i c a l 
exigiency forced some vested i n t e r e s t s to uphold the demand of 
Mu'*awiyah» Unfortunately Umm al-Mu'minin, '•A'ishah, the youngest 
wife of the Prophet(S) , and two of very close companions of the 
Prophet(S) revol ted against ' 'All. They were defeated at the B a t t l e 
of Jamalo ^Ali almost defeated Mu'-awiyah at S i f f in , when the Qur'an 
m 
was raised by the defeated army as the arbitrator (Hakam), This 
issue gave rise to a number of puzzling questions, and consequently 
a new sect, known as the Khawarl.1, emerged among Muslims. The early 
Mu^tazilites are supposed by some historians to be on the side of 
the Khawarlj, but actually Wasil ibn ^Ata' was totally opposed 
to the Banu Umayyah, the successors of Mu^awiyah, The Khwarl.1 
regarded both ^All and Mu*'awlyah as infidels, while Wasil ibn 
« 
^Ata' took a stand tha t was expressed in h i s doct r ine of " i n t e r -
mediate pos i t ion" (^Amr bayn al->amraynt c3i^!^'l^^^t^ ) . Nevertheless , 
h is sympathies were with ^Ali and h is family. 
In fac t the b i r t h of the Mu^taz l l i t es , as commonly bel ieved, 
owes I t s o r ig in to a theo log ica l controversy between Wasil ibn-
'•Ata' and h is teacher , Hasan a l -Basr i on the i ssue of the s t a t u s 
1.(a) ^Abd al-Karim a l - S h a h r l s t a n i , a l -Mlla l wa a l -Nihal ;Eng. t r . 
Muslim Sects and Divis ions: The Section on Muslim Sects by 
A.K.Kazl & J.G.Flynn, ^London e t c . , Kegan Paul I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
1984), pp. 41-71 . 
(b) Nawabakhti, a l -F l raq a l -Shl^ah;Pers ian t r a n s . Muhammad JawSd 
Mashkur, (Tehran, Markaz-e-Int ishara t -e ' i lm i wa'farhangl,136l 
Shamsl), pp. 22-23. 
(c) Abu al-Hasan a l - 'Ash^arf, Maqalat al-Islamlyyxn f l I k h t l l a f a l -
Musallivjji . Per . t r . Muhsin Mu'ayyadi,iTehran, I n t i s h a r a t - e 
Amir Kablr (1362 Shamsi); pp. 81-108. 
(d) Hanna al-Fakhuri and Khali l a l - J a r r , 0£. c i t . , pp.114-126 
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of a fasiq ( s i n n e r ) . We sha l l discuss those issues in the following 
pages . The r ea l problem was p o l i t i c a l and i t perturbed the minds 
of the r igh t thinking and pious Muslims a f t e r the martyrdom of 
^All and the surrender of the Caliphate by h i s son, Imam al-Hasan, 
i n favour of Mu^awiyah on c e r t a i n condit ions t ha t were never 
f u l f i l l e d by the l a t t e r , for the Umayyads ru le had been v io l a t i ng 
a l l the fundamentals of Islam and trampling the p r inc ip l e s of 
soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l j u s t i c e according to Islam. 
As mentioned e a r l i e r , i t i s said that Ghilan al-Dimashql, 
a slave of the t h i rd Caliph, ^Uthman, asked Hasan a l -Basr i as 
to whether the Umayyads were j u s t i f i e d in claiming tha t man was 
t o t a l l y he lp less and a l l the power to act belongs to Allah only, 
Hasan a l -Bas r i r ep l i ed : "The Banu-Umayyah are the enemies of 
Allah and are l i a r s . " He rose in revol t and was k i l l e d . Similar 
i s the case of another person named Ma'abad a l - Juhan i , In the 
view of Montgomery Watt there were also some other persons who 
ra i sed t h i s quest ion: "A s imi lar s tory i s told of a l -Hasan 's 
pupi l Qatada and another man 'Amr Ibn-'-Ubayd, . . . " 
This i s sue had i t s o r ig in in the a t tempted defence of Yazld and 
h i s o f f i c ia l s^ who, a f t e r the martyrdom of al-Husayn at Karbala 
claimed tha t al-Husayn and h is companions were k i l l e d by God, 
1, Sh ib l l Nu^mani, ^Ilm al-Kalam. op. c i t , , pp. 17-18. 
2. Watt, W.Montgomery, Islamic Philosophy and Theology; (Islamic 
Surveys I), (The Edinburg University Press, 19b2), po &T, 
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f o r i t i s He who i s all-powerful and man i s only an instrument 
i n the hands of Divine p redes t ina t ion (Jabr or Taqdir ) . Al-
Husayn's e ldes t son ''Ali ibn al-Husayn, popularly known as Imam 
Zayn al-^Abidin, quoted from the Qur'an the verses that said 
t h a t man was responsible for h i s a c t s , because he was given by 
God the freedom of choice and ac t ion . This debate gave r i s e to 
the two d i f fe ren t views among the Muslims. The supporters of 
the Banti Umayyah took recourse to the Qur'anic verses s t r e s s ing the 
al l -powerfulness of God, They were cal led the Jabrlyyah (c^r!^>\p') 
( the advocates of p r e d e s t i n a t i o n ) . The other group that based 
Islamic e th i c s on the freedom of human wi l l was cal led the 
Qadariyyah. The Mu^tazilah were .the successors of the Qadariyyah. 
Hanna al-Fakhuri and Khall l a l - J a r r , in Ta'rilch Fals i fah 
dar Jahan~e I s lamI , (<^L)^!^->«t(uX8^j\J) ^ say tha t i t i s wrong to 
suppose t h a t Wasil and 'Amr were the Khawari,1, but they were 
in close contact with the ^Alivids, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Zaydiyyah, 
the fol lowers of Zayd ibn ''Ali ibn al-Husayn t h a t revol ted against 
the Banu Umayyah and was martyred. Later the M u ' t a z i l i t e s were 
divided in to two groups subsequent to the coming to power of 
the <^AbbSsides, 'Amr ibn-^Ubayd, a Mu'-tazil i , joined hands with 
the ''Abbasides in supporting t h e i r claim to be the Ca l iphe te , He 
founded the Mu^tazi l i school of Basrah tha t severed i t s r e l a t i o n 
a 
with the Shi^ah, The other group of the Mu'-tazilah at Baghdad 
remained loyal to the Shi'•ah, particularly the Zaydiyyah, They 
differed among themselves on the issue of the Imam, The former 
supported the claim of the ''Abbasides, while the latter were 
1S2 
the champions of the Imama of family. 
As i s indicated by above mentioned fac ts the emergence of 
*'Ilm al-Kalam was ins t rumental in enlightening Muslims inc l ined 
t o phi losophizat ion to ponder over the problems r e l a t e d to 
t h e i r r e l i g i o - e t h i c a l and s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l Islamic Weltanschauung. 
*'Ilm al-Kalam ( d i a l e c t i c a l theology), as mentioned e a r l i e r ^ 
aims at a r r iv ing at t r u t h l o g i c a l l y within the framework of the 
teaching of Islam. Hukama* and Mutakallimun both be l ieve in 
conformity of reason to reve la t ion , with th i s d i f ference only 
t h a t the former do not take into account the question of conformity 
at the time of a t t a in ing t r u t h s , while the l a t t e r s t a r t with i t . 
Kalam i s divided in to various s ec t s , of which three main groups 
a re : (a) the Mu^-tazilah, (b) the Asha*'irah, and (c) the Shi'•ah. 
The f i r s t two groups are known as Ra t iona l i s t i c and Scholas t ic 
schools of Muslim thought . The th i rd one occupies a unique place 
because of i t s balanced approach in which reason and Divine 
guidance are reconci led . Anyhow, the Shi^'ah s t r e s s on the ro l e 
of reason more than the Sunnis, the majority sec t of Muslims, 
1. Hanna al-Fakhuri and Khali l a l - J a r r , 0£. c i t , , pp, 125-126. 
•'•«'~'1?!I«'?J"«'"S4'', 
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( l i i ) . Mu^ taz i l i t e s ' Pos i t ion with Regard to Freedom; 
As indica ted ear l ier* Mu^tazilah were the successors 
ot the Qadariyyah. The Qadariyyah were the advocates of the 
freedom of the human w i l l . The Qadar i te-Mutazi l i te th inkers 
maintained that reason should be the touch-stone for knowing 
r e a l i t y and man i s responsible for what he does because 
he decides upon and creates h i s ac ts with his free choice. As 
W. Montgomery Watt puts i t : 
The Mutazi l i tes stood for freedom of the 
w i l l and human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; in other 
respects they adopted sens ib l e , almost 
n ine teen th -cen tu ry - l ibe ra l a t t i t u d e . "^  
Abu Hudhayfah Wasil ibn 'Ata ' al-Ghazzal one of the most 
prominent pupi ls of Hasan a l -Bas r i , i s considered the founder 
of Mu'^tazilah school of Muslim philosophy. Wasil was a man of 
deep th inking and ana ly t i c a l mind, thoroughly versed in the 
r e l i g i o u s sciences and t r a d i t i o n s and had also studied in Medinah. 
He dif fered from his teacher Imam Hasan a l -Bas r i on a question 
of r e l i g i o u s dogma whether a bel iever who i s the pe rpe t r a to r 
of a grave s in would be considered to be an unbeliever and 
outs ide the Islam (as the ahl al-wa^id sec t maintains) 
or would he be ca l led a Muslim ( b e l i e v e r ) ( a s the 
2 
group M u r j i ' i t e s h o l d s ) . Wasil placed a sinner in an i n t e r -
mediate s t a t e (manzilah bayn al-manzilatayn) and withdrew 
1 . Watt , W.M., 0£ . c i t . , p . 58 . 
2, Mir Valiuddin, "Mu^tazilism",in A History of Muslim Philosophy, 
op. clt., p. 199. 
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himself from the lecture-room of Hasan a l - B a s r i . He thereupon 
founded t h i s school (Mu^tazilah) of h i s own and made his r a d i c a l 
e f fo r t s to spread i t . His followers have, from t h i s f ac t , been 
ca l led Mu^tazilah, or Ahl a l - I ' t l z a l , i . e . , the Dissenters . 
Montgomary Watt, in h i s Islamic Philosophy and Theology; 
("Islamic Survevs^I") . na r ra tes the same story in a somewhat 
d i f fe ren t way. He i s of the view tha t i t was not only Wasil 
« 
ibn-^Ata who may be considered as the founder of the Mu^tazilism, 
but i t was ' Amr ibn-%bayd who i s often referred to as the founder 
of the Mu^tazilah school: 
Once when al~Hasan was asked his view on 
* 
the dispute between the Murji'ites, who 
said the grave sinner was a believer, and 
most of the Kharijites, who said the grave 
sinner was an unbeliever, a man interupted 
before al-Hasan could reply and asserted that the 
grave sinner was in a "intermediate position." 
This man, WASIL IBN-<^ATA', then withdrew 
from the circle, and ai-^asan remarked, 
"He has withdrawn (i^ tazala) from us"; 
from this remark he and his party were called 
the Mu^tazila (the corresponding participial 
form). Unfortunately this is not the only 
account of the origin of the Mu*'tazilcv. A 
similar story is told of al-Hasan's pupil 
Qatada and another man <^ AMR IBN-'^ UBAY; and 
this latter man is often referred to as the 
founder of the Mu^tazila. 2 
Generally, Wasil's school of Mu'^tazilism is also named as 
the school of Divine Unity and Divine Justice, (al-Tavhid and 
« 
al-'^Adl). The Mu^tazilah hold five basic principles upon which 
1« Ameer'^Ali, 02. clt.. p, A14. 
2 . Watt, W.M., Is lamic Philosophy and Theology, op. c l t , . p , 60. 
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they built their theological system, but two of them are so 
significant that they are known as ahl al~Tawhid wa al--^A6liCt^Jj^_y^\jb]) 
(the people of Divine Unity and Justice). 
By Divine Unity, Mu^tazilites mean that God is one, pure 
and simple. No shadow of dualism can be attached to Him. He 
has no Attributes apart from His Essence. 
By Unity they imply the denial of the divine 
Attributes. Undoubtedly they admit that God 
is knowing, powerful, and seeing, but their 
intellect does not allow them to admit that 
these divine attributes are separate and 
different from the divine essence. 2 
The reason for this view of theirs is that if the Attributes 
of God are not considered to be identical with the Essence of 
God, "Plurality of eternals" would necessarily result and the 
belief in unity would have to be given up. This is, according 
to their opinion, clear unbelief (Kufr). Again they maintain 
that the Holy Quran is the "work" of God, and so His creation, 
and not the "word" of God. 
By Divine Justice, they meant that God is ever just and 
can never be cruel. "By Justice they imply that it is incumbent 
on God to requite the obedient for their good deeds and punish 
the sinners for their misdeeds." Here Mu''tazilites vehemently 
1 • The five basic principles of the Mu^tazilah school are as 
follows: (^^ Ta;^ad: >^y(Unity of God); (b) ^Adl: ii^ (Justice); 
(c) Wa<d wa wa'^ id; A>-.rj>^ (Promise and Threat); (d) Manzilat bayn 
al-Manzilatyni^^£jj;o*c:^>>(the Intermediate ^ Position;; and 
(e) !Amr bl al-Ma<ruf wa Nahv ^an al-Munkar;>^ C^^ c5^ -^>^ i^ (^the 
Principle enjoying good and Prohibiting evil). 
Contd... 
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advocated freedom of the human w i l l ; 
, , . (Mutaz i lah) maintained t h a t God has endowed 
man with some freedom of v o l i t i o n and l i b e r t y 
of ac t ions . Man can make or mar h is fortune 
according as he exercises tha t power in a r igh t 
or wrong d i r e c t i o n , '' 
Man, according to them, i s responsible for a l l h i s a c t i o n s , 
and gets reward for h i s vir tuous ac ts and punishment for h is 
malicious deeds. 
The Divine Unity and Divine Jus t i ce are the basic p r inc ip l e s 
of the b e l i e f s of the Mu^tazi l i tes and t h i s i s the reason why they 
c a l l themselves "the people of Unity and J u s t i c e " (Ahl al-TauhJd. 
wa al- '^Adl). 
Now keeping in view the basic be l i e f s of Divine Unity 
and J u s t i c e , we may discuss o ther important b e l i e f s t ha t necessar i ly 
follow from the f i r s t two in order to understand Mu'- tazi l i tes ' 
p o s i t i o n with regard to freedom. 
( 1 ) . The f i r s t quest ion, then, i s concerend with man's 
conduct and destinyo Mu^tazi l i tes hold t h a t God Almighty's 
Ju s t i ce neces s i t a t e s that man should be the author of h i s own 
a c t s . In such a condit ion alone can he be said to be free and 
(References from previous page ) "* 
2o Mir Valiuddin, "MuHazilism", 0£. c i t . . p , 200. 
3 . Nadvi, M. D., 0£. c i t . , p . 25. 
4 . Mir Valiuddin, o£. c i t . . p , 200. 
1. Nadvi, M.D., 0£. c i t . , p . 25. 
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responsible for h is deeds. The same view was held by the 
Qadari tes . T.J.De Boer, in t h i s connection, wr i t e s : 
The forerunners of the M u ' t a z i l i t e s , who were 
cal led Qadari tes , taught the freedom of the 
human w i l l ; and the M u ' t a z i l i t e s , even in 
l a t e r t imes, when t h e i r speculat ions were 
d i rec ted more to theologico-metaphysical problems, 
were f i r s t and formost pointed to as the supporters 
of the doct r ine of Divine Righteousness . . . ' ' 
Thus, Mu*^tazilites accepted t o t a l l y the theory of indeterminism 
and became t rue successors of the Qadar i tes . According to them 
i f man were not the author of h is own ac t s and if these ac ts 
were the c rea t ion of Almighty God, how can he be held responsible 
for h is deeds and deserve punishment for h is s ins? In such a 
condi t ion would i t not be i n j u s t i c e on the par t of God t h a t , 
a f t e r c rea t ing a human person he lp l e s s . He should c a l l him to 
account for h is s ins and send him to h e l l ? I t seemed i l l o g i c a l 
to M u ' t a z i l i t e s . Despite the differences among d i f fe ren t 
Mu'-tazilah a l l of them agree in the matter of man's being the 
crea tor of h is v o l i t i o n a l a c t s . He i s , they maintain, free a t 
h i s wil l to do whatever he l i k e s . Whatever he does, they 
a s s e r t , he i s responsible for that and not God. God wi l l reward 
or punish him on the bas i s of h is good or bad deeds, "Since 
man i s the author of h is own a c t s , i t i s necessary for God to 
2 
reward him for his good deeds" and punish him for his evil 
1o De Boer, T.J., The History of Philosophy in Islam, Cosmo 
Publications, New Delhi, 1983, pp. hh-h^, 
2. Cf. Mir Valiuddin, "Mu'tazilism", OJD. cit., p. 201. 
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a c t s . As Al-Shahris tani puts i t : 
"The M u ' t a z i l i t e s unanimously maintain, t h a t 
man decides upon and crea tes h i s a c t s , both 
good and e v i l ; t h a t he deserves reward or 
punishment in the next world for what he 
does . In t h i s way, the Lord i s safeguarded 
from assoc ia t ion with any ev i l or wrong or 
any act of unbelief or t r ansg res s ion . For 
i f He created the wrong, He would be wrong, ^ 
and i f he created j u s t i c e . He would be j u s t . " 
( 2 ) . Furthermore, Mu^tazi l i tes a s s e r t tha t the j u s t i c e of 
Almighty Gtod makes i t incumbent upon Him not to do anything 
contrary to j u s t i c e and equ i ty . Since God i s jus t and loves 
His c r e a t u r e s . He always does good and wishes best for His 
crown of a l l the c rea tu res h^uman person, Mir Valiuddin 
maintains: 
I t i s the unanimous verdic t of the M u ' t a z i l i t e s 
t h a t the wise can only do what i s s a lu t a ry 
( a l - s a l a h ) nd good, and that God's wisdom always 
keeps in*view what i s sa lu tary for His se rvan ts ; 
t he r e fo r e . He cannot be cruel to them. He cannot 
bring in to effect ev i l deeds. He cannot renounce 
tha t which i s s a l u t a r y . 2 
In t h i s way, Mu^taz i l i t es point out tha t God cannot ask His 
human c rea tu res to do t h a t which i s impossible. Consequently 
reason also suggests tha t God does not place a burden on any 
crea ture g r ea t e r than i t can bear because He i s a j u s t , merciful 
and a Supreme Good, 
1. Al-Shahrastani , Kit5b a l -Mila l wa-al-Nihal, quoted by Mir 
Vahiduddin in h is Ar t ic le on "Mu'tazilism" in (Edt.) book 
'A History of Muslim Philosophy, op. c i t . , p . 201. 
2« Mir Valiuddin, 0£. c i t . . p , 201o 
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The Mu*^tazilites also maintain that reason i s the t r ue c r i t e r i o n 
of good and e v i l . "Things are not good o r e v i l , because God 
declares them to be so . No, God makes the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
good and evi l . " In r e a l i t y , they say, goodness and e v i l are 
inherent in the essence of the things themselves. This very goodness 
or ev i l of th ings i s the cause of the commands and p roh ib i t ions 
of the Law. The human i n t e l l e c t i s capable of perceiving the 
goodness and ev i l of a few things and in t h i s connection no laws 
are required to express t h e i r goodness and e v i l , for ins tance , to 
declare t ha t i t i s commendable to speak the t r u t h and despicable 
to commit oneself to un t ru th . Mu^tazi l i tes hold t ha t a l l t h i s 
shows t h a t the ev i l and goodness of things are obvious and requi re 
no proof from the Law (Shari^ah) . God does not l i k e ev i l and 
shameful a c t s : 
Shameful and unjust deeds are ev i l - in - themse lves ; 
t he re fo re , God has banned indulgence in them. I t 
does not imply tha t His put t ing a ban on them 
made them shameful and unjust deeds.5 
Al-Shahrastani has very luc id ly expressed t h i s theme of thorough-
going ra t iona l i sm of the Mu^-tazilites in these words: 
"The adherents of j u s t i c e say: All objects of 
knowledge f a l l under the supervision of reason 
and receive t h e i r obl igatory power from r a t i o n a l 
i n s i g h t . Consequently, obl igatory g ra t i t ude for 
1 . I b i d . , p . 201. 2 . I b i d . , p . 201. 
3 . I b i d . , p p . 201-202. 
170 
divine bounty precedes the orders given 
by (divine) law; and beauty and ugliness 
are qualities belonging instrinsically to 
what is beautiful and ugly."1 
According to Mu^tazilites God is just and has bestowed 
upon man the faculty of free will. Man is the creative efficient 
of his actions, good and bad, and gets reward and punishment in 
the future world by based on what he does; and that no moral 
evil, or unequity of action, or unbelief, or disobedience, can 
be ascribed to God, because, if He had caused unrighteousness 
2 
to be. He would be Himself unrighteous. They also unanimously 
maintain that the All-wise-God does only that which is beneficial 
and good for human beings. It is so because of the fact that 
"a regard in the light of wisdom 1^) for the good of 
humanity (^Ux)ULa«) is incumbent upon Him, though they differ as 
to His being obligated to secure the highest good and to bestow grace 
Fazlur Rehman in his book The Philosophy of 
Mulla Sadra. made similar remarks: 
The Mu^tazila,... nevertheless affirmed that 
God acted for the benefit and "in the best 
interests (al-aslab)" of His creation and, 
further that God allowed man a totally free 
will so that man might be entirely responsible 
for his own actions and God might be tree from 
1. Mir Valiuddin's Article on "Mu*tazilism" in M.M.Sharief, (ed.) 
A History of Muslim Philosophy, op. cit., p. 202, of, al-Shah-
ristanS, al-Milal wa al-Nihal7 pp. 62-63. 
2. Ameer 'Ali, 0£. cit., p. 418. 
3. Ibid., p. 418. 
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the blame of determining men's behaviour 
and then rewarding or punishing him." 
All mentioned above "they call the doctrine of "^ adl, or justice." 
i, Now from the second main p r inc ip l e of the Mutaz i l i t e s , i . e . 
the Unity of God, the following be l i e f s necessa r i ly r e s u l t as 
c o r o l l a r i e s : 
( a ) . The Mu^tazi l i tes deny the p o s s i b i l i t y b e a u t i f i c visiorp*C^^ 
Taey hold t h a t v i s ion i s not poss ib le without proper place and 
d i r e c t i o n . As God i s beyond place and d i r e c t i o n , a v i s ion of 
Him i s poss ib le ne i the r in t h i s world nor i n the 
next world, 
( b ) , They bel ieve tha t Qur'an i s a created speech of Allah. 
Amir 'Ali, with reference to a l - S h a h r i s t a n i , po in ts out : "They 
also maintain t ha t the word of God i s c rea ted , and when c rea ted , 
i s expressed in l e t t e r s and s o u n d s . . . , " I t was held by the 
Mu^tazi l i tes that the Qur'an i s an or ig ina ted work of God and i t 
came into exis tence together with the prophethood of the Prophet(S) 
of Islamo 
( c ) . God i s E te rna l . Etern i ty i s the pecu l ia r proper ty 
of His Essence, and hence i t i s the d i s t inguish ing a t t r i b u t e 
1. Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla gadra; (Sadar al-Din al~ 
Shi raz i ) . ' (Albany: Sta te Universi ty of New York 'Press , 1975), 
pp, 174-175. 
2 . Ameer *Ali, op, c l t . . p , 418. 
3 . I b i d , , p . 417. 
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of the Divine Being, No mutabil i ty i s a t t r i b u t e d to Him. In 
t h i s respect according to the Mu^tazi l i tes , God's p leasure and 
anger are not a t t r i b u t e s ( s i f a t ) ( Cl>\-L* )^, but statesCahwal cii>->b 
They dec la re : 
God's p leasure and anger should not be regarded 
as His a t t r i b u t e s , because anger and p leasure 
are s t a t e s and s t a t e s are mutable, whereas the 
essence of God i s immutable. They should be taken 
as heaven and h e l l . "^  
The Mu^taz i l i tes were a group of r a t i o n a l i s t s who made 
a rad ica l attempt to judge a l l Islamic be l i e f s from the view 
of t h e o r i t i c a l reason and renounced a l l those ideas 
t h a t lay beyond the reach of reason. They re jec ted the 
view tha t r eve la t ion could be contrary to the d i c t a t e s of reason. 
In t h i s regard, Mir Valiuddin wr i t e s : 
They hardly rea l ized the fact tha t reason l i k e 
any other facul ty with which man i s g i f t ed , has 
i t s l i m i t a t i o n s and cannot be expected to comp-
rehend r e a l i t y in a l l i t s d e t a i l s . 2 
Ameer ''All has eloquently praised the serv ices of the 
Mu^tazi l i tes to the cause of the development of Muslim philosophy, 
He says: 
1. Mir Valiuddin, 0£* £il*» P* ^02. 
2. I b i d . , p . 204. 
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• Mu^tazilalsm has been, with considerable 
plausibility, compared to the scholastic 
philosophy of the Middle Ages in Europe. 
Scholasticism is said to have been the 
"movement of the intellect to justify by 
reason several of the dogmas of the faith'.' 
Mu'tazilaism also directed its endeavours 
to establish a concordance between Reason 
and positive revelation. But there the 
parallel ends. In the Christian Church, the 
the dogmas requiring explanation and just-
ification were many. The doctrine of the 
trinity in unity, of the three "Natures" 
in one, of originals sin, of transubstan-
tiation, all gave rise to a certain intelle-
ctual tension. The dogmas of the Church 
accordingly required some such "solvent" as 
scholasticism before science and free though 
could find their way into Christendom, In 
Islam the case was otherwise; with the excep-
tion of the unity of God the doctrine of 
Tauhid, which was the foundation of Mohammed's 
Church there was no dogma upon which insis-
tence was placed in any such form as to compel 
Reason to hold back its acceptance. The 
doctrine of "origin and return" mabda( ^tS^) 
and ma'adC ^^^), "coming (from Gtod) and 
returning (to Him)" and of the moral 
responsibility of man, was founded on the 
conception of a^Primal Cause the Originator 
of a l l t h ings . 
Mu^tazil i tea, have in one way or the o the r , attempted to 
prove t h e i r b e l i e f s and t r i e d to r a t i o n a l i z e the Islamic ideas 
in the l i g h t of Qur^'an and Had i t h . The chief exponents of the 
Mu^tazilah school a re : Wasil ibn *^Ata', Abu a l - H u ^ a y l a l -
*'Allaf, Al-Nazzam, Bighr ibn al-Mu'tamir, Mu'^ aramar, Hiamamah ibn 
Asijras al-NumayrI, ^Amr ibn Bahr Al-JShiz, Abu "^Ali a l -Jubbai 
and Abu Hashim e t c . 
1. Ameer'Ali, og. c i t . , pp. 422-A23. 
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( i v ) . The Ash^arl tes ' Pos i t ion with Regard to Freedom; -
Ash^arisra has r i g h t l y been charac te r i sed as a react ionary 
movement against Mu'tazilisra. I t i s the name of a philosophico-
theo log ica l school of thought in Islam tha t developed during the 
4 th / lOth and 5 th / l1 th c e n t u r i e s . This movement was "an attempt 
not only to purge Islam of a l l non-Islamic elements which had 
qu ie t ly crept into i t but also to harmonize the re l ig ious 
2 
consciousness with the r e l i g ious thoughts of Islam." This i s 
a theo log ica l school and i t s founder was Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari 
(260-1/873-4) .^ Sometimes i t i s a lso ca l led the Asha'rah.^ The 
Ash*arism la id the foundation of an orthodox Islamic theology 
or orthodox 'Kalam', as r a d i c a l l y opposed to the r a t i o n a l i s t 
'Kalam' of the Mu^tazilah school . In cont ras t "to "the extreme 
orthodox sec t s of Muslims, i t made use of the d i a l e c t i c a l method 
for the defence of the au thor i ty of Divine reve la t ion as v i t a l l y 
re levant to the theo log ica l suboects . The Ash^arites "had fought 
5 
against Reason with t h e i r ysual reper tory of t r a d i t i o n s . " 
Ash'arism disfavoured Mu^tazilism because of i t s l imi ted and 
merely r a t i o n a l approach. The Ash^arites contended tha t 
1. M. *Abul Hye, "Ash*^arlsm" in M.M.Sharief, ( e d . ) , A History of 
Muslim Philosophy, op. c i t . , p . 220. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 220. 
3 . Encyclopedia of Islam, o^p. c i t . , Vol. I , p . 694. 
4 . I b i d . , p . 69A. 
5 . Ameer *Ali, 0£ ' £ i i*» P* 441 . 
175 
the Mu^tazil i te doc t r ines were too abs t rac t for the general 
Muslim Community. They very quickly apprehended t h a t "the masses 
might be led in to the conclusion that r e l i g i o n was no longer 
binding and t h a t they might r i d themselves of i t s cont ro l as 
they l i k e d , " The apprehension may have been i l l - founded, but 
the fact seemed qu i t e c lear t h a t i t was genuine enough. They, 
therefore , r i g h t l y sought a movement sui ted to the genera l i ty 
as against one which was su i ted only to the abstract-minded 
2 
people. 
The general condition of the Muslim society at the end 
of the 3rd/9th century was such that the development of such a 
movement as orthodox ^11 m-ul Kalam was inevitable. The rational-
ization of faith, which developed at the beginning of the second 
century of the Hijrah as a systematic movement of thought in the 
name of rationalism in Islam or the Mu'tazilite movement was, in 
its original stage, simply an attempt to put Islam and its basic 
principles on a rational foundation by giving a consistent rational 
interpretation to the different dogmas and doctrines of Islam. 
But when the Mu'tazilite rationalists began to study the ^ Arab 
translations of the works of Greek physicists and philosophers 
made available to them by the early ^ Abbasid Caliphs, particularly 
by al-Mansur and al-Mamun, they began to apply the Greek 
philosophical methods and ideas to the interpretation of the 
basic principles of Islam as well. 
1. Nadvi, M.Do, Muslim Thought and Its Source, op. cit.. p. 52. 
2. Ibid., p. 52. 
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I t i s s t a ted t h a t t h i s react ionary movement Ash^arism 
(or Muslim Scholast icism) came into existence on the following 
grounds : -
( a ) . The M u ^ t a z i l i t e ' s doctr ines were too abs t rac t for the 
general Muslim Community of the time and i t was r i gh t l y appre-
hended tha t the masses might be led to the conclusion t h a t 
re l ig ion was not a binding force and they might do whatever 
they l i k e . Thus they would deviate from the t r u e s p i r i t of 
r e l ig ion , 
( b ) . Some of the ear ly ^Abbasid Cal iphs, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
al-Ma'mun began to pa t ronize the ra t ional ism of the Mu^'tazilites 
in pub l i c . The scho la r s , during t h i s period, began to apply the 
Greek trend of ph i losophis iz ing to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of Is lam. In t h i s context Muzaffaruddln 
Nadvi wr i t e s : 
A group of scholars with Catholic a t t i t u d e came 
forward with a mission of compromise. To put a 
s top to the d issens ions in the Muslim ranks, 
they s t a r t e d a socie ty of brotherhood with the . 
object of harmonising various schools of Islam. 
( c ) . The main point to emphasise i s tha t Ma'mun and his 
immediate successors did not allow t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s belong-
ing to other scl^ools to exerc ise t h e i r freedom of thought to 
which they were e n t i t l e d . As M.D.Nadvi puts i t : 
1. I b i d . , p . 53 . 
177 
Ma'mun may have been inspired by good 
motives, but as a f ree- th inker himself 
he ought to have allowed others to 
think f r e e l y . The r e su l t of a l l t h i s 
coercion and repression was what might ^ 
have been expected in the circumstances. 
While the above mentioned three factors besides many 
others were opera t ing during tha t t ime , i t was necessary, the 
Ash^arites hold, to s top the fa lse i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Islam and 
present the true Islamic s p i r i t in order to r e s to r e i t s p e c u l i a r i t y 
and s ign i f i can t i d e n t i t y . Thus, some mutakallimun (orthodox 
theologians) came forward and s t a r t ed a new movement. I t was at 
f i r s t a subterranean movement. I t could not come into the 
open for fear of publ ic c r i t i c i s m , Al-Junayd, for ins tance , had 
to discuss the Unity of God behind closed doors. Al-Shafi*i held 
tha t some t ra ined people could defend and purify the f a i t h but 
tha t t h i s should not be done in pub l ic . Al-Muhasibi and o ther 
contemporaries of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal incurred his d i sp leasure 
for defending the f a i t h with argument or reason. 
Al-Ash*ari was not the f i r s t to t ry to apply 
Kalam or r a t i o n a l argument to the defence of 
orthodox doc t r ine ; among those who had made 
s imi la r at tempts e a r l i e r was al-Harith_ bin 
Asad al-Muhasibi . 2 
But slowly and gradual ly the movement gathered momentum and 
began to be openly preached almost a t d i f ferent places of the 
1. I b i d . , p . 53 
2 . Encyclopedia of Islam, op. c i t . , p . 694,(Vol. I ) . 
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Muslim World in Mesopotamia by Abu-al Hasan ''Ali bin Ismail 
al-Agh^ari (d . 330 or 334/941 or 945), in Egypt by al-Tahawi 
(d . 331/942), and in Samarqand by Abu Mansilr a l -Maturidi 
(d. 333/944). But of a l l these , al-Aghari became the most 
popular hero , before whom the Mu^tazi l i te system ( the r a t i o n a l i s t 
Kalam) went down. "Al-'Asrfari seems to have been the f i r s t to 
do t h i s in a way acceptable to a l a rge body of orthodox opinion. 
He had the advantage, too , of having an in t imate and de t a i l ed 
knowledge of the views of the Mu^tazila" , because he was c lose ly 
2 
a f f i l i a t e d with t h i s r a t i o n a l i s t i c school upto the age of f o r t y . 
Henceforth, he came to be Known as the founder of the orthodox 
phi losophica l theology, and the school founded by him was named 
/- 3 
a f t e r him as Ash''arism, 
The chief points of the Ash^arites movement which was rad ica l ly 
opposed to the doct r ines of the Mu'tazilah were as under: 
( l ) . Ash^ariyyah held tha t God i s one, unique, e t e r n a l 
ex i s t en t Being. He i s not a substance, not a body not an accident , 
not l imi ted to any d i r e c t i o n and not s i tua ted in any space . He 
has , they say, e t e rna l At t r ibu tes such as knowledge, s i g h t , 
speech, and tha t i t i s by these that He knows , sees , 
speaks , whereas the Mu^tazi l i tes said tha t God has no At t r ibu tes 
1. I b i d . , p . 694. 
2 . Ib ido , p . 694. 
3 . M. ^Abdul Hye, "Ash^arism", o£. c i t . , p . 222. 
4 . Encyclopedia of Is lam, op. c i t . , p , 694. 
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d i s t i n c t from His Essence. 
( 2 ) . The Mu'-tazilah said tha t Qur^anic expressions, such 
as Clod's hand and lace must be in te rp re ted to mean "Grace", 
"Essence" and so on. The Ashairah, whilst agreeing t h a t nothing 
corporeal was meant by these expressions, held tha t they were 
the r ea l At t r ibutes whose p rec i se nature was unknown, Al~*AsharI, 
"took God's s i t t i n g on the throne in a s imi la r ( l i t e r a l sense) 
way." The Ash^ari tes , as against the Mu^tazi l i tes held t ha t 
"God has At t r ibutes which inhere e t e rna l l y in Him and are i n 
2 
addi t ion to His Essence," According to them these At t r ibu tes 
were e ternal but they were ne i t he r i d e n t i c a l with His Essence, 
nor were they qui te d i f f e r en t from or o ther than His Essence. 
On the contrary, the Mu*'tazilites held that God i s one, e t e r n a l , 
unique and absolute Being, having no touch of dualism in Him, 
They fur ther maintained: 
(God's) Essence i s se l f -con ta ined . He does 
not possess any a t t r i b u t e s apart from His 
Essence. His Essence i s , for ins tance , know-
ing, powerful, seeing, wi l l ing e t c . They denied the 
a t t r i b u t e s of God as any^thing other than and in 
addi t ion to His essence. 
( 3 ) . As against the view of the Mu^tazilah tha t the Qur-'an 
was crea ted , the Asha^irah maintained tha t i t was God's speech. 
1. I b i d . , p . 69A, 
2 , M. Abdul Hye, "Ash'arism", o^. £ i t . , p . 227. 
5* Ifeid.. pp. 226-227. 
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an eternal Attribute, and therefore, uncreated. As regards 
the eternity of the Quran, the Ash'-arites adopted again an 
intermediary position between the extreme views of the Zahirites 
and the Mu^tazilites: 
The Hanbalites and other Zahirites (extrme 
orthodox schools) held that the speech of 
God i.e.', the Qur>an, is composed of letters, 
words, and sounds which inhere in the Essence 
of God and, is, therefore, eternal. ' 
The Mu^'tazilites and a section of the Rafidites, on the contrary, 
went to the other extreme and maintained that the Holy Book was 
2 
created. 
Here i t may be po in ted out t h a t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s 
u n t e n a b l e , f o r i t was the sh i^ah Imams who sa id t h a t n e i t h e r t h e 
Qur 'an was c r e a t o r nor was c r e a t e d . The Ash*^arite view ho lds 
t h a t t he Qur-'an i s c o - e t e r n a l wi th God. While t h e Shi^ah say 
t h a t t h e s p i r i t or meaning of the Qur*an i s e t e r n a l and the words 
through which the Qur-'an was r evea l ed were c r e a t e d . 
( 4 ) . I n o p p o s i t i o n t o the s t a n d - p o i n t of t he Mu*^tazilah 
t h a t God could not l i t e r a l l y be seen , s i n c e t h a t would imply t h a t 
He i s c o r p o r e a l and l i m i t e d , the Asha^irah held t h a t t h e v i s i o n 
of God i n t h e world to come was p o s s i b l e , though men cannot 
1 . I b i d . , p . 2 3 3 . 
2 . I b i d . , p . 2 3 3 . 
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understand tne manner of it. The Mu^tazilites and the "philoso-
phers" denied the possibility of seeing God with eyes, as that 
would imply His bodily existence, which is absurd. The Ash^arites, 
as against the Mu azilites and the "philosophers" and in agreement 
with the orthodox class i,e. the Zahirites and the Mushabbihah, 
held that it is possible to see God; but they could not agree with 
their view that God is extended and can be shown by pointing 
1 
out, 
(5), The very crucial question at issue between the two 
schools the rationalist and the traditionalist of Islamic thought 
was that of the freedom of the human v/ill. On this very problem 
of free-will or on the ability of man to choose and produce 
actions, the Ash*arites took up again an intermediary position 
between the liberatarians (Qadariyyah) and the fatalists (the 
Jabariyyah). The orthodox people and the Jabarites maintained a 
purely fatalistic view. They held that human actions are 
predetermined and predetestined by the Almighty God. Man has 
no power to produce any action. They asserted that "Every 
thing is from God." He has absolute power over every thing 
(as the Qur-*an declares) including human will and actions. The 
Qadarites and their successors the MuHazilites, on the other 
hand, held that man has full power to produce an action and has 
1. Ibid., p. 234. 
2. Al-Qur>an, 11:284. 
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complete freedom (Qadar) in h i s choice though the power was 
created in him by God. They fur ther said tha t i t i s only on 
the basis of human free wi l l t ha t man would be rewarded or 
punished by God for h is good or bad ac t i ons . 
The Ash^arites struck a middle path . They made a d i s t i n c -
t i o n betv/egn ' c r e a t i o n ' (Khalq : ( > - ^ ) and ' a c q u i s i t i o n ' (Kasb; 
'*--i>*»> ) of an ac t ion . The Almighty God, according to them, i s 
the Creator (Khaliq; Ui^\^) of human ac t ions and human person 
i s the acqu i s i t o r (Muktasib: L--JA^). Al-'Ash^ari, in h i s 
' a l -Maqa la t ' , says: 
"Actions of human beings are created (makhluq) by God, ^ 
the c rea tures are not capable of c rea t ing any a c t i o n , " 
Again, in a s imi lar way, he, in h i s other famous t r e a t i s e , 
'Kifab al-Ibanah "an Usui al-Dlyanah, dec l a re s : 
"There i s no c rea to r except God and thepact ions 
of man are , the re fore , His c r e a t i o n s . " 
In shor t , one can eas i ly come to the conclusion tha t the Mu^tazi-
l i t e s emphasis was on the r e a l i t y of the choice in human, a c t i v i t y , 
while the Ash^ar i tes , on the cont rary , i n s i s t e d on God's Omni-
potence, and therefore ,mainta in that everything, whether good 
and e v i l , i s wil led by God and He c r e a t e s the ac ts of men by 
1, Al-'Ash*'ari, al-Maqalat, p . 291 quoted by M.'Abdul Hye in h i s 
a r t i c l e on "Ash'arism", o£, c i t . , p . 229, 
2 . Al-Asjh^ari, Kitab al-Ibanah. '^ an Usui al-Diyanah, p . 9, quoted 
by M. 'Abdul Hve. op. c i t . , p . 2^^' 
c rea t i ng in men the power to do each a c t . 
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1 
( 6 ) . ^jfliile the Mu'^tazilah ^with t h e i r doct r ine of 
al-Manzil bavn al-manzilatavn ^z^^^y^^O^<JJ^^) held tha t any 
Muslim found gu i l t y of a serious s in was neither a be l iever nor an 
unbel iever . The Ashairah, on the cont ra ry , i n s i s t e d tha t 
he remained a b e l i e v e r , but was l i a b l e to punishment in 
h e l l - f i r e . 
( 7 ) . The Ash^arites maintained the r e a l i t y of various 
escha to logica l fea tures such as the Basin, the Bridge, the 
Balance and i n t e r s e s s i o n by Muhamraad(S) , which were conspicu-
ously denied or r a t i o n a l l y in terpre ted by the Mu^' tazi l i tes . 
Regarding human freedom the Ash^arites ' p o s i t i o n i s r e s -
t ruc ted . Their system i s mainly based on the idea of necess i ty 
in which man i s completely bomnd and can not exerc i se moral i ty . 
Osman Amin, i n t h i s regard , in h is a r t i c l e "Renaissance in 
Egypt: Muhammad ^Abdul and His School" w r i t e s : 
The system of the Asharites ( the dogmatic 
theor log ians of Islam) was based on the 
idea of necess i ty . Following t h e i r idea 
of metaphysics, if one should admit t h i s 
n e c e s s i t y , then no morality would be p o s s i b l e . 
As Kant has s a i d , , t h e r e i s no moral i ty 
without freedom. 
1. Encyclopedia of Islam, op. c i t . . Vol. I , p . 69^. 
2* I b i d . , p . 694. 
3 . Osman Amin, "Renaissance in Egypt: Muhammad ^Abdul and His 
School", in M.M.Sharief, ed , , A History of Muslim Philosophy. 
Vol. I I , p . 1497. 
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Generally, i t is affirmed that the basic difference 
between Mu^tazilism and Ash'-arism is that the former gives 
prominence to "reason" and therefore, called 'Ra t iona l i s t i c ' 
school of Muslim thought, while, on the contrary, the l a t t e r 
gives preference to "revelation" and termed as ' scho las t i c ' 
school of Muslim thought. The Mu^tazilites held that 'reason' 
i s the real c r i te r ion of truth and ' revelat ion ' only confirms 
the dicta tes of reason. They further asserted that the object 
of revelation is to remove doubts and misgivings from the 
wavering minds by invit ing them to adhere to reason. Conversely, 
the Ash'^arites maintain that ' revelat ion ' i s the real c r i t e r ion 
of t ruth and the business of 'reason' i s , thus, to substant iate 
the religious tenets and injunctions by i t s arguments. 
Ml 
1. Nadvi, M.D., Muslim Thought and its Source, op. cit., p. 6. 
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( v ) . The Shi^ l te Pos i t ion regarding Freedom;-
The Shi^ i te f a i t h i s based upon the f ive p r i n c i p l e s : 
1 ) . Unity of God (al-TawhXd) . J^yJ\ 
\ t ^ ^ ' 
2 ) . Divine Ju s t i c e (^ . ad l~ i - I lha i ) . (s^lJjJl i^ 
3 ) . Prophethood (al~Nubuwwah). O v ^ ] 
4 ) . Imamah. C^lo) 
5 ) . Day of Resurrect ion (al-Ma^'ad)» ^\jlAi 
Of these only three are believed to be the p r inc ip les 
of f a i t h by the Sunnis: (1) Unity of God, (2) Prophethood, and 
(3) Mafad. 
The Mu^tazilah, alongwith the Shi^ah accept Divine Jus t ice 
as one of the basic p r i n c i p l e s . Accepting Divine 
Jus t i ce as a p r inc ip l e of f a i t h makes much difference with regard 
to men's own freedom of wi l l and ac t ion and t h e i r reward or 
punishment. The Asha*'irah and other sec t s of the Sunnis that 
do not bel ieve in Divine Ju s t i c e as a p r i n c i p l e of fa i th hold 
tha t God is not bound by any law to reward v i r tuous deeds and 
punish ev i l deeds. They say tha t God i s Almighty and to believe 
tha t He i s governed by the law of j u s t i c e amounts to c u r t a i l 
His a l l -powerfulness . Good and e v i l as well as t h e i r rewarding 
or punishment depend on the Will of God not on J u s t i c e . The 
Shl^ah and the Mu^tazilah, on the con t ra ry , hold that as Jus t i ce 
i s an a t t r i b u t e of God, i den t i ca l to His Essence, I t i s God 
who i s the Maker of the law of J u s t i c e . In t h i s case if God 
follows His own law, i t does not i n any sense mean curtailment 
186 
of His power. On the bas i s of t h i s p r inc ip le of f a i t h they 
say that i t i s according to Divine Jus t i ce tha t man should 
be free and capable of act ing according to h i s w i l l , otherwise 
man may not be responsible for h is a c t s , and consequently he 
may not be rewarded or punished. They say fur ther that i f God 
does not reward the vi r tuous and does not punish the v ic ious 
He would be unjus t , which i s impossible. 
The whole system of e th ics i s based upon the p o s t u l a t e 
of the freedom of human w i l l . In the Sh i ' i e f a i t h , human 
freedom i s a l og ica l co ro l l a ry of Divine J u s t i c e . The Shi^ah 
l i k e some of the Asha^irah and a l l Mu^tazilah, hold tha t man's 
ac t ion are of two types : reflexi-sre that i s unvoluntary, and 
willed or chosen. There i s no 'dispute as regard the r e f l ex ive 
a c t s , for they are i n s t i n c t i v e and man has no control over them 
but the ac ts which are chosen by man to perform are voluntary 
a c t s : In these cases man can act in two ways, for he may choose 
between r igh t and wrong, good and e v i l . We have seen t h a t 
Mu'tazi lah bel ieve in t o t a l freedom of man with regard to 
voluntary a c t s . This freedom i s cal led ' qada r ' ( Jj^) or ' ta fwld ' 
'. ' / -
i d^y^) * The term ' tafwid ' . as discussed e a r l i e r in t h i s 
« 
chapter , means ' d e l e g a t i o n ' or ' au thor i za t ion . According to 
some Mu^tazilah, God has delegated power to man for performing 
good or e v i l a c t s . This means that power i s always wi th man. 
On the other hand Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'^ari 's d i s c i p l e , Abu Bakr 
a l -Baqa l lan i , a l a t e r Mu^tazilah, believes that power being a 
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Divine Attr ibute so le ly belongs to God, and He i s the Creator 
of a l l kinds of a c t s . I t i s only God who bestows power upon 
man to choose between good and e v i l , r igh t and wrong a c t s . Man 
possesses t h i s l imited power only. This doctr ine i s ca l led the 
doctr ine of ' a c q u i s i t i o n ' or Kasb ( ^ w ) , In t h i s way, the 
Mu^tazilah and the Asha^irah take two extreme p o s i t i o n s , while 
the Shi^a, -'^cording to the teaching of the Imams of the Prophet ' s 
Family (Ahl al~Bayt), take an in termedia te p o s i t i o n . The saying 
of the Imam J a ' f a r al-Sadiq(A) i s : 
(ne i the r determinism nor freedom or delegated power, but an 
intermediate pos i t ion ) , ' 
In Usui a l -Kaf l , i n Kitab al-Tawhid, there i s a chapter 
e n t i t l e d : * ^ J l ^ l j l t ^ ^ > ^ ^ \ i ^ i i a J ^ i ^ V 
(al~,1abr wa al-qadar wa al-amr bayn a l ' amrayn ) the Persian 
t r a n s l a t o r and commentator, Sayyid Jawad Mustafawi, defined 
qadar ( J^-^) as synonymous with another 'Arabic word Tafwid 
( U r j r ^ ) . After explaining the doc t r ine of determinism and 
human f ree w i l l , he wr i t e s : 
"The doctr ine of freedom or 'amr bayn al~amrayn (an intermediate pos i t i on ) forms the content of 
a l l the Tradit ions na r ra ted in t h i s chapter , 
and a l l the Tradi t ions reaching us through the ^,^ 
Imams of the Prophet ' s Family (Ahl al-Bayt; c^\JJ5»l). 
In a l l these Tradi t ions Jabr and tafwid (or "' 
qadar) have been r e j e c t e d , and by refiiting 
them an intermediate p o s i t i o n Camr bayn al-^amaryn) 
1. Abu Ja*far Muhammad ibn Ya'qub ibn Ishaq al-Kulaynl (d. 328 o r 
329 H. ) , ilsSl .al=Ka|i, (Tehran ( I r a n ) : I n t i s h a r a t - e Islaiuiyyah) 
Vol. I , pp, 222-224, ( In Kitab al-Tawh£d: Ch: Al~Jabr wa a l - q a d a r 
wa al-^amr bayn al-»amrayn,tTraditxon Nos. 11 & I^TJ": ^ — ^ — ^ 
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is posited, that is neither man is as 
helpless in his acts as the tools in the 
hands of a worker, not having any power 
not to do anything or defend himself, nor 
is man fully capable of performing his 
acts independently, as if God has no power 
over his acts. In reality all his acts are 
related, on the one hand.,to God, and on the 
other, to his owneself." 
The commentator regards this issue as a very critical one that 
has embarrassed and worried many scholars. He quotes the author 
of Kifayat al-Usul as saying: 
"The late '•Allamah Maglisi (Muhammad Baqir) 
referred to the eight different views of 
eminent scholars and raised objections 
against them; he forwarded his own ninth view 
considering it based on the Traditions. Most 
of the scholars regarded pure consciousness 
of man as the ground of freedom. According 
to this view, man can claim: 'I wish to do 
this and not to do that'. This is considered 
to be the clinching argument in favourpOf the 
claim that man has freedom of action." 
Jawad Mustafawi regards the 12th Hadith (Tradition) of 
this chapter conclusive in this matter. The 12th Hadith is 
as follows: 
"...Ahmad ibn Muhammad says: "I asked Imam 
Rid5': "Some of our scholars say that we the 
Shi'iah believe in jabr, while some others 
believe in man's capacity to do acts (istita^ah)". 
The Imam said: "Write: In the name of God,'the 
Merciful and the compassionate. ^Ali ibn al-
Husayn said that Allah has proclaimed: 0 the 
son of Adam, thou performeth the obligatory acts 
1. Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
2. Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
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with My Will and My (delegated) power, and 
is t capable of disobeying Me with a l l the 
bounties that I bestowed upon t h e e . I made 
thee l i s t e n i n g and seeing. Whatever good 
reacheththee ist by God, and whatever ev i l 
reacheththee isfc by th ine own wish, for I am 
more praiseworthy for thine v i r t u e s than 
thysel f and thou i s t more to be blamed for 
th ine own vices than Me, because what I 
do wi l l not be judged by anybody and what 
thou doeth w i l l be judged." Afterwards the 
Imam said (or narrated what God has said) 
tha t what a man wished was ac tua l ized for 
him."1 
I t would not be out of place to quote here some ra ther 
lengthy passages from an a r t i c l e by an I r an ian Shl^i j u r i s t , 
Dr.Abulqasim Gorji : 
"About the Divine Will ( i r a d a h ) , the Ash 'a r i t es 
hold tha t Divine V/ill and Omniscience (*Ilm) 
are two separate A t t r i b u t e s . But the Shi^i tes 
and a group of Mu'- tazi l i tes maintain that God's 
Will i s the same as His Knowledge, and they 
c a l l i t Da*"!, meaning "Divine In t en t ion" . . . . 
There are some di f ferences of opinion as to 
whether act ions can be regarded as "good" or 
"bad" in independence of the decree of the 
Divine Lawgiver ( a l - S h a r i ^ ) . 
The Ash ' a r i t e s bel ieve that a "good" act ion 
i s that which the Sharl^ah has ordered the people 
to do, and a "bad" ac t ion i s tha t which i t has 
prohibi ted people from doing. But the Shi '- i tes 
and the Mu'^tazilites hold t h a t "goodness" or 
"badness" of ac t ions can be recognized by human 
reason; tha t i s , r egard less of the decree of 
the Sharlfah^ Some act ions are good and some bad. 
The Lawgiver orders people to do what i s "good" 
and p roh ib i t s them from doing "bad" deeds. 
1 . I b i d . , pp. 222-223. 
190 
I s man r e a l l y free to perform actions v/hich 
are apparently done of h i s own free w i l l , or i s 
he compelled to perform such act ions? A group 
of the Ash 'a r i t es are of the opinion that man's 
w i l l and power have no e f fec t i n bringing about 
these ac t ions , and i t i s only God's Will and 
Power tha t i s e f fec tua l i n t h e i r taking p lace . 
This bel ief i s ca l led "Jabr" . 
The Mu^tazi l i tes hold t h a t the only fac tor 
causing these act ions to take place i s man's 
wi l l and power. God has only created man and 
given him power, wi l l and intel l igence» As long 
as God has not taken these forces and po ten t i a l i t -
ies away from him, he can independently do what-
ever he wants; there i s no need for him to be 
ins tantaneously and cons tan t ly given power, wi l l 
and other p o t e n t i a l i t i e s by God, This bel ief i s 
ca l led "a l - ta fwid" . 
However, the Shi**ites bel ieve that man's 
act ions depend on h is own w i l l , but not in the 
sense tha t he i s t o t a l l y independent in doing 
them. Rather Just as God i s the i n i t i a t i n g 
cause ( a l - ^ i l l a h al-mubdithah) of man's l i f e , 
power and wi l l t h a t i s , God has o r i g i n a l l y 
given man these q u a l i t i e s and a b i l i t i e s so God 
i s as well the maintaining cause ( a l - ^ i l l a h a l -
mubqiyah) of these p o t e n t i a l i t i e s and q u a l i t i e s . 
That i s to say, God grants these powers and 
a b i l i t i e s cons tant ly and perpe tua l ly , otherwise 
man cannot perform any ac t i on . Thus, such 
act ions can be a t t r i b u t e d both to God and man. 
This bel ief i s ne i the r determinism nor free w i l l , 
but something between the two Camr bayn a l -
^ amrayn), 
About Divine Destiny and Providence (qa^a wa 
Cfadar), the re are also differences of opinion 
among Islamic t h i n k e r s . If by "Destiny" (ga^a^) 
i t i s meant t ha t a l l th ings even man's actions 
are brought in to existence by God, and if 
by "Providence" (qadar) i t i s meant tha t the 
q u a l i t i e s and p a r t i c u l a r s of a l l things even 
of those things or ig ina ted by man's will——have 
taken place and shape so le ly as a r e su l t of 
God's Will , then qada^ and qadar, in th i s sense, 
are accepted by the 'Ash^ar i t es and re jec ted by 
the Shii^ites and the Mu*^tazilites. And if by 
"gada'" and "qadar" other senses are meant, 
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such as : 'The existence or happening of every-
th ing , even man's free ac t ions and t h e i r p a r t i -
c u l a r s , depends on God's Wil l , but not d i r e c t l y , 
and ra the r through the spec ia l means of tha t 
th ing , including man's w i l l and pov/cr', or i f 
"qad5>" and "qadar" are taken to mean ' d e c l a r a t i o n 
and*determination of some another by Gtod', then in 
both of these senses, qada^ and qadar are admitted 
by the Imamiyyah S h i ^ i t e s . Moreover, there are 
c e r t a i n verses in the Qur'an and ahadith of the 
Holy Prophet and Imams affirming t h i s be l ie f . 
The Shi^i tes and the Mu^taz i l i tes consider 
i t reprobate and wrong to a t t r i b u t e ce r t a in 
q u a l i t i e s or act ions to God such as oppression, 
tyranny, giving of a duty to anybody beyond h is 
s t r eng th , and so on, and bel ieve i t necessary 
and r igh t to a t t r i b u t e c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s and 
act ions to Him such as mercy, compassion, ass ign-
ing of prophets and so on. 
The Ash'^arites due to t h e i r negation of 
r a t i o n a l foundation of goodness and badness of 
act ions (al-ijiusn wa al-qubb al-aql iyyan) and also 
owing to t h e i r maintaining tha t nobody can poss ib ly 
assign dut ies and ob l iga t ions to God, r e j ec t 
both of the above viewpoints . 
But i t i s obvious t h a t both of t h e i r own 
viewpoints r e s t on shaky grounds. Because, as 
to the f i r s t pos i t i on , i t has been es tabl ished 
that the goodness and badness of actions are 
r a t i o n , as to t h e i r second pos i t i on , i t may be 
said that by denial or c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s and 
act ions to be a t t r i bu t ed to God, what i s meant i s 
t ha t such things as tyranny and oppression are 
inappropr ia te for the sublime s t a t i o n of God, and 
if some acts l i k e assignment of prophets are 
considered to be incumbent upon God, i t i s meant 
t h a t re f ra in ing from such acts i s not becoming 
to God, the Almighty, which i s affirmed by reason. 
And t h i s notion of denia l or incumbency, in t h i s 
sense, by no means e n t a i l s any imposition on God 
by somebody e l s e . 
Like the Mu^taz i l i t e s , the S h i ' i t e s be l ieve 
tha t s ince God i s Wise (Hakim), He never does 
any useless or f r i v o l o u s ' a c t i o n , any act ion which 
i s in vain and devoid of benefi t and expedience, 
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because God is absolute and total perfection; 
the benefits of His actions.accrue to His 
creatures, not to Himself, But the Ash'-arites 
believe that since God has absolute perfection, 
His actions are not out of motives and purposes." 
Saur al-Din al-Shirazi (popularly known as Mulla Sadra) 
too with the reference of Al-Tusi, maintains that "man is neither 
absolutely pre-determined nor totally free but shares a part 
of both."^ 
With regard to freedom of the human will Shi^ite position 
is mediatory, while Mu^tazilah and Asha^irah hold opposite extremes 
preaching libertarianism and predestinarianism respectively. 
The tkrus-i: of the two major schools of Kalam (the Mu^tazilah 
and the Asha^irah) is rooted in the following issues:-" 
(1). Priority of reason over revelation or vice versa; 
(2). Status of the Attributes with relation to the Divine 
Essence; 
(3)» Freedom of human will or predestination; 
(4). Whether the Qur^an is created or eternal; 
(5). Divine Justice, i t s import and implications; and 
finally 
(6). The criterion of good and evil. 
But when one goes through the shi^ite Imamiyyah doctrines, one 
will find, in general, somewhat different position as: 
1. Abulqasim Gorni, "Shi^ism in Relation to various Islamic 
Sects'; Al-Tawhld (Tehran, (Iran) 1984), Vol. I , No. 2, pp.44-46. 
2. Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra. op. c i t . , p. 170. 
3<. Waheed Akhtar, "Introduction to Imamiyyah Scholars: Al-
Shaykh* al-Saduq and His Works", Al-Tawhid, op. c i t . . Vol. I l l , 
Nai. pp. 106-107. 
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( l ) . There i s no quest ion of p r i o r i t y between reason or 
r eve la t ion , for both are complementary to each o ther 
and they do not con t rad ic t each o the r , as i s wrongly 
held by the Asha^irah in some mat te rs , 
( 2 ) . The Divine At t r ibu tes are e s s e n t i a l l y included in 
the Divine Essence, as the Mu^tazilah hold. 
( 3 ) . There i s ne i the r absolute freedom or tafwid ( O J^r* )^ 
nor absolute determinism. The Shl '- i te p o s i t i o n i s 
a via media between the two extreme pos i t i ons taken 
by the Mu"^ta2ilah and Asha'-irah in t h i s mat te r . 
( 4 ) , The Shi^ah bel ieve that the words of the Qur'an 
are created, and cannot be held as e t e r n a l . 
( 5 ) . Divine Jus t i ce implies t h t man i s not asked to do 
what i s beyond h i s capacity ( i s t i t a ^ a h ; Ovfi^ i^iA i^). 
( 6 ) , The c r i t e r i a of good and ev i l are provided by 
' r eve la t ion , but they are in confirmlty with the 
d i c t a t e s of reason. 
CHAPTER Y 
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Muhammad Iqbal occupies a unique position m the history 
of Muslim thought. He may be considered the best advocate of 
Muslim awakening in modern era. His out-look was progressive 
in a broader sense of the term. He introduced certain radical 
ideas with a zeal for reforming the Muslim society. He imbibed 
higher values and ideals from the East and the West, and inter-
preted them in the framework of Islamic Weltanschauung according 
to the demands of contemporary philosophical and scientific 
out-look. Khalifah "Abdul Hakim writes in this regard: 
Iqbal was an heir to a very rich literary 
and philosophical scholarship. He imbibed 
and assimilated all that was best in the 
Islamic and oriental thought to which he 
added his extensive knowledge of Western 
literature, philosophy?and culture both of 
the past and the present. His range of the 
interest covered religion, philosophy, art, 
politics, economics, nationalism, the 
revival of Muslim life and the universal 
brotherhood of man, '' 
I Man occupies the central position in Iqbal's philosophy. 
The core of his works and world-view is the doctrine of Khudi 
(human ego), the reality of its vej;y existence and the necessity 
\ 
to do everything to strengthen it: 
1. A^bdul Hakim, K,, "Renaissance in Indo-Pakistan: Iqbal" in 
M.M.Sharief, ed,, A History of Muslim Philosophy, op. cit.. 
Vol. II, p. 1617. 
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The moral and r e l i g ious idea l of man i s not 
se l f -nega t ion but self-aff i rmat ionjand he 
a t t a i n s t h i s idea l by becoming more and more 
Ind iv idua l , more and more unique. '' 
This conception i s the central theme of h is thought. In f a c t , 
the doctr ine of human persona l i ty i s the s t a r t i n g and determining 
point i n I q b a l ' s so lu t ions to a l l o ther complex cosmological 
» 
problems, 
Iqbal considers the entire universe and the entire material 
world as a composite of individual egos. All life is individual; 
there is no such thing as universal life. God Himself is a 
unique and absolutely perfect Individual Being. 
"He is the most unique individual. The universe* 
as McTaggart says, is an association of individuals". 
Iqbal attaches much importance to the independence and 
self-determining nature of the human ego. According to him 
these are the fundamental characteristics of individuality; 
The nature of the ego is such that, in spite 
of its capacity to respond to other egos, it 
is self-centered and possesses a private 
circuit of individuality excluding all egos 
other than itself. In this alone consists 
its reality as an ego. 
1. Iqbal, Sir Muhammad^ The Secrets of the Self (Asra2p-e Khudi) 
Translated by*R.A.Nicholson, .^Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 
1955), (Introduction), pp. XVIC-XIX. 
2. Ibid., p.XVII. 
5. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, op. cit< 
p. 72. 
196 
Further , in i t s higher manifestations in man and ih God 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y becomes a self-contained exclusive c e n t r e . 
Iqbal r e j e c t s a l l philosophies which degrade and weaken 
man's Khud_i: (.g^^i-Cegohood). He c r i t i c i z e s and a t t acks vehemently 
those schools of thought and thinkers ^^o negate human i n d i v i -
dual and ego, such as Advaita ^fendantaof Shankra and asect io and panthe-
i s t i c tendencies inSufism. He i s equally opposed to the European 
v a r i e t i e s of Idealism tha t designate secondary s t a tu s to human 
ego,but accepts tHe v o l u n t a r i s t i c t r a d i t i o n s i n the West, Human 
w i l l , the ac t i ve , c r e a t i v e force of human ego, i s in h is viev/, 
e t e rna l ly r e s t l e s s and never stops in i t s quest for pe r f ec t i on . 
Obviously, t h i s view of man and the universe 
i s opposed to that of the English Neo-Hegelians 
as well as to a l l forms of pan the i s t i c sufism 
which regard absorption in a universal l i f e or 
soul as the f i n a l aim and sa lva t ion of man. 
The Hindu view of the world as 'mava' and the Islamic doc t r ine 
of ann ih i l a t ion (fana: \l>d) of self , according to I q b a l , have 
been responsible for the decl ine of the East . He sees the 
universe as a kingdom of c rea t ive and free egos t h a t form the 
core of r e a l i t y . His philosophy may be described as the Islamic 
version of pan-egoism. In the scheme of c rea t ion man occupies 
the highest p l ace . He i s the only being,(besides Allah) 
1. The Secrets of the Self, op. c i t . , p . XIX. 
2 . IBid . . n . XVII. M , p
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who is self-determining and self-creating: 
Man becomes unique by becoming more 
and more like the most unique Individual. 
What then is life? It is individual: its 
highest form, so far, is the Ego (Khudi) 
in which the individual becomes a self-
contained exclusive centre. Physically 
as well as spiritually man is a self-
contained centre. 1 
The human ego reveals its existence in its constant 
struggle, never ending creation and fulfilment of desires, 
passions and ideals. Iqbal, in this regard declares in his 
Asrar-e Khudi; 
Life is latent in seeking. 
Its origin is hidden in desire.... 
We live by forming ideals, P 
We glow with the sunbeams of desire. 
However, Iqbal does not believe that the existence of the 
Khudi is confined only to the production of ideals and desires. The 
latter represent only the initial stage of life, which at higher 
stages seeks its fulfilment in creative activity to subordinate 
and reshape the external world according to tlie needs of human 
beings so that the individual persons may live freely and realize 
their ideals creatively: 
1. Ibid., p. XIX, 
2o Ibid., pp. 23 - 27. 
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The final act is not an intellectual act, 
but a vital act which deepens the whole 
being of the ego, and sharpens his will 
with the creative assurance that the world 
is not something to be merely seen or known 
through concepts, but something to^be made 
and re-made by continuous action. 
According to Iqbal genuine 'egohood* or authentic indivi-
duality is inseparable from unceasing activity of a creative 
life. In one of his poems in Saql Mamah , Iqbal very lucidly 
symbolizes this idea with the image of a wave, which says of 
itself: 
'\flien I am rolling, I exist, 
When I rest, I am no more.' 
According to Iqbal, creativity, tireless activity and the 
constant struggle against difficulties are the vital modes of 
human life. They are, in other words, life itself, which finds 
freedom in these manifestations of ego. 
For Iqbal freedom is the Summum Bonum of human existence. 
A deep analysis of his conception of freedom, as elaborated in 
his poetry and philosophical writings, may justifiably lead us 
to the conclusion that in his thought freedom is the source of 
all values. He maintains that the life of ego is possible in 
1. Iqbal, S.M., The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 
op. cit., p. 1^6. ~~" 
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freedom only. In one word,"life is an endeavour for freedom." 
In his 'Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam' Iqbal 
holds that "there are only ego-sustaining and ego-dissolving 
2 
acts." And freedom, in its strict sense, sustains the ego. 
No Muslim Philosopher, before Iqbal, had given the highest 
position to freedom in the hierarchy of values. For him freedom 
is not only a value or mode of human existence, it is, as stated 
earlier, the very life of ego. 
In the philosophy of Iqbal, man's Khudi, with its basic 
and significant qualities freedom and creativity is the 
force that creates itself as well as the world. Freedom and 
creativity are the outstanding qualities which human ego unfolds 
to shape and mould its particulai historic situation according 
ot its aspirations. Creativity and freedom are interconnected, 
since the act of creation requires freedom. Freedom is the source 
of all values and in the real sense of the word, it is the life 
of ego. 
« 
Regarding freedom and creativity Iqbal has alluded to 
various Qur'anic verses in his Urdu and Persian poetry. In the 
Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, he specifically 
dealt with this issue. In his fourth Lecture,IheHuman Ego—His 
Freedom and Immortality", Iqbal presents three significant themes 
1. The Secret of the Self, op. cit., p. XXI. 
2. Iqbal, S.M., The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 
op. cit., p. 119. 
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from the Qur'an: man's being a Viceegerent of God, a chosen 
entity and "the trustee of a free personality which he accepted 
-1 
at h i s p e r i l . " Iqbal argues that man's freedom and c r e a t i v i t y , 
a t the ear ly stage of l i f e , must be under the control and guidance 
of Law that may teach him to abide by c e r t a i n moral p r i n c i p l e s : 
The g rea te s t obs tac le in the way of l i f e 
i s matter , Nature; yet Nature i s not e v i l , 
since i t enables the inner powers of l i f e 
to unfold themselves* 'The Ego a t t a i n s to 
freedom by the removal of a l l abs t rac t ions 
in i t s way. I t i s p a r t l y f r ee , p a r t l y 
determined, and reaches f u l l e r freedom by 
approaching the Individual who i s most free 
—-God. • 2 
God has created everything t h a t i s i n Heavens and earth 
for His Vicegerent man. Human being i s free at h is w i l l to 
make use of a l l tha t has been bestowed on him by his Supreme 
Creator (Al lah) . But t h i s worldly mater ia l l i f e i s not h is 
u l t imate de-^tiny. I t only paves the way tha t leads 
towards the higher l i f e . Man's aim, according to Iqbal , 
must be neareness to God, who alone i s the source of his 
freedom. By exercis ing his freedom and c r e a t i v i t y he can conquer 
the mater ia l world and reach f u l l e r freedom through approaching 
God, who i s Absolute Freedom, In brief , man's highest achievement 
or d i s t i n c t i o n , according to I q b a l , does not l i e in seeking 
se l f -nega t ion or detachment from the mater ia l world and in t he 
a n n i h i l a t i o n of h is egohood in the Ultimate Reality (fana f l 
Al lah: cU)((3U9). God. i s over and above the world and a l l a t tempts 
1 . I q b a l , The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, op« c i t . 
p. 95. 
2 . The Secrets of the Self, op . c i t . , pp. XX-XXI. 
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to submerge one's self into Divine Being are futile, Allah Himself 
emphasizes the human identity of the Prophet(S): 
At one place The Qur'an asks Muhammad(S) to say to the people 
1 
that he is a man like other human beings I 
The Qur'an underl ines and h ighl ights man's separate i d e n t i t y , 
t h a t i s , i t teaches how to affirm one ' s selfhood. But selfhood 
f inds the means of perfec t ion in the corporeal world tha t provides 
him an area of ac t ion . According to Iqbal human ego i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
2 
rooted in self-affirmation and conquest of the Universe: 
'The hight of renunciation is not renunciation 
of the world of phenomena. 
The hight of renunciation is in conquest of the 
corporeal and the celestial.' 
All this could be done only when the individual person is free 
and creative. 
Action ( (J^) is also an important aspect of Iqbal's 
thought. "Activity", according to him, is the fundamental aspect 
of reality. Intrespectively, it is ego; outwardly, it is movement. 
1, Al~Qur>an, XVIII:110 
2 . Iqba l , S.M., Kul l iyat-e Iqbal (Urdu), [Aligarh ( India) :Al lgarh 
Book Depo, 19751 » P» 33^ i.Bal-e J a b r l l , p . 42) . 
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Worldly l i f e is cons is t s in man's coming out of i n a c t i v i t y and 
passive and s e r v i l e obedience and a completely s t a t i c s t a t e . In 
i t s r ea l sense, according to Iqba l , Worldly l i f e d i r e c t s the 
individual to lead a l i f e of d e s i r e , a c t i v i t y , effor t and tens ion . 
Moreover, he maintains t h a t t h i s l i f e i s an in tens ive urge to 
l i v e as a free ind iv idua l and to c rea te va lues . Due to t h i s ' f r e e 
c rea t ive urge ' man exi led himself from the Heaven. In the preface 
to his Reconstruction, Iqbal wr i tes that the Qur'an "emphasizes 
'deed' r a ther than ' i d e a ' " . Again, he says tha t according to 
the Holy Book the ea r th i s not a " t o r t u r e - h a l l where the elementHy 
p 
wicked humanity i s imprisoned for an o r ig ina l act of s i n . " 
I qba l ' s conception of^man's expulsion from Heaven'is bas i ca l ly 
different from the Chr i s t i an dogma of Adam's f a l l and expulsion. 
He d i f fe rs from the dogma of the Chr i s t i an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t th inkers 
who place ' f a l l ' and divine grace at the cent re of t h e i r philosophy 
and regard man as a l i ena ted from the source of h i s being, from 
world and from God because of h is " f a l l en s t a t e of being," Iqbal 
i s of the opinion tha t the ' f a l l * does not mean any moral depravity 
but " i t i s man's t r a n s i t i o n from simple consciousness to the 
f i r s t f lash of se l f -consc iousness , a kind of waking from the 
dream of nature with a throb of personal c a u s a l i t y in one 's being,"-^ 
This pehnomenal world i s not invain(or Cij^)or t o r t u r e - h a l l . I t i s , 
according to the Qur 'an, " ' t h e dwelling p l a c e ' of man and a 'source 
1 , Iqbal , The Reconstruct ion of Religious Thought in Islam, op. c i t . 
(Preface) , p . V. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 85 . ' 
5 . I b i d . , P - 8 5 . 
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of profit' to him for the possession of which ne ought to be 
1 
y 
grateful to God": 
"And We have given you (mankind) 
power in the earth, and aiopointed 
for you therein a livelihood. How 
little do ye give thanks I"^ 
Thus, the human person has to treat his dwelling place as a source 
of profit and not as a punishment, Man exists in a real sense 
only when he is free and creative. 
The Universe, according to Qur'an, is liable to develop 
further: 
It is a growing universe and not an already 
complete product which left the hand of its 
Makor ages ago, and is now being stretched 
in space as a dead mass of matter to which 
time does^nothing, and consequently is 
nothing, 
Iqbal puts it more unambiguously in the following verse saying: 
The Universe is perhaps 'incomplete' 
As every movement coraes the sound: "Be and 
it was. 
This universe, in brief, is finite as well as boundless. 
It is an open unfinished entity, constantly undergoing development 
1. Ibid., p. 84. 
2 . Al"Qur>ln. VII :10 
3o Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, op. cit. 
p. 55. 
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and extension. I t provides a unique type of s t imula t ing f i e l d 
for man's free and c r ea t i ve a c t i v i t y , through which on the one 
hand, he conquers and overcomes the na tura l world and on the 
othe r , pe r fec t s the power of h i s egohood or i n d i v i d u a l i t y , Man 
shares with God in the process of c r e a t i v i t y . In the " In t roduc t i on" 
to The Secrets of the Self, Prof. Nicholson i n t e r p r e t s the view-
point of Iqbal about the universe and mafi's c r ea t i ve a c t i v i t y 
i n the following words: 
Thus the universe i s not a complete ac t : 
i t i s s t i l l in the course of formation. 
There can be no complete t r u t h about the 
universe , for the universe has not yet 
become 'whole ' . The process of crea t ion 
i s s t i l l going on, and man too takes h is 
share in i t , in as much as he helps to 
bring order into at l e a s t a por t ion of 
the chaos. The Qur'an ind ica t e s the ^ 
p o s s i b i l i t y of o ther c r ea to r s than God,> 
as "Blessed i s God,, the best, of^those who 
create ( (^:k^si^\^<^^X^ 
In the e n t i r e poet ico-phi losophica l wr i t ings of Iqbal these 
two modes of human existence freedom and c r e a t i v i t y occupy 
an important p l ace . Man i s free a t h is w i l l to make or mar 
h i s l i f e in t h i s world. I t i s in t h i s world that man c r e a t e s 
new th ings and makes h i s l i f e as he w i l l s : 
Man's f i r s t act of disobedience was also 
h i s f i r s t act of f ree choice; and tiiat i s 
why according to the Quranic nar ra t ion , ^ 
Adam*s f i r s t t r ansg res s ion was forgiven, -^  
1 . The Secrets of the Self, op . c i t . , ( In t roduc t ion) , p . XVIII . 
2 . Al-Qur^an, (23:14) . 
3 . I qba l , The Reconstruction of Religious Thotight i n Is lam, p . 85 
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This means that freedom and creativity have been bestowed on 
man by God due to which he evolves his own world and creates 
his own values. Iqbal points out that if the existing world 
gives no meaning and importance to human personality, it should 
be destroyed and reshaped in accordance with human aspirations 
and ideals. In one of his poems " '^-^" (Life) in Bang-e Para, 
1 
he asserts: 
'Create thy own world i f thou be amongst 
the l i v i n g , 
Life i s the secre t essence of Adam, the 
hidden t r u t h of c r e a t i o n , . . , 
Life i s reduced to a r i v u l e t with l i t t l e 
water in bondage, 
In freedom, l i f e is a boundless ocean! 
Again, in t h i s connection, i n the same poem Iqbal dec la res : 
'Burn up t h i s borrowed ear th and sky. 
And r a i s e a world of your own from the a shes . ' 
In Derb-e Kalim jK^,,,,^ i n a poem " (Creat ion) , he 
fu r the r says: 
'Only he overcomes the revolut ion of Time, 
Who c rea tes an e t e r n a l l i f e with every b rea th . ' 
1 . Kulliyat-»e Iqbal (Urdu), op . c i t . , p . 259. 
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For human activity, Iqbal uses a very expressive and all-
inclusive phrase, *Kasb-l halal'( J^^r^)* which stands for 
* 
"lawful acqu i s i t i on" according to orthodox theo logians . But 
according to Iqbal 'Kasb-i h a l a l ' has a wider meaning as "acquir -
ing th ings or ideas so le ly through one ' s personal e f fo r t s and 
s t r u g g l e . " ^ Analysing the same theme Iqbal po in t s out t ha t 
enjoying anything which has not been acquired by work or s t ruggle 
i s harmful fo r the ego. He does not even consider acquir ing 
anything through inher i tence as Kasb-i h a l a l . He says i n 
p 
Zabur-i '•Ajam: 
'Be ashamed if you want to i n h e r i t a ruby 
from your forebears; 
This cannot give the pleasure tha t l i e s 
in quarrying a ruby. '3 
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kasb-i h a l a l , according to Iqba l , s t i p u l a t e s 
t ha t a l l egos have to undergo an in tens ive l i f e of ac t ive e f for t 
and continuous s t ruggle and i t t o t a l l y excludes a l l ideas of se l f -
renunc ia t jon . In h i s 'Pilgrimage of E te rn i ty ' ( " Jawid Namah") 
Iqbal d e c l a r e s : . 
v j 
1 . Vahid, S.A., Iqbal : His Art and Thought, (London: John Muiry, 
1959), p . 38 . 
2 . Diwan~e Iqba l LShorl (Pers ian) . (Tehran ( I r a n ) : I n t i s h a h r a t - e 
Pagah, 1 s t e d . , I50i Shamslj, p . 8 1 . 
3» Vahid, S.A., 0£. c i t . , p . 39. 
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'The cosmos shape;^  
Unceasing wonders even now; the stuff 
Of life is not blind following, A heart 
which is alive creates an epoch new. 
And repetition makes it contract, sag 
With its own inner soul.''^  
Again, the following verses of his 'Jawid Namah' assert man's 
freedom and creativity: 
'Life is mortality 
And everlastingness as well; it is 
Compact of both creativeness and zeal. 
Dost Live? then learn to love and to create 
And hold the heavens in grasp like us. 
And shatter all that suits thee not,2and make 
A fresher world grow from thy mind,' 
The last two lines reinterpret an earlier Persian poet, Sa*di's 
following couplet: 
•Truely it is as torturous as burning in 
the hell-fire, 
Entering Paradise through the assistance of a 
neighbour.' 
1, Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, The Pilgrimage of Eternity,(Jawid Namah). 
Translated by'Sh, Mahmud Ahmad, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic 
Culture, 1961), p. 55. 
2. Ibid., p. 182. 
3o Sa*di, Kulllvat^e Sa^dl ,r( lran: Int isharat-e Javidan, (136I 
Shamsi)J , p . 134» 
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According to Iqbal freedom and creativity are the two fundamental 
modes of human ego. He holds that it is freedom, constant struggle 
( (\^L/r^) s"^ life of activity that develop the ego. Creativity, 
as stated earlier, is possible only when there is freedom, and to 
Iqbal, creative and original activity alone can sustain and fortify 
the ego (Khudi). Mere imitation is of no use in strengthening 
1 
the human personality: 
'Demean not thy personality by imitation; 
Guard it, as it is a priceless jewel.* 
Mawlana Rumi, whom Iqbal chose as his guide on his pilgrimage 
to eternity, also preaches a life of ceaseless activity and 
endless struggle to attain personal freedom and immortality. He 
goes even to the extent of saying: 
cAA''<.j^cr-=<^ 
'Useless s t r i v i n g i s b e t t e r than inact ion.* 
Both Mawlana RumI and Iqbal agree t ha t the perfect Man (Mard-i 
Mu^min or Mard-i Kamil) can work miracles in the sense of 
c rea t ing a new world of va lues . Iqbal fu r the r adds tha t the 
Perfect Man (Mu^min) i s a miracle in himself and i s a c rea to r 
1 . Kul l iva t -e Iqbal (Urdu), o£. c i t . , p . 630, (iferb-e Kallm, p .168) 
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of new values. He possesses a special and unique status in 
the kingdom of God. Human ego in its movement towards uniqueness 
has to pass through three stages: 
(i). Obedience to the Law. 
(ii). Self-control, which is the highest form of 
self-consciousness or Ego-hood, and 
(iii). Divine Vicegerency, 
Iqbal, in a letter to Nicholson, describes the character-
istics of the Perfect Man: 
"This (Divine Vicegerency: niabat-i Ilahi ^'<^W) 
is the third and last stage of human development 
on earth. The na^ib (vicegerent) is the vicege-
rent of God on earth. He is the completest Ego, 
the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in 
mind and body; in him the discord of our mental 
life becomes a harmony. The highest power is 
united in him with the highest knowledge. In his 
life thought and action, instinct and reason, 
become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of 
humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolu-
tion are justified because he is to come at the 
end. He is the real ruler of the mankind; his 
kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth,"^ 
Further, defining man's uniqueness and as miraculous power in 
himself, Iqbal very lucidly asserts under the same title Divine 
Vicegerency: 
1. The Secrets of the Self, op. cit., (introduction), P.XXVII. 
2. Ibid., pp. XXVII-XXVIII. 
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'His genius abounds with life and desires to 
manifest itself: 
He will bring another world into existence. 
A hundred worlds like this world of parts 
and wholes 
Springs up, like roses, from the seed of his 
imagination.' "1 
'He bestows life by his miraculous action. 
He renovates old ways of life. 
Splendid visions rise from the print of his foot, 
Many a Moses is entranced by his Sinai, 
He gives a new explanation of Life, p 
A new interpretation of this dream.' 
Regarding creativity he says in one of his poems " O^ " 
(Creation), included in his collection of Urdu poems, 'Darb^i 
• 
Kalim' (The Rod of Moses); 
'New worlds der ive t h e i r pomp 
Prom thoughts qu i t e fresh and new: 
Prom stones and br icks a world 
Was ne i the r b u i l t nor grew. 
The resolve of t hose . 
Who depths of se l f explore , 
Transforms, t h i s stream to sea 
That he has no merge or s h o r e . ' 
1 . The Secrets of the Self, oj^. c i t . , p . 80 (Verse 905 - 908), 
Persian vf>rses from Dl>t§n-e IgbSl L'Shorl. op. c l t . , pp .106-107 . 
2 . I b i d . , p . 82 (Verse 931-34) 
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Iqbal stresses that hioman ego is not a datum but a 
creative possibility, an active effort and struggle, and a 
co-worker with God, Man smashes the world which does not suit 
him and evolves his own world and creates his values. According 
to Iqbal, through freedom and creative activity man shares in 
the deeper aspirations of the universe around him and shapes 
his own destiny as well as that of the universe. In this process 
of progressive change (i.e. evolution), God also becomes a co-
worker with man, provided that man takes the initiative. As the 
Qur-'an declares: 
P 5 ^ 
"Verily, God will not change 
the condition of men till they^ 
change what is in themselves." 
This injunction of the Holy Qur'an, as stated in the previous 
chapter of this work, clearly asserts that man is by his nature 
creative and free. He can make or mar his life as a result of 
his actions. Man makes his Heaven and Hell as a result of his 
deeds: 
'It is action that makes life either 
paradise or hell; 
This earthly creature is neither sacred nor 
profane in his nature." 
1 . Al-Qur>an, X I I I : 1 1 . 1 . Ai-uur^an. A i i i : n . 
2 . Kul l iva t -e Iqbal (Urdu), 0£. c i t . , p . 274. 
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^^Ju^^^y?c^l^-->U ^t^i;^,,i^ 
'Firm conviction, uneasing struggle and 
love conquer the universe; 
In his struggle for existence man possesses 
nothing but these weapons.' 
According to Iqbal, man being a partner in the creative 
activity of his Maker (Allah)shouLd not subscribe to the oft-
repeated notion of 'Taqdir' ( -/U^)» that is Fate. He emphati-
cally says that 'man himself is his fate and the maker of his 
destiny: • ^ . . • i 
•Lover of truth! Be like a shining sword 
and be the fate of thine own world.''' 
In one of his poems in 'Darb-i Kalim' he asserts: 
•Decrees of Fate are not concealed 
From man whose heart throbbing seems: 
He sees the image of new world 
In slumberous state, during dreams. 
When prayer call at early morn, 
Transports him to Morpheus' domain. 
He tries to build the world beheld p 
With utmost might and utmost main,' 
Iqbal points out that it is possible for man to change his 
destiny ( ^ ^ ) , It is up to him to attain perfect mastery over 
his destiny. In this regard he writes in JawJd Namah; 
1. Iqbal as a Thinker, by Eminent Scholars, (Lahore: Shaikh 
Mohd, Ashraf, 1973), p. 280. 
2. Iqbal, Sir Miihammad, Darb»e Kalim. (The Rod of Moses). Trans. 
Syed Akbar *Ali Shah, (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, Pakistan, 1985), 
p. 82. 
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' I f one dest iny does not s u i t thee , 
Desire from God a d i f f e ren t des t iny ; 
Thy demand for a new dest iny i s becoming, 
For Giod can decree numerous d e s t i n e s . ' 
Syed ''Abdul Vahid quotes the following l i n e s of Wilcox which 
find an echo of the above Iqba l i an thought regarding human 
des t iny: 
"There i s no chance, no Destiny, no Fate , 
Can circumvent or higher or control 
The firm resolve of a determined Soul." 
Moreover, Iqbal says tha t c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y and invention of 
new meanings are the g i f t s of Gtod bestowed on man: 
• I t i s a g i f t by God bestowed. 
To coin fresh words with meanings new: 
Yet s k i l f u l a r t i s t must work hard. 
As inborn trend i s owned by few*. ^ 
Iqbal maintains t ha t human ego possesses in i t s unique na ture 
the a t t r i b u t e s of freedom and c r e a t i v i t y through which man i s 
d is t inguished from the non-human be ings . He underlines t h i s 
theme of the uniqueness of ind iv idua l existence (man's KhtKJi) 
with a l l i t s inner fecundity and se l f - suf f ic iency in the follow-
ing verses of Bal-e J i b r i l : -^  
1 . cf. S. A,Vahid, 0£o c i t . , p . I 6 3 . 
2 . The Rod of Moses, op . c i t . . p . 82. 
3 . Kul l iva t -e Iqbal (Urdu), o^ .^ c i t . . p . 346, 
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'Thy heart is thy candle. 
Thou thyself is thy light; 
Thou art the only truth in the world. 
The rest is magic's shadow-world.' 
Iqbal is of the view that art, religion and ethical ideas must 
be judged from the view-point of human personality. He holds 
that actions of an individual can only be Judged as good or bad 
when he is free at his will: 
A being whose movements are wholly determined 
like a machine cannot produce goodness. Freedom 
is thus a condition of goodness. ' 
Man is known through creativity. A man who has the ability 
of perceiving, judging and acting freely, rightly comes under 
the category of perfect Man and a co-creator alongwith God. 
Iqbal underlines these points in the following words: 
Inner experience is the ego at work. 
We appreciate the ego itself in the act 
of perceiving, judging and willing. 2 
He very strongly pleads that only due to the 'creative skill* 
that man establishes his relationship with God. He refers to 
1 • Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, op. cit, 
p. 85. 
2o Ibido, po 102. 
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the two Arabic words 'Amr " J^l" (direction) and Khalq "O'^n 
(creation) to express this relationship of God and man. 
The Arabic language is, however, more fortunate in 
this respect. It has two words "Khalq" and "Amr" to 
express the two ways in which the creative activity of 
God reveals Itself to us.'Khalq'is 
creation; 'Amr' is direction. As the 
Qur>an saysTjTTo Him belong creation and 
direction.' 
Iqbal is of the opinion that this verse of the Holy Scripture 
clearly indicates that the essential nature of the soul is 
directive, as it proceeds from the directive energy of God; 
though one does not know how Divine 'Amr' functions as ego-
activity. It is this directive activity of the self that makes 
man a free being, as the Qur'an indicates: 
'Say: Each one doth according to his rule 
of conduct, and thy Lordpis 
him whose way is right.' 
best aware of 
Thus according to Iqba l , human ego (Khudl) can be considered to 
ex i s t only when i t i s c r e a t i v e and f r e e . The ego 's experience 
cons is t s of a se r ies of a c t s . I t s exis tence i s known through 
i t s judgements, w i l l ^ a t t i t u d e s , des i r e s and a s p i r a t i o n s : 
1 . I b i d . , p . 103. 
2 . Al-Qur>an, XVII:84 
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Thus my real personality is not a thing, 
it is an act. My experience is only a 
series of acts, mutually referring to 
one another, and held together by the 
unity of a directive purpose. My whole 
reality lies in my directive attitude. 
You cannot perceive me like a thing in 
space, or a set of experiences in tempo-
ral order; you must interpret, understand 
and appreciate me in my judgements, in . 
my will-attitudes, aims and aspirations. 
For Iqbal, as stated earlier, man is a self-contained 
centre of activity, self-conscious, creative and self-evol-
ving. Human self is free in the sense that it is not determined 
by anything outside it. Freedom is its own architect and the 
very laws of governing its mode of operation are of its own 
making. Above all, according to Iqbal, as mentioned before, man 
is the architect of his own life and is the sole sovereign and 
2 
master of his destiny: 
'Futile is the complaint about the 
God-determined destiny. 
Why art thou not thyself the Gtod-
determined destiny?' 
'Develop thyself so that before 
every decree, 
God will ask thee: 'What is thy wish'? 
1. Iqbal, S.M., The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 
op. cit., po 103. 
2. (i). Kulliyat-e Iqbal (Urdu), op. cit., p. 674 (Armughan-1 Hi^ jaz 
(Urdu?: p. ^2. Ruba^i: llJT "^ ^^"^^ 
(ii). Ibid., p. 347, (Bal-e Jibrll. p. 55). 
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Iqbal a s s e r t s t h a t God speaks through freedom. He (CJod) 
does not regard a s l a v e ' s prayer as genuine, because he ( the 
slave) i s not free to communicate with God. "Prayer in Islam 
i s the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom." Iqbal holds 
tha t Islam recognizes t h i s very s ign i f i can t facul ty of ego-
a c t i v i t y and "is anxious to r e t a i n the power to act f ree ly as 
p 
a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the ego." 
The real man can only be brought up in the spirit of freedom, 
while, on the contrary, slavery distorts character, degrades 
human nature and lowers man to the level of a beast. Accordingly 
Iqbal proclaims: 
'In slavery the heart is killed in the body, 
In slavery the soul becomes a burden to the body; 
In slavery the community is disunited. 
This one and that one quarrel with this one and 
that one.'3 
Regarding a slave's action, Iqbal declares that it is devoid of 
true spirit. In Darb~e Kalim, he says: 
•In slave's body heart for deeds is nil, . 
Always his days and nights are at standstill,* 
1. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam, 
p. 109. 
2. Vahid, S.A., ogi. cit., p. A3. 
3. The Rod of Moses, op. clt.. p. 100. 
4. Ibid., p. 92. 
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•Of r ipe b e l i e f s , i f nat ions hear t 
Has no share or a l lo ted p a r t , ^ 
Their ac ts are mean, debased and low, ' 
Point ing out the worst s t a t e of s lavery , he goes a s tep fur ther 
claiming tha t even an unbelieving s t a t e i s b e t t e r than s lavery . 
2 In Bal-e J i b r i l , Iqbal says: 
'Conviction i s at ease in f i r e l i k e Abraham, 
Conviction i s absorpt ion in Allah and ret i rement 
in one 's inner being. 
Listen!0 pr i soner of the modern c i v i l i z a t i o n * 
Life of unbelief i s b e t t e r than l i f e of s l a v e r y . ' 
I q b a l ' s man i s the a r c h i t e c t of h i s world and c rea t e s i t with 
the help of h i s freedom. He i s also s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t i n a way 
tha t i s denied to o ther c r ea tu r e s of the t e r r e s t r i a l world: 
'The world of the moon and the p le iades 
has no worth before thee ; 
Theirs i s the world of necess i ty , th ine 
of freedomo'^ 
As mentioned before, Iqbal l ays grea t s t r e s s on c r ea t i venes s , 
and r e f e r s to the Qur'an which very c l e a r l y mentions the human 
1 . I b i d . , p . 92. 
2 . Kul l lva t -e Iqba l . (Urdu) . op. c i t . , p . 373. 
3 . cf. Ansari, A.A., "An E x i s t e n t i a l Approach to Iqba l" i n Iqbal 
Essays and Studies , op. c i t . , p . 135. 
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worship at regular intervals during the day and night so as to 
restore or increase the capacity of freedom by bringing the 
ego into close touch with the ultimate source of life and freedom. 
Further, underlining the importance of Islamic worship, 
Iqbal points out that prayer in its real sense is meant to secure 
the 'unity' of feeling in the congregation. Its form, in general, 
» 
creates and fosters the sense of 'social equality' inasmuch as it 
tends to destroy the feeling of rank, race-superiority or higher 
status among the worshippers. In this connection, Iqbal writes 
in a long poem " (The Complaint):^ 
'As in the heat of battle the time approached, 
the time of namaz, 
In the direction of the Kabbah posterated the 
people of Hijaz; 
To the one'rank belonged all, whether Mahmud or T^ yaz, 
No distinctions of 'master' and 'slave' were observed; 
The ruler and the ruled, the have-nots and the haves. 
All bowed their heads in reverence in Thine Presence.' 
In the same context, in The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in 
Islam, he elaborates: 
1. Ibido. p. 203. 
2 , Kul l iya t -e Iqbal (Urdu), 0£, c i t . , p . 165, (Bang-e Para, p . 165). 
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The real object of prayer, however, is better 
achieved when the act of prayer becomes cong-
regational. The spirit of all true prayer is 
social. Even the hermit abandons the society 
of men in the hope of finding in a solitary 
abode, the fellowship of God. A congregation 
is an assoication of men who, animated by the 
same aspiration, concentrate themselves on a 
single object and open up their inner selves to 
the working of a single impulse. It is a psyco-
logical truth that association multiplies the 
normal man's power of perception, deepens his 
emotion, and dynamizes his will to a degree 
unknown to him in the privacy of his individuality,... 
From the unity of all inclusive Ego who creates 
and sustains all egos follows the essential unity 
of all mankind. The division of mankind into races, 
nations, and tribes, according to the Qur'an, is 
for purposes of identification only. The Islamic 
form of association in prayer, besides its cogni-
tive value, is further indicative of the aspira-
tion to realise this essential unity of mankind 
as a fact in life by demolishing all barriers 
which stand between man and man, ' 
In Iqbal's view congregational prayers are meant to cultivate 
among the believers a sense of unity and integrity. The congre-
gational prayers represent an association of free egos effected 
in full freedom by free beings. In his view, psychology has 
so far failed to understand, analyse and explain how such unity 
could be brought about. Islam, without making use of analytical 
tools, arrived at the best way of attaining such unity, Iqbal 
says in this regard: 
Indeed, regarded as a psychological pehnomenon 
prayer is still a mystery; for psychology has 
not yet discovered the laws relating to the 
1, Iqbal, S,M,, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. 
op. clt.,pp. 92-9^. 
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enhancement to the human s e n s i b i l i t y in a 
s t a t e of a s soc i a t ion . With Islam, however, 
t h i s s o c i a l i z a t i o n of s p i r i t u a l i l lumina t ion 
through assoc ia t ive prayer i s a specia l point 
of i n t e r e s t . As we pass from the da i ly cong-
rega t iona l prayer to the annual ceremony 
round the c e n t r a l mosque of Mecca, you can 
eas i ly see how the Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n of 
worship gradual ly enlarges the sphere of 
human a s soc i a t i on . ' 
Iqbal may be ca l l ed the only Muslim thinker who gave the 
highest s t a t u s to freedom in the realm of va lues . He bases h i s 
conception of freedom-on the Qur'anic teachings and dec la res 
t h a t i t i s the immense f a i t h in God tha t provides the capac i ty 
and courage to exercise f ree w i l l and c rea te oneself and one ' s 
va lues . God, in his world-view, does not deprive man of his" 
freedom, as some o r i e n t a l i s t s hold, but ra ther guarantees i t . 
He does not accept the of t - repeated notion of fa te ( t a q d i r ; yj<^) 
advocated by the orthodox Muslim schola rs . He r e j e c t s a l l 
those systems which degrade human 'Khudl' by c u r t a i l i n g man's 
power of ac t ing f ree ly and make h is persona l i ty i n a c t i v e and 
meaningless. Nicholson makes s imi lar remarks i n t e r p r e t i n g 
the s tand-point of Iqba l : 
" . . .The convict ion tha t Khudi (selfhood, 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y , personal i ty) i s r ea l and 
i s not merely an i l l u s i o n of the mind. 
Iqba l , t he re fo re , throws himself with a l l 
h i s might against i d e a l i s t i c philosophers 
and pseudo-mystical poe t s , the authors , i n 
h i s opinion, of the decay prevai l ing i n 
Islam, and argues that only by s e l f - a f f i r -
mation, se l f -express ion , and self-development 
1 . I b i d . , p . 92. 
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can the Muslims once more become strong 
and free." 
Iqbal's philosophy is religious. But one must note that 
he does not treat philosophy as the handmaid of religion. Iqbal 
conceives free society as a kingdom of ends, in which every 
individual is free, an end in himself. He holds that the full 
development of the individual presupposes a free society (Ummah: 
..-S^l). He finds the ideal society in what he considers to be 
the Prophet's conception of Islam. Every Muslim, he asserts, 
in striving to make himself a more perfect individual, is helping 
2 
to es tab l i sh the Islamic kingdom of God upon ea r th . In h i s 
Rumu2-e BekhudI (The Mysteries of s e l f l e s s n e s s ) , Iqbal p o e t i c a l l y 
explains tha t the ind iv idua l who loses himself i n the community 
r e f l e c t s both the past and the future of Ummah as a mir ror . I t 
i s so because he transcends s t a t i c morali ty and en te rs in to the 
l i f e of Islam, which i s i n f i n i t e , ever las t ing and ensures a 
dynamic, free mora l i ty . I t i s to be noted that I q b a l ' s Rumuz-e 
Bekhudi i s not contrary to h i s Asrar-e Khudi, but a sequal to and 
a complemGntary pa r t of i t . kci individual as a member of a 
community (Mil la t ) does not lose his individual ex i s tence . He 
i s in the r ea l sense, the guiding s t a r tha t d i r ec t s the des t i ny 
°^ Mi l l a t . Only a f ree and c r e a t i v e ind iv idua l , according to 
Iqba l , can make h is soc ie ty f ree and c r e a t i v e . Man's moral 
behaviour assumes meaning in c o l l e c t i v e l i f e , and his i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
1 . The Secrets of the Self ( i n t r o d u c t i o n ) , 0£. ci_t., pp . XI I -XI I I . 
2 . I b i d . , pp. XIII-XIV. 
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is developed in society only. Iqbal, in his Rumuz, describes 
the nature of the relationship of the individual and the social 
life of the community (Millat), in the midst of which he lives, 
moves, translates his values into action and expresses his authentic 
being. Alone, man is weak and powerless and his aims are narrow. 
It is the active prrticipation of the living membership of a 
vital 'Millat' that confers on him a unique sense of power and 
makes him aware of higher collective purposes which deepen and 
widen the scope and significance of his very individual ego. 
He says: ' 
•The destiny of the nations lies in the hands 
of the individuals, 
Every individual is the star of the community's 
destiny,' 
'The individual is alive only due to its 
relationship with the community, alone, 
he is nothing. 
The wave's existence is in the river, outside 
the river, it is nothing,' 
Iqbal points out that freedom is not merely a value or 
a mode of human existence, but it is the very life of the ego. 
In short, "life is an endeavour for freedom,"^ Man, Iqbal holds, 
is an active principle of life. The unique power of free choice 
is not a free gift of God; it is to be attained through unceasing 
hard struggle. Man often has to encounter dangers in his struggle 
1 • Kulllvat-e Iqbia.(Urdu). op. cit.. pp.657 & 190. 
2. Nicholson, R.A., The Secrets of the Self, op. cit.. p. XXI. 
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for seeking freedom and completeness. The ego has to attain 
freedom by removing all the obstructions in its way. Man by 
his nature is partly free and partly determined. He attains 
fuller freedom by approaching the unique Individual who is 
•4 
the most free Being God (Allah). In reality, Iqbal holds, 
life is ceaseless striving and an endeavour for freedom. His 
» 2 
man believes in 'endless quest': 
'Everything is alive only through endless effort.'^ "^ ^ 
'Without unceasing endeavour no potentiality 
is actualized, 
The life of Farhad is illuminated with the 
sparks scattered from his chip-axeJ^^i) 
'Only he overcomes the revolution of Time, f • i-f ^  
Who creates an eternal life with every breath.'^ "'" ' 
'Where'er be life, it means a ceaseless search, 
I know not if I am a prey or He.'(iv) 
'I am all an imperfect burning all a painful 
longing 
I give away certainty for doubt as I am the 
victim of a ceaseless questj^^'^ 
1. The Secrets of the Self, op« crt., p.XXI, (Introduction). 
2, (i). Kulllv5t-e Iqbal (Urdu), 0£. £it., p. 124» 
(ii). Ibid., p. 593. 
(iii). Ibido, p. 563. 
(iv)o Dlwan-e Iqbal LShorl (Persian), o£. cit.. p. 410, (From 
J5wid N5roah, Eng. Trans, op. cit.. po 180). 
^^) * Ibid., p. 232, 
ffl. WrM 4&^ S f!,^ ~ 
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Emphasizing man's freedom and constant s t r i v i n g for 
c r e a t i v i t y , Iqbal maintains that man wi l l be able to wash away 
the b lo t of s in and gu i l t from his conscience. He says i n 
'Payam~l Mashriq ' : 
•If you do an extraordinary (c rea t ive ) ac t , ^ 
I t becomes a *good work even though i t i s s in fu l l • 
Iqbal bel ieves that man makes the world with his free 
c r e a t i v e s k i l l . All worldly objects are there for the se rv ice 
of man. He has only to bring into play his hidden p o t e n t i a l i t i e s 
for various deeds, and a l l t h i s ear th and heavens w i l l move 
at h i s command for i t i s only the free ego-ac t iv i ty which gives 
them meaning and purpose. 
Iqbal i n fe r s two p r inc ip l e s from the Qur'anic legend of 
Mam: 
( a ) . Man's longing for the i n f i n i t e ; and 
( b ) . h i s des i r e for immortality through s e l f - m u l t i p l i c a t i o n . 
The Qur'an s p l i t s up the legend in to 
two d i s t i n c t episodes the one r e l a t i ng to 
what i t descr ibes simply as ' t he t r e e ' and 
the other r e l a t i n g to the ' t r e e of e t e r n i t y ' 
and the 'kingdom that f a i l e t h n o t . ' 2 
According to Iqbal man i s the possessor of a free p e r s o n a l i t y 
accepted a t h i s p e r i l and the ego i s free personal c a u s a l i t y . 
1 . Dar, B.A., Iqbal and Post-Kantian Voluntarism, (Lahore: 
Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1956;, p . 146. 
2o Iqba l , S.M,, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islam. 
op. c i t . , p . ST! ~ 
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I t s des t iny i s self-(3etermined in i t s un i t ive experience. He 
a s s e r t s : 
In the higher Sufism of Islam un i t ive 
experience i s not the f i n i t e ego effacing i t s 
own i d e n t i t y by some sor t of absorption into 
the i n f i n i t e Ego; i t i s r a the r the I n f i n i t e 
passing in to the loving embrace of the f i n i t e . 
The idea l of Islam i s se l f -a f f i rmat ion , not s e l f -nega t ion . Iqbal 
a t t acks Sufism because i t tends towards s e l f - a n i h i l a t i o n ^negation 
of one ' s own freedom to ex i s t as an individual c r ea t i ve agent of 
the Divine w i l l . Fate i s not pre-des t ined , i t i s a c t u a l l y the 
ego ' s free c r e a t i v i t y : 
In I q b a l ' s poetry and philosophy, freedom 
seems to be the value of a l l values the 
Summum Bonum. He would agree with the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s t h a t human existence i s 
grounded in freedom. S a r t r e ' s dictum t h a t 
•Man i s condemned to be f r e e ' would have been 
turned upside down by Iqbal saying 'Man i s 
blessed to be f r e e ' . Freedom i s not condemn-
a t i on . For Sa r t r e there i s no choice for man 
but freedom. For Iqbal man chooses his 
freedom from wi th in , i t i s not th rus t upon 
him from without . Ibn- i 'Arab! says: 'What 
the essence (of man) demands was given to 
him. ' He means to say tha t man chose his 
being f r ee ly , for no compulsion was involved 
in t h i s p rocess . Man i s the a rch i t ec t of h i s 
own des t iny , Iqbal holds that acts are e i t h e r 
s e l f - su s t a in ing or se l f -d i s so lv ing according p 
to t h e i r af f i rmat ion or negation of freedom. 
1 . 
2. 
Ibid., p. 110. 
Waheed Akhtar, "Iqbal's Conception of Time" in A,A,Ansari, 
ed., Iqbal: Essays and Studies, (New Delhi: Ghalib Academy, 
1978), po 92. 
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The ego has a beginning in time and therefore it is 
finite. But this finitude, says Iqbal, is not a misfortune. 
He writes; 
(The Qur^an) does not contemplate liberation 
from finitude as the highest state of human 
bliss. The 'unceasing reward' of man consists 
in his gradual growth in self-possession, in 
uniqueness and intensity of his activity as 
an ego. '' 
He further claims that even the Day of complete destruction 
(or in his words 'Universal Destruction') cannot affect a full-
grown ego. In this regard he refers to a Qur'anic verse: 
"And the Trumpet is blown, and all who are 
in the Heavens and the Earth swoon away, 
save him whom Allah Willeth."^ 
Iqbal holds that true infinity is intensity, not extensity, 
Action provides the ground for the intensity of the ego. In 
reality. Life offers a scope for ego-activity. As he says: 
True i n f i n i t y does not mean i n f i n i t e 
extension which cannot be conceived 
without embracing a l l ava i l ab le f i n i t e 
extensions . I t s nature cons i s t s i n i n t e n s i t y 
and not ex t ens i ty ; - , . . .Life of fers a scope 
for ego -ac t i v i t y . -^  
1. Iqba l , S.M., The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. 
op. c i t , , p , 117. 
2* Al-Qur^an. XXXIX:69 . 
3. Iqbal, S,M., The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. 
0£. cit,, pp. 118-19o ' 
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It is in action that the free ego seeks immortality. The 
martyrs who sacrifice their lives for the sake of higher ends 
attain immortality. In Iqbal's view Martyrdom of Husayn ibn 
^Ali is the highest instance of the individual freely choosing 
his own destiny and thus attaining immortality. In this context, 
regarding Imam Husayn (referred to him by name (Shabblr), he 
says in Bal-e Jibril; 
'The station of Shabblr is eternity, 
While the positions of the Kufis and Shamis 
are ever-shifting.' 
Iqbal holds that immortality can be attained through action, 
living and creating one's own self and the surrounding universe 
freely as well. The ego does not end with the death of the 
body. Iqbal's Perfect Man ( U^yj/) is not awed by death. The 
inevitablity of death strengthens his faith in Allah and he 
tries to attain immortality through acquiring the pleasure of 
Him. In Bang-e Para in a long poem entitled 
Iqbal says: 
'Ignorants consider death the end of life. 
While the eve of life is the beginning of an 
eternal life. ..,'1 
Death is nothing but revival of the lust for life. 
It is a dream that conveys the message of awakening. 
Alas ! you, the ignorant person, are unfamiliar 
with the mystery of death; 9 
The transitory character of an image implies permanence? 
i. Kuliivgte IqbSi (Urdfl), p. 254": 2. tbid.. pp. 23i>^i3* 
In Bal-e Jlbril he further asserts: 
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' I l e a r n t t h i s wisdom from Abu al-Hasan(7*Ali(A)3 , 
t h a t the soul remains unaffected by the death 
of body,• 
Immortali ty, in the eyes of Iqba l , i s an idea l which may 
or may not be a t ta ined by every one. I t s achievement so le ly 
depends upon one ' s personal e f for t s o r constant s t r i v i n g \fJ^^ 
As the Holy Qur^an dec la res : 
"Blessed i s He in Whose hand i s the Soverigni ty , 
and He i s able to do .all t h i n g s . 
Who hath created l i f e and death 
t ha t He may t r y you. which of you 
i s best in conduct (or in point of deed); 
and He i s Mighty and Forgiving. "^ 
According to Iqba l , l i f e offers to the ego a great scope for 
personal e f fo r t s to achieve the idea l of immortali ty, and death 
i s perhaps the best t e s t whereby the synthet ic a c t i v i t y of 
the ego i s brought to t r i a l . In t h i s regard Iqbal says i n 
Payam-e Mashriq: 
1. Ibid., p. 379. 
2. Al~Qur>an. LXVII:1,2. 
3. Dlw§n~e Iqbal Lahorl (Persian), 0£. clto. pp.199-200. 
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'I tell thee a piece of secret wisdom, 
If thou would'st learn from me the 
lesson of life: 
Thou diest if thou hast not the soul 
in the body, 
If thou hast the soul in the body thou 
diest not.' 
An ego perfected through a life of creativity and action 
overcomes finitude. Martyrdom is eternal life, for in it the indi-
vitdual ego becomes one with the creative activity of Allah and 
conquers time: 
It is here that he becomes the Perfect Man; 
his eye becomes the eye of God, his word 
the word of God and his life the life of God 
participates in the general life of Nature 
and 'sees into the life of things' ' 
Iqbal is of the view that it is only the pure time that brings 
to the ego its freedom, creativity and immortality, Man that 
has attained a relatively perfect egohood, possesses a priviledged 
position in the heart of Divine creative energy and is capable 
of consciously participating in the creative life of Allah 
the Supreme Creator: 
Endowed with the power to imagine a 
better world, and to mould 'what is' into 
•what ought to be' the ego in him aspires, into 
the Interests of an increasingly unique and 
comprehensive individuality, to exploit all 
the various environments on which he may be 
called upon to operate during the course of 
an endless career. 
1. Iqbal, Muhammad, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, 
(Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbai;, po 119. 
2o Iqbal, S.M., The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. 
p. 72o 
232 
Iqbal, with reference to Nie^:2sche's doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence, points out that in the history of modern thought 
there is a positive view of immortality. He himself conceives 
2 
"Recurrection as a universal phenomena of life." He is of 
the view that immortality is not liberation from the shackles 
of time, it rather means to be eternally present before Allah: 
*^ Iqbal finds a psotive* view of immortality 
in Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. 
In his view of time Nietzsche deviates from 
Kant and Schopenhauer by regarding it as a 
real and infinite process. But his doctrine 
implies fixity of events happening again and 
again. It is a more rigid kind of mechanism 
and hence eventuates in determinism. Time, 
regarded as circular movement, makes immortality 
intolerable. The Supreman of Nietasche's 
conception amounts to a repetition.,of what man 
has been a number of times before. 
Iqbal holds that the creative activity of 
time does not repeat itself. It is free; it 
is not deterministic. Consequently, Nietzsche's 
doctrine fails to overcome finitude. For Kant 
immortality remains merely a postulate of 
morality. The Qur'anic view is partly ethical 
and .partly biological, Iqbal defines Barzakh 
( t/J^, ) as a state of suspension of life 
between death and resurrection. Resurrection 
itself is conceived.by him as a universal 
phenomenon of life. Reward and punishment 
on the day of judgement are not willed by God, 
but willed by man himself. He receives what 
he choees to deserve. Immortality is within 
the reach of the ego, but man has to wil it; 
it is not given him as a gift. Iqbal asserts 
that immortality is not liberation from the 
shackles of time, but it means to be eternally 
present before Godi 5 
1. Iqbal, S.M,, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 
op. cit., pp, 114-115. 
2, Ibid,, p. 115, 
5. Ibld.,pp, 114-15 4. Ibid., p, 1l6« 
5» Waheed Akhiar, "Iqbal's Conception of Tiae", o£. clto, p.93, 
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Iqbal maintains tha t the t rue nature of time i s rea l ized when 
we look into our deeper s e l f : 
•Real time i s l i f e i t s e l f which can preserve 
i t s e l f by maintaining tha t p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e 
of t ens ion^(persona l i ty ) which i t has so fa r 
achieved. ' 
In o ther words, man,according to Iqba l , having time with God, 
can himself become e t e r n a l . In Asrar-e Khudi; ^^ j^jf***! Iqbal Says: 
^^.-ffohjlf c.i^j\ LJ ff ji: Lyi:i/^ 
_ ^yjhi erf yfl^ -;J i^oL>;u>v 
'Knowing not the o r i g i n of Time, 
Thou are ignorant of ever las t ing L i fe . 
How long wi l t thou be a t h r a l l of night 
and day? 
Learn the mystery of Time from the 
words "I have a time with God". 
Phenomena a r i s e from the march of Time, 
Life i s one of Time's mys te r ies . . . . 
Our Time which has n e i t h e r beginning nar end. 
Blossoms fixjm the flower-bed of our mind. 
To know i t s root quickens the l iv ing with new l i f e : 
I t s being i s more splendid than the dawn. 
Life i s of Time, and Time i s of L i fe : 
"Do not abuse Time I" was the command of the 
Prophet. "^ 
1. The Secrets of the Self; (Asrar-e KhudI). op. c i t . , ( In t roduct ion 
p . XXV. 
2» I b i d . , pp.136-37,(Verses 1561-66 & 1575-80). 
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Further in Asrar-e KhudI (The Secrets of the Self) Iqbal under-
lines that when the self is strengthened by 'Love' (*ishq; O^^) 
it gains dominion over the outward and inward forces of the 
universe. Moreover, it symbolizes man's freedom; 
The fifth part of the Secrets of the 
Self shows that when the Self is streng-
thened by Love it gains domination over 
the outward and inward forces of the 
universe. Love, in Iqbal's thought and 
* poetry, is the moving force and creator 
of values and ideals; it symbolizes man's 
freedom. It is through love that the ego 
conquers finitude and attains immortality. 
It is not the negation but the affirmation 
of individuality and hence it individualises 
the lover as well as the beloved. Iqbal's 
concept of love is the culmination of the 
Sufi concept of love, but he has redefined 
it and broadened its meaning and scope so 
that it may embrace the ego, time, creativity, 
freedom and even God. ' 
According to Iqbal, it is this faculty 'Love ("^Ishqt (y^) 
that distinguishes man from other beings. ^Ishq, he thinks, is 
a source of knowledge and a creative force. It is only ^Ishq 
which is capable of knowing real time and participating in 
its creative activity. Iqbal maintains that the ego is the 
seat of ^Ishq and antedates (is prior to) space and time. He 
eloquently describes the connection between 'Love' and the 
Ego in his Asrar-e Khudi (The Secrets of the Self): 
1. Waheed Akhtar, "Iqbal* s Conception of Time? 0£. cit., p. 94. 
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'When the self is made strong by Love, 
Its power rules the whole world. ... 
By Love it is made more lasting, 
More living, more burning, more glowing. 
From Love proceeds the radiance of its being. 
And the development of its unknown possibilities. 
Love fears neither swor^ nor dagger. 
Love is not born of water and air and earth. ... 
The hardest rocks are shivered by Love's^glance: 
Love of God at last becomes wholly God.' 
Iqbal has given a more comprehensive expression of Love in 
his Jawid Namah (The Pilgrimage of Eternity) pointing out that 
due to it man transcends worldly space and time and reaches the 
supeiphysical realm. In the following lines Iqbal presents 
beautiful similes on ^Ishq; 
^ ^ 
r'> ^riy:sjr'\s> 
'Love dwells 
Within the soul as sight doth in the eye, 
Within and yet without: 'tis both the fire 
That flames and ashes cold. 'Tis greater than 
One's knowledge and one's faith. The final plea 
Is love, and both the worlds are love's empire. 
1. Diwan--e Igbll L5hori (Persian), o£. cit,, pp. 93-97,(Trans) 
from The Secrets of the Self, op. cit., pp. 28-43. 
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Love doth transcend both time and space, and yet 
The far, the nigh, the future and the past 
Proceed from love, \7hen love the ego seeks 
From God, it sways the world, establishes 
The place of heart and breaks the ancient spell 
Of this old idol-house. The lover gives 
His self to God, surrenders he the sense 
That to evasion takes. Art thou one such ^ 
Transcend the bounds of space, be free from death,' 
In the light of the preceding discussion, one can conclude 
that in the philosophy of Iqbal Man's Khudi is a manifestation 
of his urge for freedom and creativity. Since the act of 
creation requires freedom, it is a logical corollary that 
creativity and freedom go together and hence are interdependent. 
Moreover, freedom and creativity are the Divine qualities which, 
human ego unfolds to shape and mould its particular historic 
situation according to its aspirations. Therefore, freedom is 
the source of all values and ideals and above all it is the 
very life of ego. In a word, freedom, according to Iqbal, is 
the raison d'etre for Khudl, 
1. Ibid., p. 321,(Trans, The Pilgrimage of Eternity, op. cit.. 
pp:~15-l6 (lines 3^5'3^W^ 
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COMPARISON BETWEEN SARTRE'S AND IQBAL'S NOTIONS OF FREEDOM 
Both Jean-Pau l S a r t r e and Muhammad I q b a l occupy a unique 
p l a c e i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a reas of i n f l u e n c e i n the modern Western 
and Bas te rn p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r l d s . S a r t r e i s a prominent champion 
of e x i s t e n t i a l ph i losophy , while I q b a l ' s g r e a t n e s s l i e s i n r e v i v i n g 
and r e c o n s t r u c t i n g I s l amic though t . I t would be an i n t e r e s t i n g 
s tudy to compare and c o n t r a s t t h e i r p o s i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g freedom, 
an i s s u e t h a t has acqui red new dimensions i n the con tex t o f thepresesit 
h i s t o r i c s i t u a t i o n i n which i n d i v i d u a l ' s i d e n t i t y and freedom have 
been t h r e a t e n e d by bu reauc racy , t echnology and an a l l embracing 
c o l l e c t i v i s m . This s tudy becomes more i n t e r e s t i n g i n view of 
t h e i r c o n t r a s t i n g b e l i e f s S a r t r e i s a d e c l a r e d a t h e i s t , and 
I q b a l i s f i r m l y committed to t h e I s l amic f a i t h , as one of 
them r e j e c t s Gk)d i n o rde r to safeguard human freedom, whi le the 
o t h e r r e a f f i r m s h i s f a i t h i n God so t h a t man can e x e r c i s e h i s 
freedom f u l l y . Yet both of them are champions of i n d i v i d u a l 
man's freedom. Fur thermore , both of them a r e c r e a t i v e w r i t e r s 
of t he h i g h e s t c a l i b r e . S a r t r e i s a g r e a t f i c t i o n w r i t e r of 
ou r age and I q b a l i s u n i v e r s a l l y acclaimed as one of the g r e a t e s t 
p o e t s of I n d o - P e r s i a n t r a d i t i o n i n the 20 th c e n t u r y . 
The s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s i n t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
o u t l o o k s are equa l ly g l a r i n g . There a re some a r ea s i n which 
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both are in agreement and some in which they d i sagree . Their 
difference seems prominent due to S a r t r e ' s t ack l ing of the 
metaphysical notions onan a t h e i s t i c bas is ; conversly I q b a l ' s 
system of thought i s rooted in the in tens ive f a i t h in God, 
and his approach i s a t h e i s t i c one. The main question i s 
how far does be l ie f or unbelief in God make a difference in r e l a t i o n 
to a ph i losopher ' s views on freedom. Does i t make a fundamental 
d i f ference or give r i s e to only secondary and minor di f ferences? 
S a r t r e ' s and I q b a l ' s conception of freedom has been already 
discussed separa te ly in previous chapters of t h i s study. Here we 
can compare and con t ra s t in d e t a i l t h e i r notions of freedom. 
Exis ten t ia l i sm i s a point of depar ture , insofar as i t 
provides an a l t e r n a t i v e approach to the understanding and l i v i n g of 
l i f e and consequently changes one ' s e n t i r e out-look by c rea t ing 
new a t t i t u d e s , values and i d e a l s . The cen t r a l contention of 
e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy in the words of Sar t re ' existence 
precedes essence ' i s a revolut ionary one and shakes the h i t h e r t o 
dominant e s s e n t i a l i s t philosophy to i t s foundations. I t provides 
a new conception of man, and a new outlook by making 'human ex is-* 
t ence ' the r ea l frame of re fe rence . For Sar t re human r e a l i t y 
or human sub jec t iv i t y i s the foundation of a l l thought and ac t i on . 
He says that man f i r s t of a l l e x i s t s , encounters himself, surges 
2 
up m the world and consequently defines himself afterwards. 
1. S a r t r e , J . P . , Exis ten t ia l i sm and Humanism, op. c l t . , p . 28. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 28. 
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Iqbal, who is an amalgam of Eastern religious insight 
into reality and Western intellectualism, nas crucial existen-
tial insights to offer. He dwells upon certain important 
existentialist themes without calling himself an existentialist. 
However, he is not in full agreement with the exponents of the 
slogan Sartre's dictum "existence proceeds essence" and 
its implications. Nevertheless, he emphasises the main themes 
current in contemporary existentialist philosophy such as: 
(a) Man's existence and his personal involvement; 
(b) Anti-intellectualism and anti-personal functionali-
zation; 
(c) Alienation and authentic existence, and prominent 
among all 
(d) Freedom and creativity. 
These ideas he c e r t a i n l y shares with the cont inental e x i s t e n -
t i a l i s t s . Before proceeding to discuss Iqba l ' s views on 
these i s s u e s , i t would be relevant to enumerate and expound some 
common elements enunciated by the ex i s t en t i a l i s t thinker Sar t re and the 
Muslim philosopher I q b a l . 
( a ) . Man's Existence and His Personal Involvement; 
Exis ten t ia l i sm being a philosophy of 'human ex i s t ence ' 
man's encounter with himself has i t s roots in the phi losophies 
that emphasized the s ignif icance of the study of man and h i s inner 
experience. Such philosophies have been predominantly myst ical 
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and humanistic. What is described as mystical experience, if 
analysed properly, seems to be akin to existential experience 
or subjectivity. The dictum of Protagoras: "Man is the measure 
of all things", and that of Socrates: "Know thyself" emphasize 
the study of human reality from two different points of view. 
Mystics of the East and the West and Sufis and ^arifs in the 
Muslim World, despite their concern and yearning for establishing 
direct, immediate and intimate relationship with God, have been 
more concerned with human existence and subjectivity than the 
philosophies of rationalist and empiricist traditions. Similarly 
all creative literature right from the pre-Socratic Greek epics 
and tragedies as well as Sanskrit poetry up to the modern age 
has been always treating man as the central theme of poetry, 
drama, novel, stories and other literary genres. Though exist-
entialism is described as a 'literary philosophy* by the t'rota-
gonists of analytical philosophy of our age contemptuously, 
yet it is an apt description for existential philosophy in view 
of the similarity of the approaches of creative literature and 
existentialism to the study of man. 
It is worthwhile to trace the elements of existential thought 
and its approach in the spiritual experiential insight of 
Sufis and literati expressed in their stray utterances and poetic 
works. Starting from Iliad and Odyssy of Homer up to the 
medieval ages in the creative experiences of Saint Augustine 
(Confessions), Dante (Divine Comedy) Ibn Slna (al-Isharat and 
Hay ibn Yaqzan). Suhrawardi, al-Maqtul (Hikmat al-'Ishraq). 
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Rumi (Mathnawi), Sa*di (Gullstan), Hafiz (Piwan), al-Qhazzali 
(al-Munqadh min al-Dalal), *^ Attar, Mahmud Shablshtari, Sana'I 
(Hadiqah). Ibn al-^Arabl (Futuhat al-Makklyah and Fusus al-Hlkam). 
Mulla Sadra (al~Asfar), Mir Taqx Mir (Kulliyat), Khwajah Mir 
Dard (Piwan and *'llm al~Kitab). Bldil (Kulliyat and Chahar %nsur). 
and Ghalib (Piwan-e Urdu and Kulliyat-e FarsI), everywhere the 
spiritual existential experience is expressed m symbolic and 
metaphorical language unfolding the innermost depths of the 
totality of human existence. Similarly in modern times in the 
works of Goethe, Dostoyevsky, Franz Kafka, Miguel de Unamuno, 
T.S.Eliot, Leo Tolstoy, Chekhov, Albert Camus, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Iqbal, Tagore and Aurobindo Ghosh one may find certain 
elements of existential approach and thought intermingled with 
either romanticism or idealism or mysticism. All the represent-
atives of romanticism fix>m Rousseau to Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley 
and Keats share some basic features with the present existentialists. 
Whatever may be the philosophy or ideology of genuine creative 
writers the element that threads them together and brings them 
closer to existentialists is their subjectivity and creative 
involvement in and commitment to the totality of human existence 
and its destiny. 
In the words of Karl Jaspers, "man is everything".Ejdstentialisn 
aims at describing and evaluating in its termenology are 'human 
situations'. When the term "existentialism" is used broadly, it 
refers to a type of thinking that "emphasize human existence" 
242 
and the qualities peculiar to it rather than to nature or the 
physical world. Man-centered and individualistic existentialism 
seeks to probe the darker corners of the human situation. Yet 
emphasis on 'human existence', though the beginning of a defini-
tion, is actually too vague for us to use in reference to this 
philosophy. Existentialism, therefore, represents "an attitude 
or outlook that emphasizes human existence that is, the 
distinctive qualities of individual persons rather than man 
2 
i n the abs t rac t or nature and the world in gene ra l . " 
All the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s have t r i ed t h e i r best to const ruct 
t h e i r phi losophica l systems on e x i s t e n t i a l b a s i s . For them 
'human ex is tence ' i s p r i o r to everything. This theme of human 
exis tence has been g rea t ly emphasized by various e x i s t e n t i a l 
philosophers i n t h e i r respect ive works, such as Soren Kierkegaard's 
'Fear and Trembling' , 'Concluding Unscient i f ic P o s t s c r i p t ' , and 
' E i t h e r / O r ' ; Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time', Karl J a s p e r ' s 
'Philosophy of Ex i s t ence ' ; Gabriel Marcel 's 'The Mystry of Being ' , 
and 'Man Against Mass Soc ie ty ' ; and Jean-Paul S a r t r e ' s 'Being 
and Nothingness' and Exis tent ia l i sm and Humanism'. Besides 
these prominent advocates of ex i s t en t i a l i sm , the subject of 
•human ex is tence ' as indicated e a r l i e r , i s also dea l t with in 
the wr i t ings of Nietzsche, Husserl , Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Dostoyevsky and Albert Camus. In short i t can be said that a l l 
1 . Beck, Robert N., Perspectives in Social Philosophy, op. c i t . . 
p . 362. 
2 . T i tus , H.H., 0£. c i t . , p . 299. 
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"existential philosophies are concerned with the manoeuvre of 
existing individuals whose being is ambiguous (both bound and 
free, separated and Joined) in a total existence which is 
ambiguous (finite and infinite, end and means, a plenitude and 
nothing." 
One should keep in mind that there are two groups of 
thinkers in existential philosophy. One is theistic in which 
Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel fall; the other is atheistic 
of which Heideggar and Sartre are the exponents. Both the theistic 
and atheistic groups of existentialism explain their con-
ception of human person and his different modus according to 
their own outlook. But as for freedom,there is no basic differ-
ence between the two groups. 
Sartre in his 'Being and Nothingness' and "Existentialism 
and Humanism" explained his views regarding the existence of man. 
Analysing his famous dictum, 'existence precedes essence" he 
says that the being which exists in the world is only man. As 
mentioned earlier, Sartre does not believe in the existence of 
God and therefore his approach towards existentialism is an atheis-
tic one.As he himself says in "Existebtialism and Humanism"; 
Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a 
representative, declares with great consis-
tency that if God does not exist there is 
at least one being whose existence comes 
1. Blackham, H. J., 0£. cit., p. 153. 
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before its essence, a being which exists 
before it can be defined by any conception 
of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger 
has it, the human reality, 1 
According to Sartre, man is the only being that has no nature 
because there is no God to have a conception of him. He is a 
subjective being: 
Man first of all exists, encounters himself, 
surges up in the world and defines himself 
afterwards. ... Man is, indeed, a project 
which possesses a subjective I'ife. 2 
Man is undefinable because to begin with he is nothing. Sartre 
asserts: 
He will not be anything later, and then he 
will be what he makes of himself. Thus, 
there is no human nature because there is 
no Grod to have a conceotion of it.3 
Therefore, all existentialists, particularly Sartre, emphasize 
'human existence*. Sartre very keenly seeks to know the reality 
of human existence and formulates a comprehensive theory of 
being. His main interest is directed towards an ontological 
goal and in fact, all the existential thinkers have the common 
1. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism^ op. cit., pp.27-28. 
2. Ibid., p. 28. 
3. Ibid.. p. 28. 
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problem of expounding the salient features of human reality, 
Iqbal may be considered the first Muslim thinker to make 
a serious attempt to reconstruct Islamic thought on an existential 
experience of human individual. The fundamental difference 
between Sartre and Iqbal is that the former, as mentioned above, 
does not believe in the existence of God, while the latter's 
approach to existential philosophy is rooted in the firm belief 
in the existence of God. Iqbal approaches human reality 
in relation to God, Though Iqbal's and Sartre's interpretations 
are different yet their meeting ground 'emphasis on human 
personality' is the same. 
It may be said with some justification that it would be 
apt to compare Iqbal's approach to human freedom with that of 
either Kierkegaard or Jaspers or Marcel. For, they share theistic 
world-outlook with Iqbal and they start their odyssey of their 
quest for human existence from the same stand-point, that is 
belief in God who created man as a free being and ensured his 
free creativity. But the point at issue is as to how God, the 
Absolutely Free Being, can create another free being, and how 
far can man exercise his freedom despite a superior Free Being. 
God, being the Creator, in His very act of creation, delimits 
freedom of His creatures. Iqbal has resolved this difficulty 
in his 'Reconstruction', but it would be difficult for any 
authority on theistic existentialism to defend human freedom 
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agains t the Absolute Freedom of God. I t may be done only by 
reducing God to a mere concept, which would b e a n a n t i - e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
p o s i t i o n . I q b a l ' s pos i t ion with regard to man's freedom i s more 
c l e a r than that of the i s t i c e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . This point needs a 
much deeper analysis and an e labora te d i scuss ion , in which we 
can not indulge within the l imited framework of our present 
t h e s i s . However, among the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , Sar t re i s undoubtedly 
the most outstanding champion of man's freedom, while among the 
contemporary t h e i s t i c thinkers Iqbal may be ca l led the most a r t i c u l a t e 
advocate of man's freedom as well as h i s c r e a t i v i t y . 
Iqbal re fe rs to the Qur*anic teachings to s t r e s s the 
s ignif icance of human r e a l i t y in a l l i t s a spec t s . The Holy 
Qur'an in an unambiguous and forceful manner emphasizes "the 
i nd iv idua l i t y and the uniqueness of manj' and assigns him the 
highest s t a tus of being the Vicegerent (Khalifah) of God on 
2 
e a r t h . In his 'Reconstruet ion ' Iqbal po in ts out tha t according 
to the Qur-'an, "Man i s the chosen of God"-'^  as His r ep resen ta t ive 
and t rus tee on the e a r t h . He i s the supreme being among a l l the 
creatures of Allah: 
0 \j^<:^'J^^^'^^^^ 
C^' (ir-^l) 
1. Iqbal , The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n Islamt P»95. 
2 . Al-Qur^an. 11:30 and VI:165. 
5. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 95. 
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"Verily we have honoured the children 
of Adam. We carry them on the land 
and the sea, and have made provision 
of good things for them, and have 
preferred them above many of those ^ 
whom We created with a marked preferment," 
Iqbal's conception of "man" has been discussed in the 
previous chapter of this dissertation, indicating that the 
'self or 'ego' occupies the central position in his philosophy. 
He maintains that it is the reality of the self (Khudi; (S:*^ ) 
through which man approaches superhuman reality.As for Sartre, 
human reality is the supreme object of inquiry for Iqbal, 
The most distinguishing element in Iqbal's world-view is 
his stress on the'human personality, its reality as a free being 
and the course to adopt to strengthen it. He holds that 'Khudi' 
or self-hood is a real and pre-eminently valuable and signifi-
cant entity which is the centre and the basis of the entire 
organisation and order of life. Like existentialists, particularly 
Sartre, Iqbal emphasizes the individuality and the uniqueness 
of human existence. He asserts in his 'Asrar-e Khudi'; 
The moral and religious ideal of man is not 
self-negation but self-affirmation and he 
attains to this ideal by becoming more and 
more individual, more and more unique. ^  
1 . Al-Qur^an, XVII: 7 0 . 
2 . The S e c r e t s of t he Se l f , o p . c i t . , ( i n t r o d u c t i o n ) , p p . XVIII-XIX. 
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According to Iqba l , " l i f e " i s nothing but " ind iv idua l" and i t s 
highest form i s , in his words, the 'Ego' (Khudl: (^^ ^J>-) in 
which the individual becomes prominently a se l f -conta ined exclu-
•1 
s ive cen t r e . He seems in fu l l agreement with Sar t re when he 
says that the human 'ego' or ' s e l f i s the r e a l e n t i t y , and 
everything, which i s tnere in the universe , i s due to i t s very 
ex i s t ence . In t h i s connection he, more p r e c i s e l y in t h t Asrar-e 
Khudl, says; 
Inasmuch as the life of the universe 
comes from the power of the self, 
Life Is in the proportion to this power. 
When a drop of water gets the Self's 
lesson by heart, P 
It makes its worthless existence a pearl. 
The form of existence is an effect of the Self, 
whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the Self. 
When the self awoke to consciousness,. 
It revealed the universe of Thought, 
Iqbal formulates and very systematically elaborates his 
theory of the soul as an active, creative entity eternally 
seeking and never stopping in its unique search. According to 
1. Ibid., p. XIX. 
2. Ibid., p, 20. 
3. Ibid., p. l6a 
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him, like Sartre, individual person's existence should be 
regarded as the sole criterion of life and every one must 
recognize his 'self and its various capabilities and poten-
tialities. Iqbal in Jawjd Namah (The Pilgrimage of Eternity) 
1 
underlines: 
Vfiiat man conta ins in himself i s the world, 
And what the world cannot enclose i s man. 
His v is ion makes the sun and moon unveiled; 
And even Gabriel no access gains 
Unto his s o l i t u d e . His lo f ty rank 
I s higher f a r than heaven; therefore know 
On man's respec t i s c i v i l i s a t i o n based. 
Ihus,likethe e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , Iqbal recognizes and underscores 
the r e a l i t y of human p e r s o n a l i t y , and, in f a c t , t h i s i s one of 
basic themes which he shares with the e x i s t e n t i a l t h i n k e r s . 
In two of h is works 'Asrar-e Khudi* and 'Rumuz-e BekhudI' , 
human ego has been most e loquent ly described in i t s d i f fe ren t 
aspects and dimensions. These works are composed in the meter 
adopted in Mathnavi of MawlanS Rutni, who too emphasized the 
importance of man, saying: : 
•\{0\,^^,,!,^\,/ 
•lam tired of the devil and the beast; 
I desire man'. 
1. Dlwan n-e Iqbal Lahorl (Pe r s i an ) , op, c i t . , p , 3A6, (Trans, from 
The Pilgrimage oi i ^ e r n i t y , op, c i t . » p . 58 ) . 
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Iqbal elaborates the same theme of h i s mentor-Rumi, 
-1 
a s s e r t i n g : 
Humanity consists in respect of man: 
So acquaint thyself with the dignity of Man. 
In juxtaposition to this attitude, Iqbal presents the plenitude 
of his expressions regarding the importance of human existence 
in different ways. As he says, in his poem L'alah-yl Sahra 
ij/^Oi): The Tulip of the Desert), that all other objects, 
belonging to heaven and the earth, including the sun and the 
stars are mute, though curious spectators of the drama of human 
2 life. He says: 
Prom Man is the warmth and activity in the 
Universe 
The sun is a spectator, and so are the stars. 
The human self (or Khudi) according to Iqbal is finite, but it 
is also boundless in its peculiarity: 
Man is an ocean of which 
Every drop in itself a boundless ocean. 
1 . I b i d . , p . 418. 
2 . Ku l l lya t - e Iqbal (Urdu), 0£. c i t . , p . 414. 
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In another poem in JSwed Namah, Iqbal, like Sartre,underlines 
the uniqueness of individual existence with all its inner 
fecundity and self-sufficiency, asserting thus: 
^\/Jh ;>\>i\ /^ Jl ^  <-^'-^ ^ ^^  A^ /' >»>=' j l  L i i iy  j / - > i 
He i s a s t a r 
With neither east nor west, which setting naught 
Doth know; whose axis corresponds to north 
Nor south. His destiny entreasured lies 
In words, "I shall create"; the earth and sky 
Are commentaries thereof. The grave and death 
And resurrection and the crack of doom 
Are facets of his soul; the fire of hell. 
The lights of heaven symbolise his deeds. 
He is the leader, he the prayer too, 
He is the mosque, the holy sanctuary. 
He is the Pen, the Ink and he the Book, 
By portions are revealed the qualities 
That in him latent lie; no limits mark 
His state. His mere existence guarantees 
The promise of all possibilities, 
Their measure is his golden mean. 
Iqbal seems to be in agreement with Heidegger and Sartre 
who hold that it is the fact of consciousness which radically 
distinguishes man from other beings and all other living creatures, 
According to them, man has achieved the highest measure of 
individuality and is, consequently, most conscious of his own 
reality: 
1, Dlwan-e Iqbal Lahori, op. cit.. p. 246, (Trans. The Pilgrimage 
of Eternity, 0£. cit., pp. 57-58.) 
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The nature of the ego is such that in spite 
of its capacity to respond to other egos, 
it is self-centred and possesses a private 
circuit of individuality excluding all etos 
other than itself. '' 
According to both, the entire religious and existential experience 
of man shows the importance and the uniqueness of the "^ human self' 
Existentialism is also a philosophy of man's personal 
involvement. In this system of thought a human being is treated, 
as an 'actor' and not a "spectator". Existential philosophy 
lays emphasis on man's inner life and experience. It brings 
out his inner, personal, immediate and subjective awareness. 
All the existentialists commonly hold that there is no knowledge 
apart from the knowing 'subject' M^an's inner life with his 
unique moods, anxities and decisions. Kierkegaard, the father 
of modern existentialism, philosophizes with reference to his 
own personal problems: 
Philosophy and biography go together in the 
sense that the former arises in response to 
personal problems in which Kierkegaard is 
involved and which are solved on existential 
level, by choice rather than simply on the 
abstract and theoritical level. ^  
Existentialism opposes all forms of objectivity and impersonality 
insofar as they pertain to the life of man. With reference to 
Kierkeg.aard^ Sartre writes: 
Tl Iqbal, The Reconstruction of "Religious Tliought in Islam, op. grt, 
p. 72. 
2, Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy, op, clt», p,128. 
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Kierkegaard bases his pos i t ion upon 
indiv idual man here and now, man in 
h i s passion and anxiety; and such of 
h i s argument i s founded openly upon 
personal experience^ . . . ' 
The realm of personal involvement i s much emphasized by 
a l l e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . Kierkegaard and Sar t re seem prominently 
eager to develop t h i s a t t i t u d e . Kierkfegaard regards the human 
individual as an ' a c t o r ' and not as an object a ' s p e c t a t o r ' : 
(Kierkegaard) does not stand back from 
problems as an impersonal analyst and 
spec ta to r ; he grapples with them as one 
who i s involved in them with his whole 
being; they are for him not merely objec ts 
of i n t e l l e c t u a l c u r i o s i t y but r a the r matters 
of v i t a l concern which he cannot regard with 
a purely detached i n t e r e s t . He i s not a 
spec ta to r , but ac to r . ^ 
Sa r t r e incorporated the same views and a s s e r t s that human 
ind iv idua l i s completely involved himself in the world. According 
to him, "man i s thrown into t h i s world" and there fore he i s 
responsible for every thing he does. Both Sar t re and Heidegger 
analyse th i s theme and d i s t ingu ish between man's be ing - in - t he -
world and h is being- in- the-midst -of- the-world as the two modes 
of his ex i s t ence . The purpose of drawing t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
to emphasize tha t although man i s necessar i ly present and 
involved in the world and cannot withdraw from i t , yet he does 
1, S a r t r e , Ex is ten t ia l i sm and Humanism, op. c i t . . p . 7 . 
2 , Fredrick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy, op. c i t . , p . 128. 
3 , S a r t r e , Ex i s ten t i a l i sm and Humanism, o£. c i t , . p . 3^« 
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not lose his individuality. One must note that 'present' or 
'involved' does not mean, for both the thinkers, absorption 
or losing one's self to the world and sink to the level 
of brute material objects, which both of them termed as the 
state of 'inauthenticity', It is an interpretation of Socrates' 
dictum: "know thyself" and to make use of this knowledge for the 
purpose of comprehending and conquering the world. In 
reality, "man is the being", Heidegger holds, "who is immediately 
present to the world and who must live out his life in and 
through his inescapable relationship to the world", because 
"the being of human reality", as Sartre also asserts, "is originally 
2 
not a substance but a lived relation," 
Existential philosophy is a personal, self-evolving, creative 
effort rather than an impersonal and imitative process of 
philosophizing. In short, it is an approach to life that lays 
its emphasis on man's existence and his personal involvement. 
Iqbal too^  like the existentialists, stresses man's 
consciousness and personal involvement in his own being and the 
world as well. There is a remarkable similarity between Iqbal and 
the existentialists in their approaches to the problems of man's 
consciousness, his identity, personal involvement, death, anguish, 
dread etc. Iqbal also is,like theexistentialisi:s, against classicism 
and intellectualism. Inspite of certain differences between 
1. Olson, R.G., An Introduction to Existentialism, op. clt., p.135. 
2. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 575. 
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Iqbal and Sartre a number of elements are common to both. 
The universe, according to Iqbal, the theist, is a God 
oriented one* Yet this approach to and description of human 
existence are much akin to those of the atheistic existential-
ists such as Sartre and Heideggar, who too have analysed 
human existence in cosmic field-situation. Concern for man 
as an existing individual being and his personal involvement 
in different spheres of life are the common points of the two 
philosophical systems. 
K^K^^^^N^^^ 
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(b)» Anti-Intellectualism and Anti-Impersonal Functionallzation; 
Existentialism is a thorough revolt against some of the 
main features and concepts of the traditional speculative 
philosophy and impersonal attitudes of the modern industrially 
oriented and technology-dominated era. It is a protest against 
the tradition of rationalism initiated by the Greeks, especially 
the traditional "system building" of philosophy as formulated 
by Plato, Spinoza and Hegal. In such a 'system', according to 
the existentialists, the human individual is lost in a supersen-
sible world, in abstract universals, or in a universal ego. In 
the previous pages, the nature or 'essence* of man has 
been discussed and distinguished from his radical * existnece'. 
In this way, it can be rightly said that "existentialism is a 
protest in the name of individuality against 'reason' and 'nature' 
that were so strongly emphasized during the eighteenth-century 
'Englightenment'". 
The basic ideas of reaction against the established 
religious authority and the challenge to Christian faith were 
first found in Kierkegaard's philosophy. In rejecting Christ-
ianity, "Kierkegaard had perceived the discontinuity between 
faith and reason, and in rejecting speculative philosophy he 
2 
retained this perception and built his position upon it." 
According to him speculative philosophy has not yet apprehended 
the true spirit of Christianity: 
1. Titus, H.H., Living Issues in Philosophy, op. £it., p. 300, 
2. Blackham, H.J,, Six Existentialist Thinkers, op. cit., p. 5. 
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And yet, no, it is not so; in relation to 
Christianity, systematic philosophy is 
merely skilled in the use of all sorts of 
diplomatic phraseology, which deceives 
the unsuspicious, Christianity as under-
stood by the speculative philosopher is 
something different from Christianity as 
expounded for the simple. '' 
Moreover, in his famous works 'Philosophical Fragments' and 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard attacks mainly 
the established "system" of Hegal. He points out that Hegelian 
philosophy fails to define its relation to the existing individual 
Further, by ignoring the ethical values it also confounds human 
existence. According to him existentialism begins as a voice 
raised in protest against the absurdity of Pure Thought: 
A philosophy of pure thought is for an 
existing individual a chimera, if the 
truth that is sought is something to 
exist in. To exist under the guidance 
of pure thought is like travelling in 
Denmark with the help of a small map 
of Europe, on which Denmark shows no 
larger than a steel pen-point aye, it 
is still more impossible. The admiration 
and enthusiasm of the youth, his boundless 
confidence in Hegel, is precisely the 
satire upon Hegel.2 
Gabriel Marcel also rejects the Hegelian idea of abstract 
knowledge. As he says, "What do we know of ourselves? 
We are beyond truth and falsehood, we cannot be qualified"-"^  and 
1o Kierkegaard S., Concluding Unscientific Postscript, (Trans, 
David F.Swenson & Walter Lowrie), Ct'rinceton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), P. 200. 
2. Ibid.. p. 275. 
3 . Jean Wahl, P h i l o s o p h i e s of Ex i s t ence , (London; Rout ledge & 
Kegan P a u l , 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 1 5 . 
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he says that there can be no absolute knowledf^ e of the real 
nor that of the self. 
Existentialism as stated before is a philosophy of human 
existence and personal involvement. Besides being anti-intelle-
ctualistic in its approach and attitude, as discussed above, it 
is set against impersonal functionalization and opts for a 
subjective approach to life. It is a revolt against the impersonal 
nature of the modern industrial or technological age as well as 
against scientism and positivism; 
Existentialism is a reaction against pseudo-
scientific philosophizing, and the term 
"existential" (Existenz) focuses this reaction 
by calling our attention to the concrete human 
situation from which philosophical thought 
arises. '' 
All the existentialist thinkers attach the greatest value and importance 
to the existence of human individual as he inwardly perceives 
himself, feels, enjoys, suffers, wills rather than to a conceptual 
framework applicable to all. In this respect, the common revolt 
of existentialists is against certain dominant philosophical 
religious, social, political and literary concepts and trends 
which imply 'dehumanisation' and impersonal functionalization, 
Frederick Copleston, in his 'Contemporary Philosophy *, poi^ t^s out 
that "the powerful tendency towards the political and social 
totalitarianism with its reduction of personal responsibility 
1, Karl Jaspers, Philosophy of Existence. (Trans. & Introduction 
Richard F.Grabau), (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia 
Press, 1972). (Editors Note) p. vii. 
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and i t s evaluation of personal values in terras of service to 
the col lec t iv i ty" gave an impetus to the ex i s t en t i a l i s t theme of 
personal involvement. Thus, i t may be said that existentialism 
i s a movement of ant i - in te l lectual ism and anti-functionalization 
of man. 
Iqbal, in agreement with the ex i s t en t i a l i s t thinkers, holds 
that the t radi t ional speculative philosophies have failed to 
grasp the basic r ea l i ty of human 'existence ' and i t s various 
d is t inc t ive qua l i t i e s . In order to highlight and emphasize 
the uniqueness of the self, Iqbaltoo,l ike the ex i s t en t i a l i s t s has deve-
iDped his cri t ique of c lass ica l and modern philosophical, theolo-
gical , l i t e ra ry and a r t i s t i c thought. 
I t must be kept in mind that Iqbal does not completely 
reject the importance of reason or in te l l ec t in l i f e . According 
to him in te l lec tual knowledge "prepares us for a more masterful inser-
2 t ion into subtler aspects of human experience." Further, he holds 
tha t in te l l ec t has been evolved to help man in his act ions . 
Here Iqbal 's approach regarding in t e l l ec t seems somewhat different 
from the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , for instance Sartre,who completely 
rejects 'reason' or 'human na tu re ' . . Sartre says: 
There is no human na tu re . . . Man simply i s . . . 
Man is nothing else but that which he makes 
of himself .3 
1. Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy, op, cit>» p.138. 
2 , Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought In Islam, p.14, 
3« Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, op, c i t , , p . 28. 
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He fur ther adds: 
One wi l l never be able to explain one ' s 
ac t ion by reference to a given and speci f ic 
human n a t u r e . . . he i s thrown into t h i s 
w o r l d . . . ^ 
Sar t re r e j e c t s human nature and ' essence ' because he does not 
bel ieve in the exis tence of God, I q b a l ' s a t t i t u d e i s cont rary 
to him (Sar t re ) because he ( iqbal ) has firm f a i t h in God's 
exis tence and tha t i s why h is approach is a t h e i s t i c one. He i s 
against i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m in the sense that he, l i k e Kant, po in ts 
out the inadequacies of the i n t e l l e c t . Here, l i ke Bergson (and 
unlike Sar t re ) he thinks that the higher form of i n t e l l e c t 
i s ' i n t u i t i o n ' . He sees no unbridgeable gulf between ' i n t e l l e c t ' 
and ' i n t u i t i o n ' : 
Nor i s there any reason to suppose that 
thought and i n t u i t i o n are e s s e n t i a l l y 
opposed to each o the r . They spring up 
from the same root and complement each 
o t h e r . The one grasps Real i ty piecemeal, 
the o ther grasps i t in i t s wholeness. 
The one f ixes i t s gaze on the e t e r n a l , 
the other on the temporal aspect of 
Reality.2 
P la to and other i d e a l i s t s had repudiated sense experience 
as a source of knov/ledge and the modern i r r a t i o n a l i s t s do not 
accept the v a l i d i t y of i n t e l l e c t as an instrument of the knowledge 
of r e a l i t y . I q b a l ' s view in t h i s regard, wri tes Khalifa *Abdul 
Hakim, i s " i n t e g r a t i v e , considering sense-percept ion, i n t e l l e c t 
'I* I b i d . , p . 34, 
2 , I q b a l , The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. 
OP. c i t , . p p , 2 - 3 . ~~~ 
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and Intuit ion to be different modes of apprehension of the same 
r e a l i t y , " His outlook is unmistakeably Qur^anic, not only 
appealing to reason in support of revelation and faith but also 
regarding hearing and sight as the most valuable divine gifts 
and declaring them to be accountable to God. Sar t re ' s position 
is different ;f or him man's r ea l i ty is the sole c r i te r ion of every-
thing and, l ike Nietzsche, he says that God does not ex is t . 
However, Iqbal 's rejection of idea l i s t s l ike Plato, Hegel e tc , 
seems similar to that of the ejcistential is ts .He,just l ike exist-
e n t i a l i s t s , attacks P la to ' s rationalism and cal ls him 'a sheep'. 
This is so because according to Iqbal, P la to ' s thought has 
deeply influenced the mysticism and l i t e r a tu r e of Islam by making them 
to follow the sheep's doctrine. In 'Asrar-e Khudi* Iqbal says 
2 
about him: 
Plato, the prime ascetic and sage. 
Was one of that ancient flock of sheep. 
His pegasus went astray in the darkness of idealism. ... 
He dominates our thinking, 
His cup sends us to sleep and takes the 
sensible world away from us. 
He is a sheep in man's clothing. 
The soul of the Sufi bows to his authority, 
1. Abdul yakim, K,, "Renaissance in Indo-Pakistan : Iqbal", 
op. clt., p. 1623. 
2, Diwan~e Iqbal Labor 1. op, cit., p. 100 (Trans. The Secrets of 
time Self), op. cit.. pp. 5b-y/). ~~ 
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Moreover, it may also be pointed out that Iqbal saw Greek 
Thought as the supreme example of classicism, which strictly 
follows certain laws. Islam, on the other nand is opposed to the 
Greek out-look and is in its spirit romantic, inviting man to 
take risks in his quest for reality; 
Plato regarded time as unreal but the 
Buddha emphasized its reality, Iqbal 
rejects Plato and accepts the Buddha. 
He devotes a part of his Mathnawi; 
Secrets of the Self, to the criticism 
of Plato's ideas and their deadening 
influence on the Muslim mind. He 
warns that 'we must be on our guard 
against his theories'. For Plato the 
concrete, physical world is an illusion 
and ideas alone partake of Reality. 
Iqbal holds, on the contrary, that: 
• Sweet is the world of phenomena to the 
living spirit. 
Dear is the world of ideas to the dead spirit.' 
Plato 'made hand, eye and ear of no 
account' and 'slumbered and took no 
delight in deeds'. The Muslim mind was 
poisoned by his philosophy of the denial 
of the material universe. It goes with-
out saying that under his influence most 
of the Muslim thinkers somehow upheld the 
notion of the unreality of time. Suflsra 
was more deeply influenced by Plato who 
may be regarded as its presiding genius. 
Iqbal does not regard change as evil and 
does not agree with the Buddha that sal-
vation lies in the liberation from the 
life-cycle by eliminating desire, the 
root-cause of the will to live. Life is 
suffering and suffering is rooted in 
desire. Iqbal, like the Buddha, does 
certainly regard life as an expression of 
desire, but, unlike him, he considers it 
a blessing: 
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'L i fe i s occupied with conquest alone, 
And the one charm for conquest i s d e s i r e . 
Life i s the hunter and d e s i r e the snare . 
Desire i s l o v e ' s message to Beauty, ' 
Iqbal thus p a r t l y r e j e c t s the Buddha's 
philosophy of l i f e because he, in I q b a l ' s 
view, could not appreciate the l i f e - f o r c e 
of t ime. Desire i s the v i t a l i t y to 
grapple with the temporal. The temporal 
i s r ea l becausq^ time i s God's a t t r i b u t e 
or God himself, ' 
A s f a r a s t h e concept of space i s concerned, Iqbal r e j e c t s the 
Greek concept of space also.The Muslim mind could never agree 
with the a b s o l u t i s t i c concept of space; 
The idea l of the Greeks...was proport ion 
not i n f i n i t y . The physical presentness 
of the f i n i t e with i t s well-defined 
l i m i t s alone absorbed the mind of the 
Greeks, ^ 
Iqbal holds t ha t the idea l of the Muslims was the i n f i n i t e 
« 
and t h i s could not be harmonized with the a b s o l u t i s t i c concept 
•5 
of spacet 
All the forms of atomism posed the same 
difficulty. The Ash'arite atomism was an 
attempt to overcome this difficulty, 
Nasir Tusi (A.D, 1201-74), for the first 
time since Ptolemy (A.D, 87-165) gave 
1. Waheed Akhtar, "Iqbal's Conception of Time", o_£_, cite, 
pp, 77-78, 
2, Iqbal, Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 132, 
3o Waheed Akhtar, 02. cit,, p, 82. 
264 
serious thought to the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of demonstrating the ce r t i t ude of 
Eucl id ' s p a r a l l e l pos tu l a t e on the 
basis of perceptual space. He rea l i zed 
the necess i ty of abandoning perceptual 
space, furnishing a bas is for ' t h e 
hyperspace movement of our t ime ' , ' ' 
Al-Beruni saw, from a purely s c i e n t i f i c 
point of view, the insufficiencypof the 
s c i e n t i f i c view of the universe . 
I r a q i , as Iqbal c la ims, i n s i s t i n g on the 
p l u r a l i t y of space-orders and t i m e - o r d e r s , , 
speaks of a Divine time and Divine space. "-^  
Again, Iqbal shares with the ex i s t en t i a l i s t s the r e a l i z a t i o n of 
the inconsequent ia l i ty of pure i n t e l l e c t or thought. Like tha t of 
t h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , h i s phi losophical system may be conceived 
as a reac t ion against the abst ract ionism of the i d e a l i s t s 
especia l ly Hegel and P l a t o . According to both the systems the 
i n t e l l i g i b l e order of things i s more than an a i ry hypothesis 
or an a ' p r i o r i datura. In t h i s regard Iqba l , i n his *Darb-e Kallm' 
speaks with bare ly concealed contempt about Hegel: 
'Hegel ' s she l l has no pear l i n i t ; 
His shadow-world i s a l l i l l u s i o n . ' 
I q b a l ' s problem i s qui te s imi la r to that of Kierkegaard 
who makes an attempt to meet the challenge of materialism, 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r e l i g i o n and soc ie ty , w?iich according to him 
c o l l e c t i v e l y erode the s p i r i t u a l foundation of human exis tence . 
1 . Iqba l , The Reconstruction of Religious Thought In Islam, 
pp. ^32-'W, 
2o I b i d . , p . 13A. 
3 . / Waheed Akhtar, ££ . c i t . , p p . 82-83« 
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Both the thinkers tried their level best to save the individual 
man from the danger of losing his individual identity. Iqbal 
realizes the loss of individual personality (Khudi) in modern 
artificial and technological milieu, especially the Muslim 
world of pseudo-mystic pantheism, and other such religious 
movements. He sees that: 
Hindu intellectualism and Islamic pantheism 
have destroyed the capacity for action based 
on scientific observation and interpretation 
of the phenomena, which distinguishes the ^ 
Western peoples^and especially the English" 
Iqbal in this way, accuses, particularly, the early Muslim 
scholastics of failing to grasp the spirit of Qur^an under the 
influence of Greek speculative philosophy and impersonal 
functionalization of man's individuality (Khudi), 
"It is the misfortune of our age that it has 
too much knowledge, that is has forgotten 
what it means to exist'.* (Kierkegaard). ... 
Iqbal's diagnosis of the sickness of modern 
civilization is not different from that of 
Kierkegaard. He is critical of contemporary 
body of knowledge because of its incapability 
to teach how to live. In Javid Nama (The 
Pilgrimage of Eternity) the Indian disciple, 
in his anguish to learn how to manage life, 
asks his spiritual preceptor: 
"My thought has scaled the heavens but 
I remain lowly and miserable on earth 
I cannot make my way in the world; I 
stumble at every step. Why am I inca-
pable of managing my worldly affairs? 
Why is the spiritually wise a fool in 
worldly matters?" 
1« The Secrets of the Self, op. cito. po XII (introduction) 
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Kierkegaard's s c i e n t i f i c a l l y wise and 
I q b a l ' s s p i r i t u a l l y wise, are both a t 
a loss and have forgot ten to ex i s t as 
human beings . Dostoyevsky summarised 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n in these words: 
'Leave us without books and we 
sha l l be l o s t and in confusion at once. 
We sha l l no t know what to jo in i n t o , what 
to c l ing t o , what to love and 
what to ha te , what to respect 
and what to desp ise . We are 
oppressed at being rften men with 
a rea l individual body and blood. 
We are ashamed of i t , we think 
i t as a disgrace and t ry to 
continue to be some sor t of impo-
s s ib l e general ised man.' 
This i s the predicament of modern man. 
Immensity of knowledge has made man 
in s ign i f i can t in h i s own eyes. He has 
d r i f t e d from himself in the ever-widening 
stream of h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l g a i n s . In 
the g igant ic machinery of technocracy and 
bureaucracy he has become an i n f i n i t e s i m a l 
p a r t , replacable any time on the s l i g h t e s t 
show of unadjus tab i l i ty with the whole. 
Dostoyevsky's 'general ised man' i s mu l t i -
plying to the point of popula t ion-explos ion, 
but the r e a l man, whom Rumi sought among 
demons and beasts with a l a n t e r n in h is hand, 
i s not to be found. E x i s t e n t i a l i s t th inkers 
t r i e d to search and r e h a b i l i t a t e the r ea l 
man in t h e i r own way, and Iqbal aimed at 
f u l f i l l i n g the same task in h i s own way. 
Concern for man i s the meeting ground for 
the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s and Iqbal.1 
As s ta ted e a r l i e r , I qba l ' s revol t aga ins t i n t e l l e c tua l i sm 
i s somewhat d i f f e r en t from that of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s who completely 
r e j ec t specula t ive philosophy and are r i g h t l y c a l l e d " i r r a t i o n -
a l i s t s . " Iqbal i s not an obscuarantist who f a i l s to understand 
the s ign i f i can t ro le played by the ' i n t e l l e c t ' i n the ind iv idua l ' s 
1» Waheed Akhtar, " E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Elements i n I q b a l ' s Thought", 
2£» c i t . . pp . 28-29. 
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l i f e , worldly affairs and social evolution. However, he points 
out the inadequacies of the i n t e l l ec t and lays emphasis on i t s 
higher form to know the ' sec re t s of the s e l f that i s , 'Reality 
in i t s wholeness'. The apparent be l i t t l i ng of the individual 
self provokes a protes t as by the ex i s t en t i a l i s t s , against the 
over-exaggeration of the i n t e l l e c t ' s role in l i f e . Iqbal 's 
poetry in part icular records th is protest , in*which he be l i t t l e s 
in te l l ec t as compared to *'ishq ( C^^) , the passion to love 
and create. 
On the whole Iqbal ' s philosophical a t t i tude l ike that of the 
ex i s t en t i a l i s t s , may be regarded as an t i - in t e l l ec tua l i s t i c with 
a severe attack on the philosophies advocating impersonal 
functionalization of man. Emphasis on the uniqueness of human 
rea l i ty plays a pivotal role in both the systems. 
^ K £ ^ ^ ^ I > ^ ^ ^ 
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( c ) . Alienation and Authentic Existence; 
According to the ex i s t en t i a l i s t s , human existence is prior to 
everything and for them the f i r s t principle i s man's making of 
himself as he is a project which possesses subjective l i f e . 
They believe that before th i s projection of the self nothing 
ex is t s , that i s , man is responsible for whatever he chooses and 
does in different s i tuat ions , and hence the responsibil i ty of 
his action fa l l s on his own shoulders* 
Exis tent ia l is t thinkers, par t icular ly Sartre, have discussed 
in deta i l the fact of al ienation in thei r writ ings. According 
to him, there are two modes of being •being~in-itself ' and 
'be ing- for - i t se l f ' . Being-in-itself , as stated ear l i e r , i s 
the self-contained being of a thing, for example, a stone i s 
a stone, i t i s what i t i s and no more or no l e s s . I t means 
the being of a thing always coincides with i t se l f only. On the 
contrary, 'being-for-i tself• is co-extensive with the realm of 
consciousness, and the nature of consciousness i s that i t is 
perpetually beyond i t s e l f . Accordingly Sartre holds tha t man in 
his existence, i s always beyond this world, sometimes towards 
the future and sometimes outside of this world, and even t r ans -
cends his own being. Man ^^^s^ possesses his being as he possesses 
a thing. Thus, he never comes to the position of a thing tha t 
coincides with an object. This can only be done when he i s not 
conscious of or rather when i t i s not alienated from himself. 
1o William Barrett , 0£. c i t . , p . 218. 
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According to S a r t r e , the human r e a l i t y has the rad ica l 
dua l i ty of the ' i n - i t s e l f and ' f o r - i t s e l f and i s made up 
of t h i s d u a l i t y . Whereas the i n - i t s e l f i s defined as a being 
"which i s what i t i s ' , man or the human r e a l i t y i s defined as 
a being 'which i s what i t i s not and i s not what i t i s . " 
Sar t re points out t ha t man i s n i h i l i t i n g nothingness, 
because if existence has no ob jec t ive ground nor has any reference 
to any system of values , then, in t h i s sense, conscious 
human existence i s pure nothingness . In o ther words, due to the 
fac t t h a t man constant ly c r ea t e s himself as well as the 
ob jec t ive s i t u a t i o n ^ h i s empir ica l being i s viewed as 
nothingness . I t can be infer red tha t to ex i s t man must perpe-
t u a l l y transcend himself or be a l i ena ted from himself. In t h i s 
regard Paul T i l l i ch holds: 
The s t a t e of exis tence i s the s t a t e of 
estrangement, Man i s estranged from 
the groupd of h is being, from other 
beings, and from himself . ^ 
From the above discuss ion i t necessa r i ly follows that 
man must abandon a l l hopes of a t t a i n i n g a secure and harmonious 
i n t e g r a t i o n with the surrounding ob jec t ive world. Accordingly, 
i n d e s i r i n g , valuing and e x i s t i n g , man necessar i ly re jec t s t h i s 
ob jec t ive world in which he l i v e s . Therefore, a l l p ro jec ts 
1 . Olson, R,G,, 0£, c l t .> p . 55 , 
2 . T i l l i c h Paul, Systematic Theology, (Chicago,1957), p , ^ 4 . 
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which are turned toward the acceptance of the world as i t i s 
cons t i tu t ed imply a diminution of man's being and a loss of 
s e l f - r e s p e c t in so f a r as they tend to reduce the tension which 
c o n s t i t u t e s the necessary condi t ion of free human ac t ion , 
S a r t r e , i n h is 'Being and Nothingness ' , points out that "freedom 
i s a lack of being in r e l a t i o n to a given being." He i s 
emphatic in a s se r t ing tha t the human r e a l i t y i s a ' d e to t a l i z ed 
t o t a l i t y (of ' i n - i t s e l f and f o r - i t s e l f ) . Man i s both ' i n - i t s e l f 
and ' f o r - i t s e l f but an important point to be noted i s that the 
two dimensions of h i s being are r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . There 
seems a deep dent in h is very being which wi l l never close 
at a l l . 
The upshot of the above Sa r t r i an theory i s that "man i s 
the foundation without foundation" of h i s values . Value der ives 
i t s being from i t s exigency and not i t s exigency from i t s being. 
Sar t re says: 
Nothing, absolu te ly nothing J u s t i f i e s me 
in adopting t h i s or t ha t p a r t i c u l a r value, 
t h i s or tha t p a r t i c u l a r sca le of va lues . 
As a being by whom values e x i s t , I am 
u n j u s t i f i a b l e . My freedom i s anguished 
at being tht foundation of values , while 
i t s e l f without foundation,3 
1, S a r t r e , Being and Nothingness, op . c i t . , p . 485. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 38. 
3» I b i d , , p . 38, 
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According to Sartre, the price of human existence is alienation 
from self, from God, from nature or material world and from 
society. Man is condemned to freedom* 
Existentialist thinkers, especially Sartre, have discussed 
in detail the spheres of finitude and alienation or estrangement. 
Sartre explains death, finitude and guilt from the stand-point 
of alienation. It is said that estranged from the ultimate 
power of being, man is determined by his finitude. His destiny 
is given over to his natural fate. He came from nothing and 
he returns to nothing. He is under the domination of death and 
is driven by the anxiety of having to die. This in fact, is 
the first answer to the question about the relation between sin 
and death. For Sartre, the most important feature of human 
reality is the fact of self-transcendence, the ontological 
necessity men are under to exist in and through choice. All 
the anguish and tragedy of human existence can be traced to 
this source. And it is this feature of human reality alone 
which constitutes its finitude. But, for Heidegger, on the 
contrary, death is the greatest source of anguish and the prime 
symbol of human finitude. He does not deny self-transcendence. 
Sartre points out that the awareness of death has value insofar 
as it obliges man or helps him to make authentic decisions. 
Moreover, he says that the awareness of death helps man to 
achieve authenticity. It necessarily involves a renunciation 
of the right to choose. Therefore, it is, infact, nothing 
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other than an impossible attempt to be for oneself the essence 
or the nature which one can only be for another . Sa r t r e , in 
t h i s connection, i n his 'Being and Nothingness* remarks: 
The very exis tence of death a l i ena t e s us 
wholly in our own l i f e , . . .To be dead i s 
to be a prey for the l i v i n g . This means, 
the re fore , tha t one who t r i e s to grasp 
the meaning of h i s future death must d i s -
cover himself as the fu ture prey of otfiers. 
We have here , t he re fo re , a case of a l i e n a t i o n . 
This i s , i n shor t , the e x i s t e n t i a l exposi t ion of a l i ena t ion as 
sys temat ica l ly elaborated by S a r t r e . 
Now, we propose to d iscuss a few observat ions regard-
ing authent ic existence put forward by e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . For 
them, an authentic man i s one who recognizes the r ad ica l 
dua l i ty between the human and non-human. According to e x i s t -
e n t i a l i s t s , man must l i v e in the world; and bein^- in- the-world 
(which cons t i t u t e s his conscious and purely authentic be ing) , 
in which man recognizes h i s exis tence and knows his p o t e n t i a -
l i t i e s does not imply ' be ing- in - the -mids t -o f - the -wor ld ' (which 
i s the s t a t e of human i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , i n which man loses his 
existence in the a r t i f i c i a l man-made world which i s the world 
transformed by human technology) . They hold tha t an authent ic 
l i f e i s one which i s based upon an exact assessment of human 
condi t ion, while in i nau then t i c s t a t e man becomes forge t fu l of the 
1. Sa r t re , J . P . , Being and Nothingness, op, c i t . , p . 5^3. 
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ontological roots of his very being. The oatological necessi-
t ies of human condition, ex i s t en t i a l i s t s hold^are degraded in 
the s ta te of ' fal lenness ' or ' i nau then t i c i ty ' . 
A brief account of Iqbal 's doctrine of al ienation will 
be given here to compare and contrast his view with that of the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . So far as contrast i s concerned, Iqbal ' s 
views on death are diametrically opposed to the views of Sartre 
and other ex i s t en t i a l i s t s . Man, according to him, i s not con-
demned to death due to the finitude of his ego. On the contrary, 
i t is finitude through which he may overcome and conquer time. 
Finitude is not a curse but a blessing, for i t motivates man 
to a t t a in inf ini ty and eterni ty: 
Finitude is not a misfortune. . . .This is a 
very important point and must be properly 
understood with a view to secure a clear 
insight in to the Islamic theory of salva-
t ion . I t i s with the irreplaceable single-
ness of his individuality that the f in i t e 
ego will approach the in f in i t e ego to see 
for himself and consequences of his past 
action and to judge the poss ib i l i t i e s of 
his future. . . .Fini tude ( is) the highest 
s tate of human b l i s s . ^ 
Iqbal believes, unlike the atheist Sar t re , that man's l i f e 
does not end with his bodily death. For Sartre, this l i f e in 
the corporeal world, is a l l that man possesses, while for 
Iqbal i t is just a preparatory ground for the l i f e -a f t e r death. 
1. Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, op. c i t . , 
p . 117. 
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He i s convinced that man's essence, tha t i s ' s o u l ' , i s immortal. 
I t i s up to man to conquer f in i tude and a t t a i n imr::ortality through 
h i s inceasing s t ruggle to overcome time and f i n i t u d e : 
(F in i tude) : The 'unceasing reward' of man 
cons i s t s i n h i s gradual growth i n se l f -
possession, in uniqueness and i n t e n s i t y of 
h is a c t i v i t y as an ego. Even the scene of 
'Universal Destruct ion ' ^immediately preceding 
the Day of Judgement cannot a f fec t the perfect 
calm of a full-grown ego ."^  
The man who does not f lee from death but faces or r a the r chooses 
i t f ree ly with a purpose overcomes i t , as i n the case of a 
martyr l i k e Husayn ibn ^Ali(A). Hence death i s not a cause of 
a l i e n a t i o n as Sar t re be l i eves , but a means to a t t a i n unity with 
God. I t also makes human l i f e meaningful, while Sar t re says 
t h a t the dread of death makes human ex i s tence absurd. A perfect 
be l iev ing man, i . e . mard-e mu^min: i^J^^^ f e e l s no dread in 
the face of death; he approaches i t w i l l i n g l y , knowing that i t 
brings i n i t s wake e t e r n i t y ; Mu^mln, according to Iqbal , dies 
with a smile on his l i p s : 
*I t e l l thee the sign of a Mu'min _ 
When death comes there i s a smile on his l i p s . ' 
1 . I b i d . , p . 117. 
2 , Vahid, S.A., 0£. c i t . . p . 24, 
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What makes human l i f e absurd and devoid of a l l human values i s 
seeking refuge in the world and escaping from death . According 
to I q b a l , i t i s not death but the attempt to escape from i t tha t 
a l i e n a t e s man from God, h is ownself and the world of numan 
exis tence* 
Before proceeding, i t i s e s s e n t i a l to note tha t Iqbal 
has never exp l i c i ty used the term "a l i ena t i on" or "estrangement" 
in his phi losophical or poe t ica l w r i t i n g s . However, the con-
cept ion of a l i ena t ion i s embedded in h i s poe t i c r e f l e c t i o n s . 
He r a i s e s the problem of two-fold a l i e n a t i o n God a l ienated 
from man and man a l ienated from God. Bes ides , man's a l i ena t ion 
frx)m the world and from himself also f igures i n h i s philosophy. 
In one of his ear ly and powerful poems, "Shikwah"" ^J"^ " (The 
Complaint) Iqbal takes up the quest ion: Why i s man a l iena ted 
from God?, and in the 'Answer to Complaint' Jawab-e Shikwah 
( ^r^'^s',) God's reply does not seem to be s a t i s f a c t o r y at a l l , 
because of the fact that estrangement or alienation is not 
1 
God's problem, but i s ac tua l ly a human problem. 
No doubt much of I q b a l ' s poetry and prose suggest to 
readers a s t r a igh t way to dea l i ena t ion . In the l i g h t of his 
concept of ' ego ' or 'KhudJ' he asks man to overcome h i s mani-
fold a l i e n a t i o n . He deals mainly with the problem of a l i ena t ion 
on the soc ia l and r e l i g i o u s l e v e l s . 
1 . Waheed Akhtar, " E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Elements i n I q b a l ' s Thought" 
op. c i t . . p . 32, 
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Iqbal ' s insistent concern with the problem of alienation 
is brought out from his early poetry. He Is of the view that 
for a creative human person isola t ion from the world or detachment 
from the external circumstances i s necessary: 
The theme of so l i ta r iness i s also in 
many instances the necessary conditioning 
factdr for the blossoming forth of the 
creative potent ia l . The creative writer, 
i n i t i a l l y engaged in the act of external-
ization of his ins ights , also wishes nece-
ssi ty to have a responsive audience, the 
absence of whom brings him chagrin and 
frustrat ion. I t i s also true that the 
pressure of the creative impulse finds a 
fruitful soi l in the detachment that is 
forced upon him by the external circumstances. 
But isolat ion or seclusion,which is a prerequisite condition 
for creative act iv i ty , i s different from alienation. Sometimes 
scholars and c r i t i c s with l i t t l e insight into creative feeling 
of lonliness confuse i t with a l ienat ion, which is harmful for 
creat ive ac t iv i ty . 'Alienation' is imposed upon man by a society, 
nature and his own self. On the contrary, a poet 's withdrawal 
from society and his feeling of lonliness i s a healthy s ta te of 
creat ive self that does not accept a l ienat ion. This i so la t ion 
i s aimed at strengthening one's individuali ty and rejecting 
the fallen s ta te of day-to-day being. I t is rather a f i r s t step 
towards de-alienation and a revolt against dehumanised society . 
1« Ansari, A.A., "Lala-e-Sehra: An Explication" in his own ed.., 
Iqbali Essays and Studies, op. c i t . , p . 210. 
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With the product of h is c rea t ive a c t i v i t y an a r t i s t or poet 
or a genius recovers his authentic self and e s t a b l i s h e s a new 
r e l a t i o n with nature and society by p a r t i c i p a t i n g through h i s 
c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y in reshaping human socie ty and c r ea t i ng human 
v a l u e s , A.A.Ansari i n the above passage, has misunderstood the 
t rue s ign i f i cance of c rea t ive lon l iness and has wrongly considered 
i t as ' a l i e n a t i o n ' , which according to h is misconceived nations 
i s a pre-condi t ion for c r e a t i v i t y . Iqbal himself did not confuse 
these two d i f fe ren t human s t a t e s . Laleh-e-Sahra (The Tulip of 
the Desert) i s a symbol of c rea t ive l o n l i n e s s , and Iqbal does 
not at a l l mean to present a l i ena t ion as a value s t a t e in t h i s 
poem. 
According to Iqba l , man should ' c r e a t e h i s own world i f 
he be amongst t h e living'i''M£r--(jU'^J'^-^Jiy^-^,i-^^L0ii'J(j'j'» tinman e x i s t e n c e 
Sar t re holds , l i e s beyond thought, and i t moves towards t r a n s -
cendence tha t of fers a f i e ld for personal ven tu re . According to 
Karl J a spe r s : 
As human beings we are never s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t ; 
we are not our own only goal but r e l a t e to 
Transcendence. I t enhances us and simultane-
ously enables us to see through ourselves and 
r e a l i z e that we are nothing. , , .Freedom and 
Transcendence lead to a basic consciousness , 
Sa r t r e s e t s up a d i s t i n c t i o n between b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f and beinfi-
i n - i t s e l f (pour-sol and en-sol), and argues t h a t values emerge 
1. J a spe r s , K., Exis tent ia l ism and Humanism, op. c i t . , p . 70. 
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as a r e s u l t of the i n s e r t i o n of the former into the l a t t e r . 
In other words, according to him values- are expression of the 
• f o r - i t s e l f ' s s t r i v i n g ' towards i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the una t t a in -
able i n - i t s e l f . The n i h i l i t i n g movement of S a r t r e ' s ' f o r - i t s e l f 
towards i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s r e a l l y an e s s e n t i a l mode of over-
coming a l i ena t ion or tha t which Iqba l c a l l s estrangement or 
separa t ion 'dUf*. O^^P* or depr iva t ion • O-^Xi ' which is a 
recurrent theme in I q b a l ' s most s i gn i f i c an t poet ry . Man's 
longing and lon l iness i s h is exclusive p r i v i l e g e because according 
to Iqba l , the t o t a l i t y of the world of non-human beings i s not 
prompted by th i s unique d e s i r e . He says: 
'Rivers , mountains, the moon and s tars 
What do they know of separa t ion and longing! 
The pain of separa t ion i t becomes me alone; 
This dust i t alone has known s e p a r a t i o n . ' 
2 Again, in th i s respec t , Iqbal says in h is B a l - e - J i b r J l ; 
'The s t a r s are strayed and non-communicative; 
Separation i s the dest iny of a l l e x i s t e n c e . ' 
1 . Kul l lya t -e Iqbal (Urdu), 0£. c i t . , p . 453, (Tr. A.A.Ansari, 
Ced.) op. c i t . ,""p. 130. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 345. 
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Thus, according to both Sar t re and Iqba l , a c r ea t i ve 
being i s condemned to a l i ena t ion tha t produces an undying 
urge for bringing out man's hidden c r ea t i ve p o t e n t i a l i t i e s 
to overcome a l i e n a t i o n . Both the th inkers hold t h a t for a 
c r e a t i v e human individual estrangement from the dehumanised 
world or detachment from other externa l circumstances that 
reduce Being-for-oneself to day-to-day"-Being i s very e s s e n t i a l . 
Only in such a s i t u a t i o n does man's c r ea t i ve impulse find a 
f r u i t f u l s o i l and he can c rea te and reshape h is world according 
to his des i res and a s p i r a t i o n s . 
However, according to Iqba l , human person complains to 
1 God for h i s l o n l i n e s s : 
''lAOiere, 0 God i s a companion for me in t h i s world? 
I am the t ree on Mount S ina i , where i s my Moses ? . . , 
I am as the t u l i p of the f i e l d , 
In the midst of a company I am alone. 
I beg of Thy grace a sympathising f r iend . 
And adept in the myster ies of my nature.* 
2 
Again,in this regard Iqbal asserts in Asrar-e Khudi: 
1, Diwan-e Iqbal Lahorl (Persian), 0£. cit., pp. 124-25, (Eng, Tr. 
The Secrets of the^elf, op. cit., pp. 144-47)• 
2. Ibid., p. 124 (p. 144). 
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'My hear t i s with yes tereve , my eye i s 
on to-morrow: 
Amdist the company I am a l o n e , ' 
"Everyone fancies he i s my f r iend , 
But none ever sought the s ec re t s wi thin my s o u l . " 
I q b a l ' s complaint to God is a plea to l i b e r a t e him from 
h i s estrangement or l on l iness which hur t s him b^dly, I q b a l ' s 
man complains to God because of h is be ing - in - the -mids t -o f - the -
world. Sar t re and Heidegger too have r i g h t l y termed t h i s s t a t e 
1 
of being as ' i n a u t h e n t i c i t y ' . Iqbal says to God: 
'My madness has a grievance agains t thy Divini ty; 
Thou hast for thee the spacelessness and has 
confined me to the four dimensioned space . ' 
Iqbal i s fed up with the corporeal s h o r t - l i v e d , l imi ted 
and a l ienated s t a t e of being. His in tense fee l ing of a l i ena t ion 
from the v/orld r e f l e c t s in his Urdu and Pers ian poet ry , B.A.Dar 
expounds I q b a l ' s view in tn i s regard with reference to his 
"Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadid": 
"Free yourself from the snare of night 
and day; Reach within yourself and r e t i r e 
from t h i s noisy world; Throw yourself in to 
the inner recesses of your h e a r t . " 2 
1. Ku l l lya t -e Iqbal (Urdu), og. c i t . . p . 
2 . Cf. B.A. Dar, " Inspi ra t ion from the West" in Hafeez Malik, ed . , 
Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakis tan , (New York & London: 
Columbia University Press , 1971), p . 201. 
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The awful s i lence of an a l ienated being and i t s dread of 
nothingness i s beau t i fu l ly expressed by Iqbal i n his poem 
It l>^^l / ,1 (i-j^ e Tulip of the Desert) in B a l - e - J i b r i l as follows:' ' 
. ..^Ut/c^trt^UtJ'; /4 j ^} L^^lii L>4^ 
'This azure Dome, t h i s l on l ine s s i 
I dread the vast expanses of t h i s dese r t ! . . * 
0 deser t breeze, l e t me also have thy g i f t s : 
Silence and Pathos, ecstasy and g r a c e . ' 
The opening l i ne s of the poem depict the p o e t ' s deep sense of 
anxiety he i s experiencing in the world. Throughout t h i s poem 
the ' t u l i p ' i s used as a symbol of the pass ionate nature of. 
man and of the i n t e n s i t y of the apprehension of Nothingness; 
This poem evokes a kind of e x i s t e n t i a l 
dread that r i s e s in undulation l i t t l e by 
l i t t l e , and i t a l so2 re f l ec t s an a n t i c i -
patory phenomenon. 
This conception of dread or anxiety , or the anguish of being 
p r e v a i l s throughout e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy. I t i s a kind of 
prelude to ex i s t en t i a l i sm . "The anguish of being revea ls the 
r a d i c a l contengency and u l t imate meaninglessness of both man 
and the world." Therefore, I q b a l ' s conception of ' a l i e n a t i o n ' 
seems very close to t ha t of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . 
However, i t should be noted that I q b a l ' s conception of 
a l i ena t i on i s somewhat d i f fe ren t from tha t of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
1. Kul l lya t -e Iqbal (Urdu), 0£. c i t . , pp . 413-14, (Tr . A.A.Ansari, 
( ed . ) OP. c i t . . pp. 213, K s ) . 
2 . A.A.Ansari, "Lala-e-Sehra: An Expl icat ion" , 0£. c i t . , p.219* 
3 . Olson, R.G., 22. c i t . , p . 57. 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y that of Sar t re and Heidegger. F i r s t l y , I q b a l ' s 
approach i s t h e i s t i c and, therefore , h i s conception of a l i ena t ion 
from God i s not s imi lar to S a r t r e ' s and Heidegger 's 
conception because they are a t h e i s t s and r e j e c t God's ex i s t ence . 
For them the quest ion of a l i ena t ion from God does not a r i s e . God 
i s no guarantee of human freedom, but He, in the view of Sa r t r e , 
t akes away freedom from man. Secondly, t he re i s also some 
d i s s i m i l a r i t y between I q b a l ' s authentic man and the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ' s 
au thent ic being. Inau then t i c i ty i s the outcome of a l i e n a t i o n , and 
a u t h e n t i c i t y means de -a l i ena t i on . In h i s l a t e r poetry , Iqbal 
suggests a way to dea l i ena t ion . His ' au then t i c man' or Mu^min 
( Idea l nan-J^^[,C/^^) i s the Vicegerant (^r^L*) of God (on e a r t h ) , 
Who has bestowed upon him His unique At t r ibu tes l i k e knowledge, 
wisdom, freedom, c r e a t i v i t y , power, pa t i ence . J u s t i c e , conscious-
ness , Love, sympathy e t c . This aspect of I q b a l ' s notion of 
au then t i c i t y i s i r r e l e v a n t to the views of Sa r t r e , for according 
to him, i t i s only 'Human ex i s tence ' which i s the ground of 
conscious and free l i f e . 
( d ) . Freedom, Crea t iv i ty and Respons ib i l i t y ; -
After having gone through and analysed b r i e f l y some of 
the common elements in ex i s t en t i a l i sm and Iqbal ian phi losophica l 
i d e a s , we may take up the i ssue of freedom and c r e a t i v i t y in 
order to compare and con t r a s t S a r t r e ' s and I q b a l ' s approaches 
to these conceotions. 
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The conception of freedom in the philosophy of Sartre 
and Iqbal has been discussed separately in the previous pages 
of this thesis. Here we shall bring out the main points of 
agreement and disagreement between the two thinkers. 
As indicated earlier, existentialism being a philosophy of 
'freedom' and 'creativity' is anti-deterministic. The emphasis 
of existentialists on personal existence and subjectivity has 
led to a new stress on man's freedom and responsibility. According 
to existentialist thinkers determinism, whether genetic, social 
or environmental, does not offer adequate explanation of man's 
inner potentialities and capabilities. Existentialists say 
that man brings out his unique inner potentialities and creative 
skill only because of his freedom. Their view-point insists 
that first of all, man exists in the world and with his utmost 
freedom creates himself through each of his actions. He is 
the maker of himself and "by virtue of his freedom, originally 
creates himself". Man is the project which possesses subjective 
life. Apart from this projection of self nothing exists. 
Existentialists hold that man fulfils his project only due to 
his freedom. He is responsible for whatever he does and, in 
this way, the whole responsibility of his action falls on his own 
shoulders. Man iias considerable freedom within his own being 
in case he wills to express it. According to Karl Jaspers, the 
1o Jaspers, K., Existentialism and Humanism, (Ed.) Hanns E. 
Fischer & (Tr.) E.B.Ashton, ^New York: Russell F, Moore Co. 
Inc., 1952), p. 69. 
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dign i ty of man i s in h is freedom: 
To see the essence of man in h is freedom, 
however, i s to see him in h is d ign i ty . All 
i nd iv idua l s , myself included, are i r r e p l a c e -
able under the same high ob l iga t ions . ' 
Freedom i s a unique quest which l i e s in working out the demands 
of one ' s inner nature and expressing one 's genuine or authent ic 
se l f . Freedom means facing conf l ic t ing choices , making decis ions 
and accepting them, 
Jean-Paul Sa r t r e alone among a l l the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t th inkers 
elaborated a systematic and de ta i led theory of freedom. He 
approaches the problem from the a t h e i s t i c view point t o t a l l y 
denying God. Man i s completely free at his w i l l to do whatever 
he l i k e s . To him there i s no God and hence "everything i s 
2 
permitted". Sartre says: 
Nothing will be changed if God does not existj ,,. 
and we shall have disposed of God as an out-of-
date hypothesis which will die away quitely of 
itself. 3 
In case God does not exist, Sartre points out, there is only 
one being whose existence comes before its essence and that 
being is 'man*. Man is undefinable, because to begin with he 
is nothing: 
1. Ibid., p. 69.. 
2. Sartre, J.P., Existentialism and Humanism, op. cit.,pp.53-34. 
3. Ibid,. p, 33. 
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Freedom i s p rec i se ly nothingness which 
i s made-to-be at the hear t of man and 
which forces human r e a l i t y to make i t s e l f 
ins tead of to b e . . . for human r e a l i t y , 
to be i s to choose oneself; nothing comes 
to i t e i t h e r from outside or from within 
which i t can receive or a c c e p t , . . Thus, 
freedom i s not a being; i t i s the being 
of man i . e . h is nothing of being. '' 
Human indiv idual wi l l not be anything unless and u n t i l he wi l l 
be what he makes of himself. Hence, there i s no human na ture , 
because there i s no God to have an idea of i t : 
For indeed existence precedes essence, one 
wi l l never be able to explain one 's act ion 
by reference to a given and spec i f ic human 
na ture ; in o ther words, to a given and 
speci f ic human nature ; in o ther words, there 
i s no determinism.2 
Man i s not what he conceives himself to be, but he i s what he 
X 
wills, what he chooses and "what he makes of himself"-^ through 
4 
freedom, and "that is the first principle of existentialism". 
Moreover, freedom, according to Sartre, is the only ground of 
all values. 
On the cont ra ry , regarding freedom and c r e a t i v i t y , Iqbal 
has quoted various Qur>anic verses in h i s Urdu and Persian 
poetry and p a r t i c u l a r l y in his 'Recons t ruc t ion ' , affirming 
1. Sartre, J . P . , Being and Nothingness, op. c i t . , pp. 440-441< 
2 . Sa r t r e , J . P . , Exis ten t ia l i sm and Humanism, op. c i t . , p. 34. 
3 . Ib id . , p. 28 . 
4 . Ib id . , p. 28 . 
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h i s f a i t h in Allah. In the fourth l e c t u r e in Reconstruction, 
he presents th ree s ign i f ican t themes from the Qur'an reaffirming 
the Islamic view of man's being a Vicegerent of Allah, a chosen 
e n t i t y and a t ru s t ee of a free pe r sona l i ty which he accepted a t 
h i s p e r i l . " Iqbal argues t h a t man's freedom and c r e a t i v i t y , 
in the sphere of e t h i c s , must be under the d i r ec t ion of the 
highest Good and Absolute Freedom i . e . God. The g rea t e s t of a l l 
o b s t a c l e s , says Iqbal , in the upward l i f e of the ego i s matter 
or Nature, yet i t i s not e v i l , since i t enables the l a t e n t 
powers of l i f e to unfold themselves. According to I q b a ] , the 
Ego a ta ins freedom by the removal of a l l the obs t ruc t ions in i t s 
way. ' I t i s p a r t l y free and p a r t l y determined', and reaches f u l l e r 
freedom by approaching the indiv idual who i s most f ree , termed 
•God'.^ 
Conversely, Sar t re holds tha t there i s no God and man i s 
condemned to freedoms 
Everything i s permitted(because of the fac t 
that) God does not e x i s t . . . One wi l l never be 
able to explain one ' s ac t ion by reference to 
a given and spec i f ic human nature; in other 
words the :e i s no determinism man i s f r ee , 
man i s freedom.5 
His pos i t ion i s not l i ke that of Iqbal who maintains t ha t man 
in some spheres of a c t i v i t y i s f r ee , and in some o ther spheres 
1 , Iqba l , The Reconstruction, op. c i t . , p . 95. 
2 , The Secrets of the Self, op. c i t . , ( In t roduc t ion ) , p.XXI. 
3 , S a r t r e , J . P . , Exis ten t ia l i sm and Humanism, op. c i t . , pp.33-34. 
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has t o fol low Divine Commands. S a r t r e empha t i ca l l y a s s e r t s i n 
Being and Noth ingness ; 
Freedom i s not a be ing ; i t i s t h e being of 
man i . e . , h i s no th ingness of b e i n g . I f 
we s t a r t by conce iv ing of man as plenum, i t 
i s absurd to t r y to f ind i n him a f te rwards 
moments or psychic r e g i o n s i n which he would 
be f r e e . . . .Man cannot be sometimes s l a v e 
and sometimes f r e e ; he i s whol ly and f o r e v e r 
f r e e or he i s not f r ee a t a l l , ' 
This i s , i n f a c t , t h e major d i f f e r e n c e betv/een the approaches 
of t h e two t h i n k e r s . S a r t r e ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i c out-look; i s 
l a b e l l e d as humanis t i c because he saves man's freedom at t he 
cos t of God. I q b a l ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i f the term may be app l i -
ed to h i s approach i s a l so human i s t i c d e s p i t e h i s f i rm 
f a i t h i n God, because God i n h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l Weltanschauung; 
does not d e p r i v e man of h i s freedom but r a t h e r gua ran tees i t . 
However, i n s p i t e of some d i f f e r e n c e s , what both the 
systems have i n common i s the d o c t r i n e of freedom through which 
human e x i s t e n c e can t r a n s l a t e i t s a u t h e n t i c i t y i n t o a c t i o n s . 
For I q b a l , as for S a r t r e , man i s a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d c e n t r e of 
a c t i v i t y , s e l f - c o n s c i o u s , c r e a t i v e and s e l f - e v o l v i n g b e i n g . 
Human s e l f i s f r e e i n t h e sense t h a t i t i s not determined by 
a n y t h i n g o u t s i d e i t . Freedom i s i t s own a r c h i t e c t and the 
ve ry laws governing i t s mode of o p e r a t i o n i n the world a r e of 
i t s own making. Above a l l , a cco rd ing to I q b a l , man i s the 
a r c h i t e c t of h i s own l i f e and i s t h e s o l e sover ign i n the 
1 . S a r t r e , J . P . , Being and N o t h i n g n e s s , op , c i t , > p , 4 4 1 , 
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scheme of creation and the undisputed master of his destiny, 
Iqbal says: 
'0 lover of Truth! Be conclusively final 
like a glittering sword, 
Be thy self the destiny of thine own world,' 
According to Sartre freedom reveals itself in dread that compels 
man to seek refuge in the inauthenticity of existence. To him 
overcoming dread leads to authentic existence that is moral,and 
flight from it is inauthentic and immoral. In Iqbal's philosophy, 
when one realizes what is freedom, it seems to be the source of 
all values. According to him life of the ego is possible in 
freedom only: 
'Life is reduced to a dried rivulet when it is 
imprisoned within confines; 
In freedom, life embraces boundlessness like 
an ocean.' 
Iqbal maintains that there are only ego-sus ta in ing and ego-
d isso lv ing a c t s . Freedom sus ta ins the ego, while slavery 
d i s so lves in to nothingness, Man's f i r s t act of disobedience to 
God, which caused his expulsion from heaven, was an act of 
freedom meant to sus ta in the ego. Escape from freedom, according 
to Iqbal , i s an ego-dissolving act t ha t negates a l l future for 
1 . I qba l , The Reconstruction, op. c i t , . p , 119, 
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human existence. He asserts that when a person gives up his 
freedom, he falls down from the high pedestal of human existence, 
into the state of inauthenticity. Iqbal, in his poems, 
calls all the acts of the slave devoid of morality; according 
to him even his prayer is not authentic, because it negates 
the freedom of ego, it is not a bold "yearning for a response 
» 
in the awful silence of the universe." A slave's prayers deepen 
and thicken this silence. To accept slavery and to remain 
contented with this state is the death of ego. Real man can 
only be brought up in the spirit of freedom, while slavery 
distorts character, degrades human nature and finally lowers man 
2 
to the level of beasts. On the one hand, God refuses to 
respond to the prostrations of the slaves, and, on the other, 
the earth refuses to accept the dead body of a slave: 
'0, the heartless being! Thou hast been a 
slave in the world; 
Because of thine surrender to slavery the 
heart of mine is burning like hell. 
Thine corpse has made the darkness mine 
even darken; 
Thine corpse has torn into shreds mine veil 
of modesty. 
1. Ibid., p. 92. 
2 . Waheed Akhtar, Iqbal in Modern Pe r spec t ive . (Aligarh, 
Calcut ta : Naurose Publ ica t ions , 1986), p . 4 1 . 
3 . Kul l lya t -e Iqbal(Urdu), 0£. c i t . , pp. 662-63. 
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Beware of the corpse of a slave; Beware 
an hundred times; 
0 Israfil, 0 the Creator of the Universe! 
pure soul! Beware,' 
For Iqbal, freedom is the highest religious, social, 
moral and political value. He gave a philosophical orientation 
to his attempt to reconstruct the religious ideas according 
to the historic necessity of his times. Like Sartre, Iqbal 
accorded the highest position to freedom in the hierarchy of 
values. No doubt freedom occupies a similar position in the exis-
tentialist philosophy in general, but Iqbal's concept of freedom 
seems far more comprehensive than that of all the existentialist 
thinkers including even Sartre. Sartre's views are in conflict 
with those of Iqbal when he (Sartre) proclaims that there is 
• 1 
no God and "we are l e f t without excuse" and that "man i s 
2 
condemned to be free," Iqbal says that ttiere i_£ God Who is 
the Most Free and is the Creator of the heavens and the earth. 
The human ego attains highest freedom by removing all the 
material obstacles in its way, though matter is not a bondage, 
it rather paves the way for attaining freedom. And attaining 
supreme freedom does not mean that human self or Ego has to 
annihilate itself for the sake of being absorbed in God. Man 
remains man and does not lose his Khudi or egohood. The Pixjphet 
of Islam, the ideal and the most perfect of all the Prophets has 
to ask his followers tc 
:o procla im: 
'We bea  witness t h a t Muhammad(S) i s the slave 
and the messenger of A l l ah ' . 
1 . Sa r t r e , Exis tent ia l i sm and Humanism, p , 34. 
2» I h i d . , p . 34, 
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It reiterates that man is first of all 'a man' howsoever high a 
position he may attain. The obedience to Allah ensures the 
life of human ego and strengthens his Khudl, which is life of 
freedom. For Iqbal freedom is not a value or mode of human 
existence. It is the very life of Khudl (egohood). 
Iqbal seems to be in agreement with Heidegger and Sartre 
who hold that it is the fact of consciousness which radically 
distinguishes man from other beings and all other creatures. 
The issue assumes central importance in the thought of Iqbal. 
For Iqbal the realization of freedom is the core of human 
consciousness. According to him it is not something static, 
rigid, given and complete, but it is a dynamic process, and 
because of freedom it is a self-creative process based on an act 
of improvisation and rejection of what has been (its bondage). 
Like Iqbal, both theistic and atheistic versions of existen-
tialistic philosophy maintain that man is incomplete, undefinable 
and unpredictable. As Karl Jaspers says: 
Nobody can conceive all human potentialities. 
Man is always capable of doing more and other 
things than anyone expected. He is incomplete, 
he cannot be completed, and his future is never 
sealed. There is no total man, and there never 
will be one.1 
Similarly, atheist Sartre asserts that: 
[^ man3 is not definable, it is because 
to begin v/ith he is nothing. He will not be 
anything until later, and then he will be 
what he makes of himself, 2 
1. Jaspers, K. Existentialism and Humanism, op. clt., p, 72. 
2» Sartre, J. P., Existentialism and Humanism, op. cit., p.28. 
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For Iqbal, human consciousness is the basic and central subject 
of discussion. According to him, it is only this unique faculty 
of consciousness which makes man radically distinct from other 
worldly objects, so that he can participate in the creative 
act of God. Here Iqbal differs from Sartre, according to whom 
there is no otner creator but only human individual. He says 
that God is the Supreme Creator of everything and man with his 
consciousness and other capabilities participates in the creative 
act of Allah. Iqbal says: 
Man, therefore, in whom egohood has reached 
its relative perfection, occupies a genuine 
place in the heart of Divine creative energy 
and thus possesses a much higher degree of 
reality than things around him. Of all the 
creations of God, he alone is capable of 
'consciously participating' in the creative 
life of the Maker. '' 
According to Iqbal, this universe is a Divine creation but it is 
not a complete act of creation: 
The process of creation is still going on, 
and man too takes his share it, inasmuch as 
he helps to bring order into at least a 
portion of the chaos. The Qur^an indicates p 
the possibility of other Creators than God. 
oV.f/.'f 
•The universe i s s t i l l incomplete perhaps, 
For one may respond to an ever-recurr ing 
command of "come in to be ing . " ' 
1 , Iqba l , The Reconstruction, op. c i t . , p . 72, 
2 , The Secrets of the Self, op. c i t . . ( I n t roduc t ion ) ,p . XVIII, 
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'There are other worlds unseen 
And the essence of exis tence i s not yet voidl 
I t i s man, i n viev/ of Iqba l , who i s dest ined to complete the 
•• 1 
p r o c e s s of c r e a t i o n . I n a long poem Saqi Namah, he w r i t e s : 
'Every one of t h e them w a i t i n g f o r thy conques t , 
For t h e u n b r i d l e d p l a y of t h y thought and a c t i o n 
The o b j e c t of t h e passage of time i s but onej 
To r e v e a l to thee t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of thy e g o ! ' 
I q b a l l a y s g r e a t s t r e s s on man's c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y and r e f e r s 
to t h e Qur-'an, which e x p r e s s l y mentions c r e a t o r s b e s i d e s A l l ah . 
For i n s t a n c e , one of the fo l lowing v e r s e s of t he Holy Book 
(Qur ' an) i n d i c a t e s : 
'B les sed i s God, t h e b e s t of those who c r e a t e ' 
Such a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Qur 'an i n d i c a t e s how I q b a l conce ives 
t h e ac t of human ' c r e a t i v i t y ' . One w i l l not f ind i n S a r t r e o r 
o t h e r a t h e i s t i c e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s t h i s view of human c r e a t i v i t y . 
And i t i s i n t h i s unique i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of human freedom and 
c r e a t i v i t y t h a t I q b a l goes beyond e x i s t e n t i a l i s t phi losophy and 
s u r p a s s e s i t s concep t ion of freedom. 
IT*] 
1. Kul l lya t -e Iqbal (Urdu), o£. c i t . , p , 420-21. 
2 . Al-Qur'an. XXIII:14, 
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C O N C_L_y_D_I N G R E M A R K S 
In our comparative study of the conception of freedom as 
advocated by Sartre and Iqbal, we have drawn certain parallels 
as well as certain points of mutual difference between the two. 
Such a study may be considered by some as misleading because 
of two reasons: Firstly, the Weltanschauung of the two is appa-
rently radically opposed, that is, one is a theist while the other 
is an atheist; secondly, Sartre's philosophy is the culmination 
of the anti-intellectualistic tradition of Western philosophy, 
particularly representing a revolt against the Platonic-Christian 
world-outlook, while Iqbal's philosophy is a radical point of 
departure within the frame-work of Eastern thought, particularly 
the Islamic tradition of philosophy, 
Iqbal's position is unique in the Eastern v/orld that has 
been under the influence of a passive, ascetic and other-worldly 
out-look of Sufistic philosophy. Moreover, it is to be noted 
that the period in which Iqbal composed his poetry and developed 
his philosophy of ego v/ith emphasis on freedom was an era of 
total surrender of the East to the colonial domination of the West 
and the manifold exploitation which the imperial system practised. 
The people of the East in general and the Muslim countries in particular, 
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from the far end of the North Western Africa, that is Algeria 
up to the middle East and further extending to the Indian sub-
continent and the far Eastern Muslim countries such as Malaysia 
and Indonasia, were forced to passively accept t^.e loss of their 
identity and individuality in the face of the agressive racial 
policies of the Western powers, particularly the Britishers. 
Iqbal was educated und^r the 'British Raj', a product of the 
English system of education conceived by Lord Macaulay (1800-59), 
He was a pupil of Sir Thomas W, Arnold, who motivated him to go 
to England and complete his education there. Moreover, he was 
bestowed the title "Sir", a title much cherished by all the 
feudal Lords and the servants of the British Empire, It is 
interesting that his contemporary poex and icf^ x'n;cr, ''=>>^ ''ndranath 
Tagore, declined to accept this title at a particular juncture 
of the struggle for freedom of India, but Iqbal never did this 
act of asserting his hatred for the British Rule, Despite this 
apparent weakness on the part of Iqbal and his admiration for 
and his intimate relations with some of the feudal lords like 
Amanullah Khan, the king of Afghanistan, the Nizam of Hyderabad 
and his chief minister, Maharaja Sir Kishan Prashad, Nawab of 
Bhopal and many minor zamlndars of Punjab, he could advocate 
and develop a philosophy that ultimately led not only the 
Muslims of the Indian sub-continent but also Hindus of India 
to attain freedom from the slavery of the British Rule, There 
is a basic difference in temperament and character of a purely 
creative genius and a philosopher or an ideologue of revolutionary 
29G 
out-look. J.P.Sartre, a Western French philosopher and 
litterateur, who was a militant combatant in the French Resis-
tance Movement against the Nazi Occupation of France during 
the second world war, could develop a conception of freedom on 
the basis of existential approach to human existence. He was 
a declared atheist. Iqbal is acclaimed as tne champion of 
freedom of the East all over the Muslim world, particularly 
by the post-Islamic Revolution Iran. Iqbal never participated 
as a militant combatant in the struggle for freedom. For a 
few years he was a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly 
under the 'British Raj' and he also acted as the president of 
the Muslim League for a while. During his tenures as the 
president of the Muslim League and a member of the Punjab Legis-
lative Assembly, he faught and advocated for greater freedom 
for Indians, and championed the cause of the Indian Muslims. 
Taking into consideration the entire career of Iqbal as a 
philosopher, as a poet and as a political activist, it may be 
said that he never proved himself to be a revolutionary political 
ideologue. The present policy of the Pakistani rulers and the 
peoples is directed towards projecting him as a creator or 
founder of Pakistan and the advocate of pan-Islamic movement, 
yet he is equally respected and admired in secular India for 
his advocacy of the up lift of the Indians irrespective of 
their caste, creed and religion. 
Apparently Sartre seems to be a much more radical revolu-
tionary philosopher as compared to Iqbal. Sartre's position 
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a t t a i n s g rea te r prominance in t h i s ro le in view of his ac t ive 
opposi t ion to the imper i a l i s t designs of h is own country, France, 
against the Algerians and the U.S.A's aggression against and 
occupation of Veitnam. He also emerged as one of the chief 
advocates of the New-Left in Europe. These pecul ia r cha rac te r -
i s t i c s of S a r t r e ' s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y pro jec t him as one of the 
chief advocates of human freedom in the context of the contempo-
ra ry p o l i t i c a l s t ruggle for freedom throughout the world as well 
as at the leve l of developing a philosophy to support h i s p o l i t i c s , 
On the other hand, apparent ly , I q b a l ' s i n t e r e s t i s 
confined to the East and the Muslims only. Occasionally he i s 
depicted by the anti-Muslim, communal f a n a t i c , chauvinist Hidu 
s e p a r a t i s t tendencies represented by the p a r t i e s such as the 
R.S .S , , and some dogmatic advocates of l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of Marxism. 
In t h i s h i s t o r i c a l context any study of Iqbal on the bas i s 
of h i s phi losophical notions of human freedom, egohood (Khudl) 
and human c r e a t i v i t y seems to cont ras t with the p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t i e s of S a r t r e . We, in the present study, have t r i e d to 
put these t r i v i a l considerat ions aside and emphasized I q b a l ' s 
purely phi losophical notions that are pregnant with revolut ionary 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l implicat ions regarding human freedom tha t includes 
man's capaci ty to c rea te his own being alongwith his environment, 
both at the soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l l e v e l s . Iqbal may be regarded 
as a v is ionary r a the r than a revo lu t ionary . 
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This study, as ob jec t ive as poss ib l e , has led us to 
c e r t a i n de f i n i t e conclusions. These may be enumerated 
as follows: 
( l ) . The d i s t i n c t i o n between the two versions of e x i s t -
e n t i a l philosophy as t h e i s t i c and a t h e i s t i c i s supe r f i c i a l so 
fa r as the p o s i t i v e aff i rmat ion of human existence and 
Ind iv idua l i ty i s concerned. 
( 2 ) . I q b a l ' s t h e i s t i c p o s i t i o n , as compared to o the r s ' 
t h e i s t i c posit ions regarding human freedom, has more points 
i n com.Tion with Sar t re than any o ther e x i s t e n t i a l i s t th inker , 
who far from being a t h e i s t i s a staunch a t h e i s t , 
( 3 ) . I q b a l ' s pos i t ion i s unique in the h i s to ry of Muslim 
thought PS regards freedom. No Muslim philosopher, e i the r 
i n the pas t or a t the present has ever regarded freedom as the 
supreme value or r a the r the value of a l l values (Summom Bonum). 
(A-). Sa r t re and Iqba l , l i v i n g in the 20th century, which 
despi te a l l i t s claims to technological and bureaucrat ic advance-
ment, reduces individual man to an in f in i t e s ima l par t of the 
g igant ic s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l machinery of the present day, emphasize 
on to log ica l ly the r i gh t of individual human being to l i v e and 
act as a free being. Their t h e i s t i c and a t h e i s t i c approaches, 
in sp i t e of the fundamental difference in t h e i r respect ive 
world-views, converge on the i s sue of human freedom. 
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( 5 ) . So fa r as human freedom i s concerned, no humanistic 
philosophy, e i the r t h e i s t i c or a t h e i s t i c , can deny man's r i g h t 
to freedom, Iqbal on the bas i s of h is firm commitment to the 
Absolute Sovereignty of Allah, according to the Qur'anic teachings , 
and S a r t r e , according to his denial of the exis tence of God, 
affirm the same fac t , t h^ t i s human freedom and his inherent 
and innate a b i l i t y to c rea te his own se l f , h is va lues , h is environ-
ment and also the e n t i r e universe in which he l i v e s , 
( 6 ) , The minor differences between Sar t re and Iqba l , i n 
the context of the present h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n of man, seem to 
be i n s i g n i f i c a n t . However, man's bel ief i n God and his unbelief 
in God makes a s ign i f i can t d i f fe rence . I q b a l ' s man ( mu>mln ) , 
who a t t a i n s freedom through sub-merging h is absolute freedom 
a freedom that may be ascribed to God only i s f r ee r in the 
view of Iqbal than the free individual whom Sar t re advocates, 
( 7 ) . In our view, whether a sel f -conscious th inke r i s 
committed to a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o n or to humanism, devoid of 
any conception of a Soverign-Free Being, tha t i s God, has to 
affirm his f a i t h in man's freedom. 
Sar t re and Iqbal seem to agree on t h i s i s s u e . Whether 
one bel ieves in God or not , i t i s the ind iv idua l human being 's 
r i g h t to freedom tha t i s to be accepted, supported and believed 
i n . I t i s t h i s point on which an a the i s t Sa r t re and a t h e i s t 
Iqbal converge to agree. 
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Such a study tha t was undertaken by us needs fur ther 
e labora t ion by comparing and con t ras t ing various philosophers 
having divergent world-outlooks, on to log ica l ly , p o l i t i c a l l y , 
s o c i a l l y and psychological ly , regarding the nature of human 
being and h i s capaci ty for freedom and c r e a t i v i t y . We f e e l ' t h a t such 
a study i s indispensable in the contemporary s i t u a t i o n , which 
t h r ea t ens to depriA?e human ind iv idua l of his freedom and endeavours 
to submerge a l l differences within an all-embracing physicalism 
and technocracy, wrongly ca l led pan-humanism, a modern a t h e i s t i c 
ve r s ion of pantheism. Iqbal revolted against the Sufis* pantheism 
l i k e Kierkegaard, while S a r t r e ' s revol t has been against the 
modern pan-physicalism. Both revol ted with a view to affirm 
and a s s e r t the r igh t of indiv idual beings to freedom, for 
without freedom human existence becomes absurd and meaningless. 
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